Peter D. Lauwers

The appellant challenged a trial judgment holding him personally liable on an unsecured line of credit, arguing that the facility was entered on behalf of several corporations and that the trial judge committed multiple factual processing errors.

The Court of Appeal applied the palpable and overriding error standard and held that, although the trial judge failed to address some evidence concerning the rarity of such unsecured personal lending and the borrower's recorded net worth, those errors were not sufficiently significant to vitiate the core factual finding.

The court accepted that the documentary record, account statements, banking records, and post-agreement conduct amply supported the conclusion that the facility was a personal line of credit.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs to the respondent.

In a class action arising from a COVID-19 outbreak at a long-term care home, the appellants challenged certification of causation and punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages as common issues, and sought leave to appeal the certification costs award.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge properly found some basis in fact for a workable methodology for proving causation on a class-wide basis through a risk ratio approach supported by available data and expert evidence.

The court also upheld certification of punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages, rejecting the argument that such relief could not be certified absent common compensatory damages, noting that sequencing could address any quantification concerns.

Leave to appeal costs was denied because no strong grounds were shown for appellate intervention in the discretionary costs ruling.

The appellant bank appealed the dismissal of its civil fraud claim arising from a corporate loan application supported by an allegedly false personal financial statement.

The court held that the application judge correctly applied the elements of civil fraud, including the recklessness branch, and was entitled to find that the respondent neither prepared nor signed the impugned financial statement and reasonably believed the financing was for a legitimate business.

The court further held that the bank’s own evidence established reliance only on the false personal financial statement, not on other alleged misrepresentations in the broader loan application.

No palpable and overriding error or inadequacy of reasons was shown, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant, a self-represented litigant incarcerated in a foreign prison, sought state-appointed counsel or amicus and a stay of proceedings pending such appointment in connection with his application for leave to appeal the summary dismissal of his applications to stay and terminate a U.S. forfeiture order enforceable in Canada under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The motion judge applied the three-part test from s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code by analogy, finding the applicant failed to demonstrate insufficient means, lacked arguable grounds of appeal given that his claims constituted collateral attacks on American judgments and Canadian court rulings, and demonstrated exceptional ability to effectively advance his appeal without counsel.

The motion was dismissed, though the Crown was directed to provide logistical support for filing materials.

The appellant homeowners' action was administratively dismissed for delay under r. 48.14(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure because it was not set down for trial within five years of commencement.

The motion judge declined to set aside the dismissal, applying the Reid factors and finding insufficient evidence to explain the delay, with inferred prejudice where examinations for discovery had not occurred.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's reasoning, noting that the appellants bore the primary responsibility for their action's progress and that the delay was moving into the realm of 'inordinate' once the five-year mark was crossed.

The appellant developer sought a declaration that a COVID-19 emergency regulation extending limitation periods also extended the 36-month deadline in a City of Toronto by-law for submitting a building permit application after receiving a demolition permit, which would have entitled the appellant to a development charge reduction of $6.7 million.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the by-law deadline was not a limitation period within the meaning of the regulation.

The Court of Appeal found no error and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged a decision declining to enforce a pre‑marriage agreement and ordering an equalization payment following the parties’ separation.

The application judge concluded the document did not qualify as a valid domestic agreement under the Family Law Act and, in any event, should be set aside under s. 56(4).

The agreement was found to be unclear, failing to identify the property to which it applied or address equalization, and the respondent did not understand its nature and consequences.

The Court of Appeal held these findings were open to the application judge on the evidentiary record and were supported by credibility assessments.

No error of law, principle, or palpable and overriding factual error was established.

The appeal concerned a dispute over interpretation of a will and administration of testamentary trusts.

The appellant challenged the application judge's interpretation and sought appellate intervention on factual, legal, and discretionary grounds.

The court found no palpable and overriding error, no error of law, and no error in principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

On costs, the court directed that one trust absorb the corporate respondent's costs and the appellant's personal costs on a full indemnity basis without recoupment from the appellant personally due to an arguable ambiguity in the will.

In an estate appeal, the court held that the judgment under appeal was, on its face, made under the Succession Law Reform Act.

Because s. 76 grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Divisional Court for appeals under that Act, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The appeal was dismissed on that basis.

The court also ordered costs payable to the respondent by the estate in an agreed all-inclusive amount.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of criminal harassment and one count of breach of release conditions.

During a court-ordered NCR assessment, the appellant made statements to a forensic psychiatrist.

The Crown introduced those statements at trial without a voir dire on admissibility under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code, without first putting the statements to the appellant in cross-examination as required by ss. 10 and 11 of the Canada Evidence Act, and without disclosing its intention to use the statements for impeachment purposes.

The Court of Appeal held that the combined effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The applicant, convicted of multiple sexual offences against a child including making sexually explicit material available to a child, sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, and sentenced to five and a half years' imprisonment, sought bail pending his conviction and sentence appeals.

The applicant argued the appeal was not frivolous on two grounds: insufficiency of the trial judge's sparse six-page reasons and material misapprehension of evidence.

The Crown conceded no public safety or flight risk concerns but argued the appeal was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The motion judge found the insufficiency of reasons argument was not frivolous and that the sparse reasons generated lower confidence in the justice of the conviction, diminishing the public interest in continued detention.

Bail was granted on terms agreed between the parties.

The applicant, convicted of sexual interference against a child aged 12 to 14 and sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment, sought bail pending appeal.

The applicant advanced three grounds of appeal: an allegedly improper corrective jury instruction regarding the defence theory, inconsistent verdicts on two counts, and error in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay based on delay.

The motion judge found all three grounds to be weak or without merit.

Applying the Oland framework, the court held that the seriousness of the offence and the weakness of the grounds of appeal elevated the enforceability concern over the reviewability concern.

Bail was denied.

The garnishee appealed an order requiring it to pay $154,257.05 to the respondent creditor pursuant to r. 60.08(17) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge found that a registered mortgage between the garnishee and the judgment debtor constituted evidence of a legitimate debt and rejected the garnishee's sole director's testimony that the mortgage was a sham, on credibility grounds.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's credibility findings or factual conclusions and held that the equitable and discretionary nature of garnishment does not constitute an independent basis to find a debt where none exists.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, a public sector union and its officers, challenged the constitutionality of back-to-work legislation (Bill 178) that ended a five-week faculty strike at Ontario's 24 colleges of applied arts and technology in 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the legislation limited the appellants' s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association by ending a lawful strike, departing from the application judge's finding of no substantial interference.

However, the court held that the limitation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter, finding that Ontario had a pressing and substantial objective of resuming classroom instruction to protect students' academic year, that the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and that the substitution of neutral interest arbitration for strike activity rendered the effects proportionate.

The appellants, a postal workers' union and its representatives, sought a declaration that federal back-to-work legislation ending rotating strikes in 2018 unjustifiably limited their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) and freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed the application as moot because the legislation was spent and declined to exercise discretion to decide on the merits under the Borowski criteria.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed the application was moot and deferred to the discretionary decision not to hear it on the merits.

In the alternative, the court found the legislation limited s. 2(d) rights but was justified under s. 1, and that neither the Prime Minister's public statement nor the Act limited s. 2(b) rights.

Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion granted.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.