Stephanie Brown

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearm-related offences following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown's case relied heavily on two statements made by the appellant to police on May 18, 2020.

The appellant appealed, arguing that he was detained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence without being advised of his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that his subsequent arrest was unlawful.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding the appellant was not psychologically detained when police questioned him in the garage of his home during the search warrant execution.

The court held that the appellant's ss. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights were violated, and that his arrest was consequently unlawful, constituting a breach of s. 9.

However, applying the s. 24(2) test, the court determined that the statements should not be excluded from evidence, as the admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

Three appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the 2018 shooting death of Nnamdi Ogba.

The appellants appealed on seven grounds, including challenges to jury instructions on modes of participation, admissibility of expert gang evidence, after-the-fact conduct evidence, firearm videos, W.(D.) instructions, Browne v. Dunn breaches, and jury roll compilation errors.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on modes of participation under sections 21(1)(b) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were deficient and that there was no air of reality to section 21(2) liability.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court upheld the admissibility of expert gang evidence and other evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal from sentence, finding that the sentencing judge erred by imposing a two-year weapons prohibition under s. 51(3) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) following a youth's guilty plea to first-degree murder.

The Court held that the correct provision was s. 51(1), which requires a longer prohibition for offences subject to mandatory orders under s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

Both parties agreed to set aside the two-year prohibition and impose a 12-year weapons prohibition.

The Court substituted the appropriate order, noting the respondent's planning and aggravating circumstances.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.

The court considered the costs of a motion in which the respondent successfully set aside a final order and was permitted to file responding materials.

The respondent sought full recovery of costs, while the applicant argued for no costs or an offset for costs thrown away.

The court found the respondent presumptively entitled to costs but reduced the amount due to the respondent's initial failure to respond, which led to the uncontested trial.

The court ordered the applicant to pay $2,600 in costs, offset by $1,400 for costs thrown away, payable at the conclusion of the litigation.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of causing death while driving with excess blood-drug concentration (THC) and dangerous driving causing death, following a fatal collision with a horse and buggy.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the Crown failed to prove a causal nexus between the respondent's impairment and the collision, and failed to establish a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code does not require proof that the impairment itself caused the death, only that the accused caused the death while committing the predicate offence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in applying the modified objective standard for dangerous driving.

A new trial was ordered.

The respondent, Yitzhak Lewin, brought a motion to set aside a final order made in his absence in a family law proceeding.

The court considered whether there was proper service of the application, whether the motion was brought promptly, whether there was a plausible excuse for the default, whether there was an arguable defence, and the comparative prejudice to the parties.

The court found that service was proper, the motion was brought promptly, and the respondent had a plausible excuse and an arguable defence.

The prejudice to the respondent if the default judgment was maintained outweighed the prejudice to the applicant if it was set aside.

The order of Bordin J. was set aside, and the respondent was permitted to file responding materials.

The court sentenced Jerome Crawford for human trafficking and related offences, considering the circumstances of the offence, the impact on the victim, the offender’s background, and the harsh conditions of pre-trial custody.

The sentence imposed was four years in jail, less credit for pre-trial custody, with concurrent sentences for related counts.

The decision discusses the importance of proportionality, the impact of systemic racism, and the need for individualized sentencing.

The appellant, Marko Tubic, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The court found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient in explaining how after-the-fact conduct evidence justified a murder conviction over manslaughter, and that the trial judge erred by referring to an unconstitutional objective standard of fault ('ought to have known') under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, Dailean John, appealed his conviction for unlawful confinement and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding him an active participant rather than a mere bystander.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude he played a culpable role given the evidence of the victim's confinement in his apartment and his awareness and control over her movements.

The appellant also sought to appeal his sentence, arguing it was unfit due to its impact on his Permanent Resident status and potential deportation.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the appeal, holding that reducing the sentence to avoid deportation would result in an unfit sentence given the seriousness and aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant, J.F., appealed his convictions for multiple offences including assault, sexual assault, forcible confinement, uttering death threats, and careless storage of firearms.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically regarding the explanation of memory gaps due to trauma, reliance on testimonial demeanour, and the use of lack of exaggeration.

The appellant also argued insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles of credibility assessment, did not reverse the burden of proof, and provided sufficient reasons for the verdict.

The applicants, Jide Animashaun and Marlon Johnson, challenged a search warrant for their cell phones and sought to exclude a firearm and cell phone data under s.24(2) of the Charter.

They argued the initial phone seizure was unlawful, the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained errors, the searches were conducted outside the authorized timeframe, and police conduct subverted the pre-authorization process.

The court found the initial seizure lawful, addressed errors in the ITO through excision and amplification, and determined the phone extractions were not outside the authorized timeframe.

The application was dismissed as no Charter violations were established.

The defendant was charged with a strict liability regulatory offence under the City of Toronto's noise by-law for excessive noise emanating from her unit.

The complainant, a neighbour, provided extensive logs, police reports, and emails detailing consistent loud music, banging, screaming, and running at late hours, disturbing her and her daughter's peace and sleep.

The defendant denied the noise, claiming it was impossible due to her work schedule, and argued she could not be responsible for the actions of adult nieces staying with her.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and corroborated, establishing that excessive noise originated from the defendant's unit.

The court also found the defendant failed to exercise due diligence in preventing the noise, despite being aware of the complaints and a co-op board order to remove her guests.

The defence's application for abuse of process, arguing forum shopping due to a parallel small claims court action, was dismissed as the regulatory charge was distinct from the civil claim.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant, Andrew Myles, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in her assessment of credibility and reliability by relying on stereotypical reasoning, finding fabricated evidence, and implicitly finding tailored evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's factual findings were rooted in the evidence and did not constitute impermissible stereotypical inferences or improper findings of tailored evidence.

The court emphasized the high degree of appellate deference owed to trial judges on credibility assessments.

Jahrell Edwards pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted handgun.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the Defence argued for a conditional sentence, emphasizing the impact of anti-Black racism and social context on the offender, as per R. v. Morris.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, Mr. Edwards' personal circumstances, and numerous mitigating factors, including his lack of prior record, stable employment, and engagement in counseling.

The judge found that a conditional sentence of two years less one day, to be served in the community, followed by 24 months probation, was the proportionate sentence, prioritizing rehabilitation and restraint while still addressing denunciation and deterrence.

The applicants, Lakhpreet Brar and Sukhvir Singh, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter due to a breach of their section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating the total delay for Brar as 22 months and 10 days, and for Singh as 24 months and 8 days, both exceeding the 18-month Provincial Court ceiling.

The court found minimal defence delay (3 days for Brar, 4 days for Singh) and rejected arguments that COVID-19 or the case's complexity constituted exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the applicants' Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings for both.

The Applicant father's motion for contempt was adjourned.

At the outset of the contempt motion, the Respondent mother brought motions for recusal and to vacate eleven prior orders.

The court heard the recusal motion, with reasons to follow separately.

The motion to vacate was granted leave in part, specifically to vacate certain orders but not to strike the Applicant's Application, and was adjourned for the Respondent to prepare a Factum.

The Applicant's contempt motion was also adjourned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing heroin, possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and possessing proceeds of crime over $5,000, and sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 12 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's refusal of a mistrial due to non-disclosure of alternate suspects, the handling of eyewitness identification evidence (applying the curative proviso), the admission of police opinion evidence, or the instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 12-year global sentence fit given the seriousness and quantity of the drugs involved.