David M. Paciocco

The appellant challenged convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking arising from drugs found during an inventory search of a vehicle he was occupying.

Applying the circumstantial-evidence framework for constructive possession, the court held the trial judge erred by treating guilt as a reasonable inference rather than the only reasonable inference available on the whole of the evidence.

The evidence was equally consistent with sole possession by the co-occupant, particularly because the drugs were concealed in a backpack linked by DNA to that person and there was no evidence of the appellant handling the backpack or participating in trafficking activity.

The convictions were therefore unreasonable and were set aside, with an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an assignment of an agreement of purchase and sale was null and void.

The assignment was subject to a true condition precedent requiring vendor approval.

The motion judge found that the vendor insisted on unreasonable terms for its approval, which constituted a 'deal breaker', and that the respondents' subsequent attempt to negotiate an abatement was not an anticipatory breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions, and affirmed that the failure of the condition precedent rendered the agreement null and void, entitling the respondents to the return of their deposit.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and obstruction of justice, as well as her 14-month sentence.

She argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework regarding her alibi evidence and failed to consider Gladue factors on sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misstated the second branch of the W.(D.) test, the error had no impact because the trial judge completely rejected the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's difficult upbringing despite being unable to formally substantiate her Indigenous ancestry for Gladue purposes.

The appellant appealed an order staying the proceedings below.

The motion judge had found an abuse of process based on the appellant's failure to immediately disclose settlement agreements, relying on the Handley Estate doctrine.

However, this doctrine was overruled by the Court of Appeal in 1086289 Ontario Inc. (Urban Electrical Contractors) v. Welland (City), 2026 ONCA 352, after the motion judge's order.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's decision was based on an unduly rigid inquiry that did not consider actual prejudice, as is now required.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the motion judge for re-determination under the current law.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court of Justice decision that dismissed an appeal from a child protection order made in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the appeal judge's conclusions regarding the inapplicability of the federal Conflict of Interest Act, the absence of a reasonable apprehension of judicial bias, and the delay in releasing the initial decision.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain arguments or fresh evidence relating to the merits of the initial decision, as those issues were not pursued before the appeal judge.

The appeal and fresh evidence application were dismissed.

The appellant bank appealed an order dismissing its motion regarding the character of a debt.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the motion judge's order was not a final order because it did not resolve the substantive dispute between the parties, leaving the issue open to be pursued before the Bankruptcy Court.

The respondent suffered injuries after slipping and falling on ice in a parking lot while reaching for his vehicle's door handle.

He received statutory accident benefits (SABs) after a LAT adjudicator found the incident was an 'accident' under the SABs Schedule.

He subsequently sued the parking lot owner and winter maintenance provider for occupiers' liability.

The appellants moved to determine whether any damages awarded must be reduced by the SABs received under s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act, and whether OHIP's subrogated claim was barred under s. 30(5) of the Health Insurance Act.

The motion judge found the tort claim did not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile, meaning the statutory deductions and subrogation bars did not apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's substantive approach or her conclusion that the context and purpose of the LAT proceeding differed from the tort action, precluding abuse of process or issue estoppel.

The Crown appealed a verdict finding the respondent not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for first-degree murder and other offences.

The respondent had killed his brother-in-law and assaulted his mother and sister while experiencing command delusions.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapplied the legal test for expert evidence and failed to properly assess the respondent's capacity to know his actions were morally wrong.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and correctly concluded the respondent's major mental illness rendered him incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in the trunk of a vehicle he had rented and was driving.

On appeal, he argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was circumstantial and did not conclusively tie him to the drugs, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the absence of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's control over the rental vehicle and the location of the drugs supported a reasonable inference of constructive possession.

The Court also held that the jury charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against children, which arose from guilty pleas.

He argued the pleas were involuntary due to pressure after his trial counsel was released and his adjournment request was denied, leaving him to face self-representation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to overcome the strong presumption that guilty pleas made in open court are voluntary.

The court held that emotional pressure and fear of self-representation did not impair his ability to make a conscious volitional choice.

The appellant retained the respondent to provide strategic advice for a hostile takeover of a competitor.

The contract included a success fee payable upon the appellant gaining control of the target's management.

After an initial meeting requisition strategy failed, the appellant pursued a consensual purchase transaction without the respondent's involvement.

The trial judge found the contract was goal-focused and awarded the success fee and management fee to the respondent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no extricable errors of law or palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's interpretation of the contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible, appealed a Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention at a secure forensic psychiatric unit.

The appellant argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and that the detention order was not the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence from a psychological risk assessment and the treating psychiatrist, which indicated a continued moderate-to-high risk of violent recidivism and a need for a gradual transition into the community.

The appellant developer sued the respondent resident for defamation, economic torts, and trespass after the respondent publicly opposed a mall redevelopment and complained to the city about safety and bylaw issues.

The respondent successfully moved to dismiss the action as a SLAPP under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, and was awarded $25,000 in damages and full indemnity costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and damages award, finding the action was inextricably linked to the respondent's public expression and lacked substantial merit.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs, finding the motion judge erred by pre-determining the costs scale, and reduced the costs award from $156,394.54 to $75,000.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed a detention order made by the Ontario Review Board.

She argued the Board failed to adequately consider her proposal for a conditional discharge that included a 'Young clause' and treatment compliance conditions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board must meaningfully consider whether the proposed conditions could practically and effectively address the risk to the public, and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The appellant pleaded guilty to 23 charges, including multiple frauds and breaches of court orders, and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge committed a material error of principle by including a withdrawn charge in the sentencing analysis.

The global sentence was reduced to three and a half years.

Additionally, two restitution orders were vacated because the victims had recovered their losses, and the remaining restitution orders were varied to allow 10 years to pay.

The appellant challenged an indeterminate sentence imposed after a dangerous offender designation, arguing that his risk could be managed in the community through a fixed custodial term followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The court held that the sentencing judge made no error in finding that the appellant’s violent risk was driven by multiple factors, including personality pathology not meaningfully amenable to medication.

The psychiatric evidence established high risk, chronic non-compliance with treatment and supervision, and an absence of insight or motivation to change.

The court concluded that the conditions necessary to control the risk could only be achieved in custody and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge's exchanges with defence counsel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court applied the established bias test and emphasized the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the heavy burden required to rebut it.

Although the trial judge's comments to defence counsel were found to be inappropriate and short-tempered, they arose in the context of counsel's repeated improper questioning, including myth-based reasoning and impermissible use of prior sexual history evidence.

Viewed realistically and practically, the exchanges did not demonstrate that the trial judge was predisposed to one side.

The appeal was dismissed.

Zurich appealed a Superior Court decision that held Zurich and Chubb equally responsible for paying statutory accident benefits to a claimant injured in a rental vehicle.

The claimant initially applied to Chubb, who denied the claim and failed to notify Zurich within 90 days as required by O. Reg. 283/95.

The second arbitrator found Chubb solely responsible for the benefits due to its breaches of sections 2 and 3 of the Regulation.

The appeal judge overturned this, finding the insurers should share responsibility.

The Court of Appeal allowed Zurich's appeal and reinstated the arbitrator's award, holding that the appeal judge erred in treating the insurers as having equal priority under section 268 of the Insurance Act.

The arbitrator reasonably exercised his discretion in requiring Chubb to pay the benefits permanently as a consequence of its breaches.

The parties jointly purchased a residential property as tenants in common.

After their relationship ended, the application judge granted an equitable vesting order transferring the appellant's one percent interest to the respondent and ordered compensation.

The appellant appealed the vesting order and compensation.

The respondent registered the vesting order on title before the appeal was heard.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal of the vesting order was moot due to the registration on title and declined to exercise its discretion to hear it.

The court also dismissed the appeal regarding compensation and denied leave to appeal costs.

The appellant made a complaint to Serbian Orthodox Church authorities about the respondent, a priest, regarding his involvement in her family law proceedings.

The respondent sued for defamation, and the appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the expression did not relate to a matter of public interest because it was a private grievance not widely disseminated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by focusing on the size of the audience rather than the content of the expression, which raised broader concerns about the propriety of priests participating in private litigation.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a full s. 137.1 analysis.