Katie Doherty

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder convictions for setting a fire that killed his mother and stepfather.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting his stepfather's dying declarations, admitting his own statements about a knee injury as fabricated, and finding he was not psychologically detained during police interviews.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's admissibility rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault arising from a shootout outside a nightclub that injured the initial shooter and five bystanders.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing a mistrial over the Crown's opening address, declining to direct acquittals on the assault charges, and refusing to leave self-defence with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's corrective instruction was sufficient, there was circumstantial evidence to support secondary party liability, and self-defence lacked an air of reality given the indiscriminate nature of the return fire.

The appellant was subpoenaed to testify at a preliminary inquiry but refused to answer substantive questions.

He was subsequently charged with attempting to obstruct justice.

At trial, the judge admitted transcripts of his refusal to testify, finding they were not protected by s. 13 of the Charter, relying on the appellate decision in Schertzer rather than the coordinate decision in Seecharran.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the judge erred in her application of stare decisis and s. 13.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that vertical stare decisis bound the trial judge to follow Schertzer, and that s. 13 does not protect testimony that constitutes the actus reus of a new offence.

The applicant, convicted of historical sexual offences against her former students and sentenced to 65 months' imprisonment, applied for release pending appeal.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that her appeal was not frivolous.

Furthermore, given the seriousness of the offences, the length of the sentence, and the weakness of the appeal grounds, the applicant failed to establish that her detention was not necessary in the public interest, despite her advanced age and poor health.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault arising from an incident where initially consensual sexual intercourse escalated to unprotected intercourse without the complainant's consent.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: errors in the W.(D.) jury instructions, improper Crown closing submissions, and that a pre-trial s. 276/278.92 ruling led to trial irregularities amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any ground.

The jury instructions properly conveyed each pathway to acquittal, the Crown's closing did not cross the line into oath-helping or rhetorical excess, and the pre-trial ruling did not create any irregularity or unfairness warranting appellate intervention.

The accused was convicted by jury of the attempted murder of her infant daughter and her mother, and of aggravated assault of the daughter, following an incident in which all three were found unconscious after being injected with insulin.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on the attempted murder count relating to the mother on the basis that the jury instructions failed to distinguish between attempted murder and the offence of aiding suicide where the mother may have self-administered the insulin.

The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, restoring the conviction, finding no air of reality to the theory that the mother voluntarily injected herself with suicidal intent.

The majority held that trial judges must only instruct on theories lacking air of reality where there is a sufficient evidentiary foundation, and that the cumulative circumstantial evidence did not support a reasonable inference that the mother intended to end her own life.

The dissent would have dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding an air of reality to the inference of autonomous self-injection and holding that the trial judge was required to instruct the jury on the legal significance of I.F.'s possible voluntary participation to the actus reus of attempted murder.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 15 years and 9 months.

He appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, including challenges to the trial judge's Corbett application ruling regarding his criminal record, the adequacy of jury instructions on propensity reasoning and post-offence conduct, the sufficiency of corrective measures following inflammatory Crown closing arguments, and the application of Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in principle by the trial judge and upholding both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and related offences for firing shots at a female acquaintance, striking her twice.

The sole issues at trial were the identity of the shooter and intent to kill.

The trial judge rejected direct identification evidence and limited-weight photo identification evidence, instead relying almost entirely on circumstantial evidence including GPS data from the suspect vehicle, security camera footage with timestamps, and DNA evidence.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in accepting the accuracy of security camera timestamps without proper authentication and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no legal error in the trial judge's application of the law regarding measurement devices in common usage and concluding that the verdict was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a fatal stabbing at a gathering.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting he acted to protect himself and a vulnerable woman from an angry group.

The trial judge instructed the jury to assess the reasonableness of the appellant's response separately for each victim, fragmenting the evidence into isolated incidents.

The jury also asked whether a group could constitute "force" under the self-defence analysis, and the trial judge's response suggested that a group alone could not constitute force without specific action.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions inadequately equipped the jury to evaluate the appellant's self-defence claim by failing to address the group dynamic as a unified threat and by artificially compartmentalizing the evidence.

The appellant, Deepan Budlakoti, appealed his conviction for firearms offences, arguing that he was entrapped by a police agent.

The Court of Appeal addressed three grounds: alleged improper reliance on a hearsay statement, failure to consider the police agent’s financial motive, and failure to treat the agent as a Vetrovec witness.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s approach to any of these issues and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Josiah Lowe, appealed his sentence of three years' imprisonment for three counts of robbery, possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000, and wearing a disguise with intent.

He argued that the sentencing judge misapplied the law regarding anti-Black racism, erred by prioritizing denunciation and deterrence, and erred in crediting his bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge’s application of the law or principles and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the powers of police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle and its occupants under s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, 2017.

The respondent, a passenger, was acquitted at trial after the judge found his Charter rights under ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were infringed and excluded evidence of firearms found in the vehicle.

On appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred in concluding that the respondent’s rights under ss. 9 and 10(a) were violated, but agreed that s. 10(b) was breached.

The Court held that s. 12(3) of the CCA does not justify a general suspension of the right to counsel under s. 10(b), distinguishing the context from roadside sobriety stops.

The evidence was ultimately admitted, and a new trial was ordered.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Doug Lloyd’s appeal from the Superior Court’s refusal to extend time for judicial review of the Crown’s decision to stay his private prosecution against Bell Canada.

The court held that prosecutorial discretion is only reviewable for abuse of process, which requires egregious conduct.

The application judge made no error in law or fact, and the Crown’s decision not to consider expert evidence or to stay the prosecution on public interest grounds did not amount to an abuse of process.

The appellant, Isaiah Todd, appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm while prohibited, following the dismissal of his s. 8 Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the reviewing judge’s finding that the confidential informant’s information was compelling and corroborated, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable grounds for the search warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Mauro Granados-Arana’s conviction appeal for first degree murder, finding no reversible error in the trial judge’s Vetrovec instructions regarding unsavoury witnesses.

The court allowed the sentence appeal, quashing the order that parole ineligibility run consecutively to a prior sentence, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Bissonnette.

The period of parole ineligibility will now run concurrently.

The moving party, a youth offender convicted of assault causing bodily harm, sought bail pending his appeal.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the moving party's extensive history of breaching pretrial release conditions, including fleeing police and possessing weapons, demonstrated he would not surrender into custody.

Furthermore, the court held that his detention was necessary in the public interest due to significant public safety concerns and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing that his confession, obtained during a 13-hour police interrogation using the Reid Technique, should have been excluded.

The appellant and an intervener argued for a new common law rule creating a rebuttable presumption of involuntariness for confessions elicited via the Reid Technique.

The Court of Appeal declined to amend the confessions rule, finding the existing framework sufficient.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to assess the cumulative effect of the prolonged, aggressive questioning and by making a palpable and overriding error of fact in concluding the appellant had not fallen asleep during the interrogation.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the included offence of manslaughter with the jury, by directing the jury to find he had the state of mind for murder if they concluded he was the shooter, and by improperly instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in removing manslaughter, as there was no air of reality to an unintentional killing.

While the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the state of mind for murder, the error was harmless and cured by the proviso, as the jury's finding of planning and deliberation necessarily included an intention to kill.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against his niece, appealed both convictions and the global 9-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's restrictions on cross-examination regarding delay in reporting or avoidant behaviour, nor in the refusal to order production of psychiatric records, and no Kienapple error as distinct delicts were found.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the proportionality and fitness of the sentence, distinguishing it from a lower comparable sentence based on the severity and duration of the abuse.

The appellant, Michael John William Ball, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's jury charge on two grounds: the standard of proof regarding the cause of death and the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness.

He also argued that the trial judge erred in handling the jury's request to review expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The court concluded that the jury charge, when considered holistically, adequately equipped the jury, and the Vetrovec warning fulfilled its purpose.

Furthermore, the trial judge's decision to cease playback of expert testimony upon the jury's indication that their questions were resolved was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion, as the reviewed evidence was uncontroversial and did not require further contextualization.