Jerrod Kyle Grossman

The court considered the costs of a motion in which the respondent successfully set aside a final order and was permitted to file responding materials.

The respondent sought full recovery of costs, while the applicant argued for no costs or an offset for costs thrown away.

The court found the respondent presumptively entitled to costs but reduced the amount due to the respondent's initial failure to respond, which led to the uncontested trial.

The court ordered the applicant to pay $2,600 in costs, offset by $1,400 for costs thrown away, payable at the conclusion of the litigation.

The respondent, Yitzhak Lewin, brought a motion to set aside a final order made in his absence in a family law proceeding.

The court considered whether there was proper service of the application, whether the motion was brought promptly, whether there was a plausible excuse for the default, whether there was an arguable defence, and the comparative prejudice to the parties.

The court found that service was proper, the motion was brought promptly, and the respondent had a plausible excuse and an arguable defence.

The prejudice to the respondent if the default judgment was maintained outweighed the prejudice to the applicant if it was set aside.

The order of Bordin J. was set aside, and the respondent was permitted to file responding materials.

The appellant, Rosetta Commisso, appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing her claims against her former mother-in-law, Evangelia Karatzoglou.

Commisso alleged that Evangelia held two properties in trust for her former spouse, Philip Karatzoglou, which should be included in his net family property for equalization purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that there was no evidence of beneficial ownership by Philip in either property (Rainbow Valley or Bullock Drive) and that Commisso lacked standing to advance a trust claim on behalf of her former spouse for equalization purposes.

The court also found summary judgment appropriate in this family law context.

The respondent father sought an order for reunification therapy for the child, alleging parental alienation by the applicant mother.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the cause of the family dysfunction was unclear on the evidence, there was no compelling evidence that the proposed therapy would be beneficial, and the motion was brought too close to trial.

The court preferred to defer the determination of therapeutic orders and family violence allegations to trial, where a more fulsome evidentiary record and witness credibility assessment would be possible.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the moving party's motion for security for costs of an appeal.

The appellant, Rosetta Commisso, was found to be impecunious and there was good reason to believe her appeal, challenging factual findings of a summary judgment dismissing her trust claims against her former mother-in-law, was frivolous and vexatious.

The court applied the two-part test under Rule 61.06(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 38(26) of the Family Law Rules, emphasizing the holistic consideration of justice.

The appeal was deemed to lack merit as it primarily challenged factual findings rather than errors of law, and partial summary judgment was found appropriate.

This is a costs decision following a successful summary judgment motion by Evangelia Karatzoglou ("Lisa") against Rosetta Commisso ("Rosa").

Lisa sought over $40,000 in costs, while Philip Karatzoglou ("Phil"), the applicant in the main action, sought over $18,000 in costs related to Rosa's claims against Lisa.

Rosa, who is impecunious, argued for no costs and that the amounts sought were excessive.

The court applied the Family Law Rules regarding costs, including the presumption of costs for the successful party and the impact of Rule 18 offers to settle.

The court balanced the factors, including the parties' conduct, offers to settle, and Rosa's financial predicament.

The appellant appealed a consent order incorporating terms of a separation agreement, alleging the respondent misrepresented his income and failed to provide full financial disclosure, particularly after purchasing a new house.

The respondent had moved under Rule 14 of the Family Law Rules to grant the consent order, providing additional disclosure.

The motion judge granted the consent order and did not order further disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Rule 13 (requiring updated financial statements) was inapplicable given that full disclosure was made at the time of settlement and the consent order had been implemented.

The court also found the use of a Rule 14B motion appropriate, despite opposition, as the matter was deemed "seemingly uncomplicated" and the motion judge had reviewed the evidence.

This case involved the final determination of child and spousal support claims, which had been governed by a temporary "without prejudice" order since 2009.

The father sought to retroactively terminate child support for two adult children and spousal support, citing significant financial and health challenges, including bankruptcy and medical license issues.

The mother opposed the retroactive termination and sought continued support for all three children, including one pursuing a graduate degree.

The court, applying sections 15.1 and 15.2 of the Divorce Act, terminated child support for the eldest child (Charlotte) effective April 30, 2019, and for the second child (Stephanie) effective April 30, 2021.

Spousal support was terminated effective November 18, 2019, a date between the parties' proposals.

The court also adjusted the accumulated support arrears, significantly reducing the amount owed by the father due to overpayments based on the new final order.

This endorsement concerns the costs of a prior motion where the respondent sought a pension valuation, which the applicant resisted.

The court had previously ruled in favour of the applicant.

The judge found neither party's position on the underlying motion to be substantially unreasonable.

The decision emphasizes that offers to settle binary issues, where a true compromise is not possible, should not be given significant weight in determining costs.

Despite the applicant achieving a result as favourable as their offer, full indemnity costs were not awarded.

The court found the applicant's counsel dockets reasonable and ordered the respondent to pay $3,250 in all-inclusive costs to the applicant.

The applicant husband brought a motion for summary judgment regarding the date of separation.

The parties settled the separation date issue, agreeing to the husband's proposed date.

The court was then asked to determine the costs of the summary judgment motion.

The husband sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the wife capitulated and acted in bad faith.

The wife argued that settlement made a costs award inappropriate.

The court found no bad faith on the wife's part and criticized the husband's counsel for excessive billing and relying on outdated case law.

The court awarded costs fixed at $2,500, all-inclusive, payable in the cause of the ongoing application, significantly less than what the husband sought.

This is a costs endorsement following a decision on motions concerning school and daycare placements for two children in a family law matter.

The father sought costs of $4,000, while the mother opposed any costs award.

The court found that success on the issues was divided: the mother was successful in having the older child attend public school rather than private school, while the father was successful in determining which public school and in securing the younger child's daycare placement closer to his home.

The court determined that the father's modest success was offset by his unreasonable behaviour, including unilateral enrollment of the child in private school without consultation, disrespectful communications, and dismissiveness of the mother's cultural concerns.

Both parties were found unreasonable for failing to make settlement offers.

No costs were ordered.

Two unmarried parents brought competing temporary motions to determine school and daycare placements for their two young children following their separation.

The father sought to enroll the older child at Bialik Hebrew Day School and the younger child at Super Kids Daycare.

The mother opposed Bialik and sought enrollment at Bala Community School and Jubilee Daycare.

The court applied the best interests of the child analysis under the Children's Law Reform Act, considering factors including stability, parental capacity, cultural heritage, and exposure to parental conflict.

The court ordered that the older child attend Dennis Avenue Community School and the younger child continue at Super Kids Daycare on a temporary basis.