Christopher Alexander Kalantzis

The accused was charged with "excess alcohol" following a motor vehicle stop.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence on grounds of violations of sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test and that the ASD was working properly.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 10(b) rights regarding the right to counsel of choice.

The police called duty counsel before attempting to facilitate contact with the accused's preferred counsel, waited only one minute before placing the accused on the phone with duty counsel, and provided misleading information about efforts to contact counsel of choice.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the serious and systemic nature of the breach.

The accused was charged with knowingly using a forged document (a cheque) as if it were genuine, contrary to section 368(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and with theft of a cheque belonging to the Sheguiandah First Nation, contrary to section 334(b) of the Criminal Code.

The cheque in question was for $4,730 and was allegedly signed by the Band's Chief and a Band Counsellor.

The court found that while the cheque was stolen and the signatures were forged, it could not determine who committed the theft.

However, the court convicted the accused of knowingly using the forged document because she deposited the cheque into her account without any evidence of entitlement to the funds, and no Band representatives could establish any legitimate claim by her to the money.

The appellant employee accepted an offer of employment that did not contain a termination provision.

Nine months later, he signed an employment agreement limiting his termination entitlements to the minimums under the Employment Standards Act.

After being terminated without cause seven years later, he sued for wrongful dismissal and unpaid commissions.

The Court of Appeal held that the termination provision in the subsequent employment agreement was unenforceable for lack of fresh consideration, entitling the appellant to common law reasonable notice.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the appellant's claims for commissions on a major account finalized after his termination, finding no error in the interpretation of the commission plan or the rejection of his unjust enrichment claim.