Ravin Pillay

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import cocaine into Australia and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The Crown's case relied heavily on cell phone data, including text messages, WhatsApp group chats, and audio recordings involving the appellant and his co-conspirators.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admissibility of the audio recordings, the trial judge's treatment of a co-conspirator's testimony, the application of the wilful blindness standard, and the characterization of the conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or legal analysis.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the nine-year sentence was fit and did not violate the principle of parity when compared to the co-accused's sentence, given the co-accused's early guilty plea.

Two appellants challenged convictions for possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after searches of two suspected stash houses.

The court held the trial judge erred in denying standing to advance a s. 8 Charter challenge because the prosecution theory itself alleged use and control of the properties, which had to be weighed in the totality of circumstances.

The court nevertheless rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable, finding the circumstantial evidence was capable of supporting possession findings for each appellant in relation to White Oak.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief arising from a lengthy relationship with the complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by requiring corroboration, improperly relying on bad character evidence, and misapprehending evidence regarding his motivation for lying to police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not require corroboration, did not engage in propensity reasoning, and made no material misapprehension of evidence.

This decision addresses the constitutional validity of a search warrant issued based on information from a confidential source (C.S.) and corroborated by police investigation.

The court analyzed the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain (ITO) under the test established in R. v. Debot, focusing on the credibility, compelling nature, and corroboration of the C.S.'s information.

The judge rejected the accused's argument that exclusion of evidence from a prior unlawful search undermined the warrant's validity.

The court found the warrant was reasonably granted, emphasizing the detailed, recent, and corroborated information provided by the C.S. and police, and upheld the admission of evidence obtained.

This decision addresses a section 11(b) Charter application by three co-accused seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in a large-scale drug importation and trafficking prosecution.

The court found the total delay (41 months) far exceeded the 30-month ceiling set by R. v. Jordan, and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances or case complexity to justify the delay.

The court found the Crown’s late addition of a key witness, failure to promptly seek additional hearing dates, late disclosure, and strategic choices in evidentiary applications all contributed to the delay.

The court ordered a stay of proceedings for all accused.

The court sentenced Pritpal Singh for trafficking and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, possession of opium, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The case involved a Garofoli application regarding the excision of unconstitutionally obtained evidence from an Information to Obtain (ITO), which was dismissed.

The court reviewed the applicable sentencing ranges for large-scale heroin trafficking, considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposed a global sentence of 13 years, with all sentences to run concurrently.

The offender pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm after driving at an extreme rate of speed on the Gardiner Expressway and colliding with another vehicle.

The collision killed the passenger of the other vehicle and catastrophically injured the driver.

The offender fled the scene and had a horrendous driving record with numerous speeding convictions.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the offender to 5 years in prison for the death and 3 years concurrent for the bodily harm, along with a 10-year driving prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused, Pritpal Singh, was tried for multiple drug trafficking and possession offences alongside a Garofoli application challenging several search warrants.

The court dismissed the majority of the Garofoli application, finding that the accused did not have standing to seek excision of evidence obtained through the breach of a third party's Charter rights, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable grounds for most of the warrants.

Based on an Agreed Statement of Fact, the court found the accused guilty of trafficking heroin, possession of heroin and opium for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, relying on circumstantial evidence and the doctrine of constructive possession.

The co-accused daughter was acquitted at the Crown's request.

This ruling addresses an application by Devante Moores to exclude evidence seized following the execution of a search warrant and his arrest, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and 9 (arbitrary detention).

The applicant challenged the validity of the search warrant, arguing the judicial summary of redacted information was insufficient, and the lawfulness of his arrest.

The court clarified the onus of proof, stating the Crown bears the onus for warrantless searches incident to arrest, while the applicant bears the onus for challenging a presumptively valid search warrant.

The court found the judicial summary sufficient and determined that police surveillance, combined with information from a reliable confidential source, provided reasonable grounds for the search warrant.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the arresting officer had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking, making the subsequent search incident to arrest lawful.

Consequently, the applications to exclude the seized evidence were dismissed.

Ali Lalji was found guilty after trial of conspiring to import 40 kilograms of cocaine into Australia.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the large quantity of cocaine and Lalji's trusted position as a deputy in the conspiracy, and mitigating factors, including his lack of prior convictions, strong community support, and prospects for rehabilitation.

Applying sentencing principles, including denunciation, general deterrence, and parity with co-conspirators, the court sentenced the offender to nine years' imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The appellant, Thanh Nguyen, appealed his convictions for several possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, alleging that the trial judge erred by convicting him on circumstantial evidence that supported innocent inferences, engaged in illogical reasoning, and that the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal on a firearm charge.

He also contended that the trial judge erred in admitting unqualified opinion evidence from a police officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and any error in admitting opinion evidence harmless under the curative proviso.

This ruling addresses the sufficiency of a judicial summary provided by the Crown in place of a heavily redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The applicant challenged the adequacy of the summary, arguing it did not provide enough information to allow for a proper challenge.

The court, applying principles from Crevier, 2015 ONCA 619, found the judicial summary sufficient, noting that it must inform the accused of the general nature of the redacted details without revealing privileged information.

The court dismissed the applicant's challenge, stating that the summary was adequate to allow the applicant to challenge the excised material.

This ruling addresses a motion brought by the accused, Devante Moores, to challenge the lawfulness of a search and seizure of narcotics and currency from a residential unit.

The Crown argued that the accused lacked standing to bring the application, alleging that the lease for the unit was obtained through fraudulent documentation.

The court applied the factors from R. v. Edwards to determine whether the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy, distinguishing the case from R. v. Van Duong.

The court found that despite the alleged fraudulent lease, the accused demonstrated sufficient indicia of possession, control, and ability to regulate access to establish a subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, thereby granting him standing to challenge the search.

This ruling addresses an application by Ramin Rayegan-Tafreshi for leave to cross-examine affiants of Information to Obtain (ITO) documents related to wiretap authorizations and a general warrant.

The applicant sought to challenge the investigative necessity for the initial wiretap authorization and the reasonable grounds for the general warrant.

The court granted leave to cross-examine the affiant regarding the wiretap's investigative necessity, finding that the ITO contained conclusory and potentially misleading statements about alternative investigative techniques.

However, the court denied leave to cross-examine the affiant regarding the general warrant, concluding that the applicant's challenge was a facial attack on the warrant's validity that could be addressed through legal argument without cross-examination.

The respondent, charged with firearms and drug offenses, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless seizure of his vehicle and subsequent searches of his vehicle and apartment.

The court found the initial vehicle seizure unlawful due to a lack of reasonable grounds and prolonged detention without authority.

The search warrant for the vehicle was deemed invalid as the Information to Obtain (ITO) applied the wrong constitutional standard (mere possibility versus reasonable and probable grounds).

The search warrant for the apartment was also invalid because the ITO contained misleading and incorrect statements regarding the respondent's alleged drug trafficking.

Given the serious and pervasive Charter breaches, particularly concerning the high privacy interest in a residence, the court excluded all evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, which would lead to the withdrawal of charges.

The accused, Ali Lalji, was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine into Australia.

The Crown relied on evidence extracted from seized cellular phones (Cellebrite data) and the testimony of a co-conspirator.

The court first ruled section 36 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act unconstitutional for violating Charter sections 7 and 12, as it fundamentally alters hearsay admissibility rules inconsistent with a fair trial.

Despite this, the Crown's evidence, particularly the Cellebrite data, proved Lalji's membership in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that Lalji either had actual knowledge that the contraband was cocaine or was wilfully blind to that fact.

Lalji was found guilty as charged.

The appellant, Garey Harris, appealed his convictions for weapons and drug trafficking offences, arguing errors in the application judge's Charter decisions (ss. 8 and 9) and the trial judge's instructions to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the Charter arguments, upholding the finding that police had reasonable grounds for arrest and that the search warrant was valid, with only a minor, non-prejudicial Charter breach regarding police remaining in the unit.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in jury instructions by potentially removing a legitimate defence from the jury's consideration, specifically regarding competing inferences of control over the seized items due to the presence of other individuals connected to the unit.

This error jeopardized the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed in part, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after intentionally striking three teenagers with his vehicle following an earlier assault and robbery.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the severity of injuries and the deliberate use of the vehicle as a weapon, and mitigating factors, such as the offender's youth, remorse, guilty plea, and rehabilitation efforts.

The judge imposed an intermittent sentence of 90 days for aggravated assault, followed by a 22-month conditional sentence for the driving offences, and 8 months of probation, along with a 5-year driving prohibition and other ancillary orders.

The appellant, Ronald Burgess, appealed his convictions for drug trafficking (cocaine, MDMA, proceeds of crime) and sought leave to appeal his sentence for marijuana trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge impermissibly used inadmissible hearsay wiretap evidence, which tainted the credibility findings against the appellant on the non-marijuana counts.

Consequently, the court allowed the conviction appeal, deeming the verdicts unsafe, and ordered a new trial for those counts.

The court also granted leave and allowed the sentence appeal, remitting the matter for re-sentencing on the marijuana trafficking conviction.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for dangerous driving.

The trial judge had found that the appellant's vehicle was the same one observed speeding on Highway 8 and that he drove dangerously in the Goderich Courthouse Square.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider other reasonable possibilities regarding the circumstantial identification of the vehicle on Highway 8.

Furthermore, the trial judge made an impermissible inference that the appellant had tailored his evidence to the Crown's case, which fatally flawed the credibility assessment.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.