Elliot Seth Birnboim

The applicant sought to set aside a marriage contract executed two days before the parties' wedding in 2006.

The court found that the respondent failed to disclose significant assets, including $540,000 in collateral mortgages, and provided opaque disclosure regarding corporate interests.

The court also found the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract to be unconscionable, as it was presented 13 days before the wedding after significant financial and social commitments had been made.

The marriage contract was set aside pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support following the breakdown of a short marriage.

The applicant claimed she managed the respondent's finances and businesses, sacrificing her own career, while the respondent alleged she fraudulently took control of his assets.

The court found the applicant established a prima facie case for entitlement based on economic interdependence and immediate need.

The court imputed the respondent's income at $878,422 using a three-year average including corporate pre-tax income, and imputed the applicant's income at $35,000.

The respondent was ordered to pay interim spousal support of $5,842.50 per month.

The court declined to order retroactive support and made the order on an interim-interim basis.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Albert Edward Green from the order of Justice John Krawchenko regarding the division of property and spousal support following the breakdown of his marriage to Kristine Jill Hill.

The court upheld the trial judge’s findings on asset valuation, the application of the Family Law Act’s equalization mechanisms, and the denial of spousal support, finding no error in the trial judge’s approach or conclusions.

Costs of $35,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The moving party, a secured creditor and former spouse of the bankrupt, brought a motion to remove the trustee in bankruptcy for cause under section 14.04 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The moving party alleged misconduct regarding the trustee's handling of proofs of claim and voting at the first meeting of creditors, as well as the trustee's attempts to sell a condominium owned by a corporation whose shares were solely owned by the bankrupt.

The court found that the trustee acted in accordance with the BIA at the meeting of creditors and that its actions to preserve the condominium were not unreasonable.

The motion to remove the trustee was dismissed.

The Applicant sought summary judgment to enforce child support provisions of a separation agreement, while the Respondent sought to stay the summary judgment and remit the matter to arbitration, and to appoint a specific arbitrator.

The court confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the matter, dismissed the Respondent's motion to adjourn the summary judgment, and granted the Respondent's request to stay the summary judgment application, remitting the matter to arbitration.

The court dismissed the Respondent's motion to appoint an uncertified arbitrator (William C. McDowell) and instead granted the Applicant's alternate request to appoint a certified family law arbitrator (Cheryl Goldhart), emphasizing the legal requirement for arbitrators to be properly credentialed for awards to be enforceable.

The appellant father appealed a child support order, arguing the trial judge erred in imputing income based on a housing benefit and in making the order retroactive to the child's birth.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decision regarding imputed income, which was based on an adverse inference due to the father's non-compliance with disclosure orders and the value of free luxury accommodation received from his brother for engineering services.

The court also upheld the retroactive child support order, noting the father's blameworthy conduct in failing to provide proper financial disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed.

The case involved two motions concerning financial disclosure in a family law proceeding.

The respondent wife (B.M.) sought an order compelling the applicant husband (P.M.) to provide answers to undertakings, advisements, and refusals from his examination.

The applicant husband (P.M.) sought unredacted credit card statements from the respondent wife (B.M.).

The court granted B.M.'s motion in part, ordering P.M. to provide various financial disclosures, including paystubs, lawyer's file on share sale, credit card statements, pension plan details, updated financial statement, T1 returns, CIBC customer profile, and holding company financial statements.

The court dismissed P.M.'s motion for unredacted statements, allowing B.M. to redact location information due to serious domestic violence allegations and P.M.'s criminal history, while clarifying that only location data could be redacted.

The respondent landlord brought a motion in writing to lift the stay of enforcement of a Landlord and Tenant Board order.

A case management judge had previously ordered the tenant to pay over $42,000 in arrears and ongoing monthly rent as a condition of maintaining the stay pending appeal.

The landlord filed uncontradicted evidence that the tenant failed to make the required payments.

The court granted the motion and lifted the stay forthwith.

The appellant, Rosetta Commisso, appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing her claims against her former mother-in-law, Evangelia Karatzoglou.

Commisso alleged that Evangelia held two properties in trust for her former spouse, Philip Karatzoglou, which should be included in his net family property for equalization purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that there was no evidence of beneficial ownership by Philip in either property (Rainbow Valley or Bullock Drive) and that Commisso lacked standing to advance a trust claim on behalf of her former spouse for equalization purposes.

The court also found summary judgment appropriate in this family law context.

This is a costs endorsement following a decision where Mohammad Hamed Yousufzay was successful in his application and Mohammad Ali Eksir's application was dismissed.

Yousufzay sought full indemnity costs, while Eksir argued for no costs or partial indemnity.

The court found Yousufzay entitled to costs and awarded them on a substantial indemnity basis due to Eksir's unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty and adverse credibility findings against him.

The court declined full indemnity costs, finding the case did not feature grave misconduct, and awarded $170,000.00 in all-inclusive substantial indemnity costs to Yousufzay.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant, Assignment Credit Corp., was ordered to pay costs to several respondents (MCAP Financial Corporation, Dorr Capital Corporation, and Cherniak Law Professional Corporation).

The court rejected the appellant's argument that prior costs agreements should stand, as they were made before the appellant's non-disclosure of a material fact (that the Mesbur Judgment was obtained on consent) was revealed.

This non-disclosure, which impacted the second issue of the appeal, justified an elevated costs award on a solicitor-client basis for the affected respondents.

The 167 respondents were denied costs due to their own failure to disclose the consent judgment and their underlying financial obligations.

This case involved cross-applications between two shareholders/directors of a closely held corporation, United Investment.

Mohammad Ali Eksir sought a declaration of oppression under section 248 of the OBCA and an order to wind up the corporation, alleging self-dealing and financial misconduct by Mohammad Hamed Yousufzay.

Yousufzay sought an order for a shareholder meeting and production of financial records.

The court dismissed Eksir's oppression application, finding he failed to prove his reasonable expectations were violated, as he was aware of and implicitly approved the impugned transactions (shareholder loans, donations, home renovation expenses, snow clearing).

The court also dismissed the request for winding up, stating it was not a just and equitable remedy given the lack of serious harm and the availability of less drastic remedies.

Yousufzay's application for a shareholder meeting with varied quorum requirements under section 106 of the OBCA was granted to allow for the appointment of directors and address corporate governance issues.

This appeal concerned the priority of various creditors in a garnishment hearing involving payments owed by the City of St. Catharines and Region of Niagara to 1671379 Ontario Inc. under a Brownfield Tax Increment Based Incentive Grant Program Agreement (BTIG).

The primary dispute was between MCAP Financial Corporation, holding a perfected General Security Agreement (GSA), and Assignment Credit Corp. (ACC), asserting priority based on an assigned consent judgment (Mesbur Judgment).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that MCAP's perfected GSA had priority for its shortfall judgment over ACC's claim, finding no inconsistency in MCAP's position.

However, the court remitted the issue of priorities among ACC and other unsecured judgment creditors to the motion judge, as it was revealed post-hearing that the Mesbur Judgment was a consent judgment, a fact not disclosed to the motion judge or other creditors, raising new legal arguments regarding the Personal Property Security Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The appellant corporation appealed an Associate Justice's decision dismissing its motion under Rule 15.01(2) to be represented by a non-lawyer employee.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the palpable and overriding error standard of review.

The court upheld the Associate Justice's application of the Astrochrome test, finding no error in the determination that the proposed representative was not duly authorized by the board of directors and that it would be unfair to allow the representation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the moving party's motion for security for costs of an appeal.

The appellant, Rosetta Commisso, was found to be impecunious and there was good reason to believe her appeal, challenging factual findings of a summary judgment dismissing her trust claims against her former mother-in-law, was frivolous and vexatious.

The court applied the two-part test under Rule 61.06(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 38(26) of the Family Law Rules, emphasizing the holistic consideration of justice.

The appeal was deemed to lack merit as it primarily challenged factual findings rather than errors of law, and partial summary judgment was found appropriate.

This trial decision addressed child support, income imputation, section 7 expenses, and costs.

The court found the applicant's financial disclosure deficient and imputed income to him based on significant non-taxable housing benefits received from his family's real estate business.

Retroactive child support was ordered from the child's birth.

The court also determined which section 7 expenses were extraordinary and how they should be shared between the parties.

Costs for the parenting order, which was settled prior to trial, were not awarded to either party.

This is a costs decision following a successful summary judgment motion by Evangelia Karatzoglou ("Lisa") against Rosetta Commisso ("Rosa").

Lisa sought over $40,000 in costs, while Philip Karatzoglou ("Phil"), the applicant in the main action, sought over $18,000 in costs related to Rosa's claims against Lisa.

Rosa, who is impecunious, argued for no costs and that the amounts sought were excessive.

The court applied the Family Law Rules regarding costs, including the presumption of costs for the successful party and the impact of Rule 18 offers to settle.

The court balanced the factors, including the parties' conduct, offers to settle, and Rosa's financial predicament.

The second respondent, Lisa, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the claims made against her by the first respondent, Rosa.

Rosa claimed that her former spouse, Phil, held a beneficial interest in two properties owned by Lisa, and alternatively claimed unjust enrichment.

The court found that Rosa lacked standing to advance a trust claim on behalf of her former spouse.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence of a sham trust or unjust enrichment.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and Rosa's claims against Lisa were dismissed.

This is an appeal from an order granting the respondent leave to amend his Answer seven years after filing, to advance constructive and resulting trust claims in three properties purchased during the marriage and held in the appellant’s name, but sold before the motion for leave to amend.

The appellant argued prejudice due to timing, that claims were statute-barred, and lack of jurisdiction over foreign land.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision that leave to amend was proper, the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied to the trust claims even after property sale, and the in rem jurisdiction issue was not relevant to the leave to amend motion.

The moving defendants sought to strike the plaintiff's Superior Court action as an abuse of process.

The defendants had previously commenced 67 separate Small Claims Court actions against the plaintiff regarding HVAC rental contracts.

The plaintiff subsequently commenced this Superior Court action against the defendants, seeking damages for breach of contract and defamation, and seeking to traverse or stay the Small Claims Court actions.

The court found that the Superior Court action was duplicative of the plaintiff's defences in the Small Claims Court actions and sought to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court.

The court concluded it would be an abuse of process to permit the Superior Court action to proceed while the Small Claims Court actions were pending, and ordered the action stayed.