Christopher Alexander Kalantzis

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The court sentenced Nicola Owen, convicted of importing almost 8 kilograms of heroin into Canada, to 9 years’ imprisonment.

The sentencing judge considered the low purity of the heroin (18%), Owen’s positive presentence report, lack of criminal record, health issues, and other mitigating factors.

The court found that the low purity and unique circumstances justified a sentence below the usual 12–17 year range for such offences.

The decision discusses the relevance of drug purity to sentencing and the importance of proportionality under s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, Rapinder Bains, appealed convictions for drug-related offences, arguing that the trial judge erred by applying a less onerous standard for entrapment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s approach, holding that it was open to the trial judge to infer from the Agreed Statement of Facts that the officer had the requisite subjective belief to proceed.

The appeal and the sentence appeal were both dismissed.

This decision addresses the constitutional validity of a search warrant issued based on information from a confidential source (C.S.) and corroborated by police investigation.

The court analyzed the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain (ITO) under the test established in R. v. Debot, focusing on the credibility, compelling nature, and corroboration of the C.S.'s information.

The judge rejected the accused's argument that exclusion of evidence from a prior unlawful search undermined the warrant's validity.

The court found the warrant was reasonably granted, emphasizing the detailed, recent, and corroborated information provided by the C.S. and police, and upheld the admission of evidence obtained.

The court sentenced Spiro Rusha to five years' imprisonment for multiple counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, including fentanyl, cocaine, and other drugs, as well as possession of property obtained by crime.

The decision reviews the aggravating and mitigating factors, the circumstances of the offences and the offender, and the applicable sentencing principles and ranges.

The court found that a penitentiary sentence was required, rejecting the defence request for a conditional sentence, and imposed ancillary orders including a firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.

The accused, Spiro Rusha, was charged with multiple counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the quantity and variety of drugs seized, substantial cash, and drug paraphernalia.

The defence argued for personal use and legitimate income.

The court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility and reliability, rejecting his explanations for drug possession and cash.

Applying principles of circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the substances were for trafficking and the money was proceeds of crime.

Rusha was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, Mark Thompson, faced charges for possession of Schedule 1 and 3 substances for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He challenged his warrantless arrest and subsequent search, arguing violations of his s. 8 and s. 9 Charter rights.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, as the confidential informant's tip was vague and insufficiently corroborated by surveillance.

The police notes were found to be misleading, exacerbating the seriousness of the Charter breach.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on the accused's liberty outweighed society's interest in the admission of the evidence, leading to its exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused brought Charter motions (ss. 7, 10(a), 10(b)) to exclude drug and money evidence in a trial for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court found no s. 7 violation regarding police body-worn camera (BWC) muting or late activation, as no evidence was "lost" and no prejudice was demonstrated.

However, the court found s. 10(a) and 10(b) violations due to delayed and incomplete advisement of rights upon detention and arrest.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court determined that the evidence should not be excluded, weighing the seriousness of the breaches (moderate, good faith, fluid situation) against the minimal impact on the accused's Charter interests (no incriminating statements, evidence discoverable) and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious drug offences on their merits.

The motions to exclude evidence were dismissed, and the accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, filed a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest and search, which were based on confidential informant (CI) information.

The Crown invoked Step 6 of the Garofoli procedure to allow the court to consider redacted CI information, provided a sufficient judicial summary was disclosed to the defence.

The court assessed the sufficiency of the judicial summary, considering defence concerns regarding the recency of information, the CI's criminal record, the reliability of previous CI information, and the specificity of personal identifying information and modus operandi details.

The court found the updated judicial summary sufficient to enable the accused to challenge the grounds for his arrest while protecting the CI's identity.

The applicant, Spiro Rusha, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a search warrant execution, arguing the warrant lacked reasonable grounds and the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading.

He also challenged the lawfulness of his arrest under s. 9 of the Charter and alleged excessive force during the arrest under s. 7.

The court dismissed all applications, finding the search warrant valid based on credible, compelling, and corroborated confidential informant information, and that the affiant did not intentionally mislead the issuing justice.

The court also found reasonable grounds for the arrest and that the force used was not excessive given the circumstances.

Nitish Verma was convicted by a jury of importing 13.739 kg of opium.

The Crown sought a nine-year sentence, while the defence argued for seven years, citing mitigating factors such as the offender's lack of criminal record, positive community contributions, and strong support network.

The court considered sentencing principles, including general deterrence and denunciation, and the less addictive nature of opium compared to other Schedule I substances.

Despite the large quantity of drugs and profit motive being aggravating factors, the court found the offender to be a courier, not a principal, and noted his high rehabilitative prospects.

A sentence of seven years was imposed, along with a DNA order, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and a forfeiture order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to comply with a demand for a roadside breath sample, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider material evidence regarding the equivocal nature of his refusal.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a careful analysis of the evidence, including the officer's cross-examination, and was entitled to conclude that the appellant's final response constituted a clear and unequivocal refusal, despite earlier potentially conditional statements.

The court affirmed that a trial judge is not required to recite every piece of evidence or make a finding on exact words, as long as the reasons are intelligible and allow for meaningful appellate review.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device in compliance with a demand made by a police officer under subsection 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved all essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the demand for breath testing was valid, the testing was conducted forthwith despite a 30-minute delay caused by the unavailability of an approved screening device, and that a technical breach of Charter section 10(b) rights regarding the failure to communicate the free legal aid telephone number was admissible under subsection 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with "excess alcohol" following a motor vehicle stop.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence on grounds of violations of sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test and that the ASD was working properly.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 10(b) rights regarding the right to counsel of choice.

The police called duty counsel before attempting to facilitate contact with the accused's preferred counsel, waited only one minute before placing the accused on the phone with duty counsel, and provided misleading information about efforts to contact counsel of choice.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the serious and systemic nature of the breach.

The accused was charged with knowingly using a forged document (a cheque) as if it were genuine, contrary to section 368(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and with theft of a cheque belonging to the Sheguiandah First Nation, contrary to section 334(b) of the Criminal Code.

The cheque in question was for $4,730 and was allegedly signed by the Band's Chief and a Band Counsellor.

The court found that while the cheque was stolen and the signatures were forged, it could not determine who committed the theft.

However, the court convicted the accused of knowingly using the forged document because she deposited the cheque into her account without any evidence of entitlement to the funds, and no Band representatives could establish any legitimate claim by her to the money.