COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Paciocco, George and Dawe JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Preston Woods
Appellant
Preston Woods, acting in person
Maija Martin, appearing as duty counsel
Victoria Rivers, for the respondent
Heard: July 9, 2026
On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Giulia B. Gambacorta of the Superior Court of Justice, on October 11, 2024, and from the sentence imposed on April 11, 2025.
REASONS FOR DECISION
OVERVIEW
1A package imported for delivery to Preston Woods was intercepted on February 4, 2020, by the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”). Although the package was declared to contain a cullender, CBSA agents believed it contained a “firearm suppressor”, more commonly referred to as a gun silencer. A firearm suppressor is a “prohibited device” within the meaning of s. 84(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
2A controlled delivery was arranged. After Mr. Woods accepted the package, a search warrant was executed. The search uncovered illicit narcotics, as well as a switchblade knife and brass knuckles. Mr. Woods, who had a long record of narcotics trafficking, was charged and convicted after trial of seven counts, including: possession of methadone (128 grams); two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking relating to the fentanyl (14.2 grams) and cocaine (76.3 grams); two counts of possession a prohibited weapon for the switchblade knife and the brass knuckles; and two counts of possession of weapons while prohibited from doing so pursuant to a s. 110 weapons prohibition order. He was acquitted of charges relating to the alleged “firearm suppressor” after the Crown failed to prove that the imported item qualified as a prohibited device within the meaning of the Criminal Code.
3Mr. Woods was found to occupy the home where the warrant was executed and where the contraband relied upon to support the possession and breach of probation charges was discovered. The methadone was found in the refrigerator. The cocaine was discovered along with 3.1 grams of fentanyl in a plastic bag on the shelf of a doorless linen closet adjacent to the kitchen. The balance of the fentanyl (11.1 grams) was discovered in the pocket of a red jacket located in the living room. Mr. Woods admitted this was his jacket and acknowledged that he had possessed the fentanyl found in the pocket. The two prohibited weapons were in plain view on kitchen surfaces.
ISSUES
4Mr. Woods argues with the assistance of duty counsel that the evidence secured during the search should be excluded because the search was unreasonable. It is not contested that the Crown failed at trial to prove that the imported device was a firearm suppressor, a fact that in Mr. Woods’ view undermines the reasonableness of the belief expressed by the affiant in the information to obtain (“ITO”) sworn in support of the search warrant.
5He also submits that the trial judge failed to apply the test in R. v. W.(D.), , [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, because she did not address why the exculpatory evidence advanced by Mr. Woods and his brother failed to raise a reasonable doubt. He also argues that the verdict was unreasonable. He says that the circumstantial evidence supported reasonable inferences consistent with his innocence and that the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient because they failed to explain why those alternative inferences were rejected.
6In addition, Mr. Woods seeks leave to appeal his sentence. In oral argument, he pursued only the ground of appeal that the trial judge failed to credit him with 48 days of pre-sentence custody. The Crown acknowledges that the trial judge was not informed that Mr. Woods had spent this time in custody and concedes that he is entitled to additional credit.
7We do not accept the grounds of appeal relating to the conviction but grant leave to appeal the sentence and allow the sentence appeal by reducing the sentence to reflect Mr. Woods’ pre-sentence custody.
ANALYSIS
1. CONVICTION APPEAL
8The constitutional challenge that Mr. Woods advances to the admissibility of the seized contraband is not properly before us. Mr. Woods’ lawyer initially challenged the search warrant but abandoned the s. 8 Charter motion in advance of the trial. After Mr. Woods discharged his lawyer well into the trial, he asked the trial judge to reopen the abandoned motion, but his request was denied. As a result, the s. 8 Charter issue was not litigated below, and Mr. Woods has not bought an appeal against the decision to deny his request to reopen. Instead, he seeks to raise the constitutional validity of the search as a new issue on appeal. This is not an appropriate case to do so. We are incapable of making the necessary factual findings relating to the reasonableness of the grounds. For example, the CBSA officer who informed the affiant about the package was not cross-examined about how or why she formed the belief that the package contained a firearm suppressor. Moreover, if there was a s. 8 breach, which is not at all assured in the circumstances, we are incapable of determining the seriousness of that breach without the benefit of a full evidentiary record relating to good faith. We must therefore dismiss this ground of appeal.
9With respect to the second ground of conviction appeal, Mr. Woods has not persuaded us that the trial judge failed to apply the rule in W.(D.). The “exculpatory evidence” on which Mr. Woods relies consists of his own testimony denying knowledge and control of the narcotics found in the closet and expressing his belief that the brass knuckles were plastic. He also relies on the testimony of his brother, which indicated that Mr. Woods did not reside at the house at the time, and that it was the brother who owned the weapons and brought them into the residence. Although the trial judge made no reference to the rule in W.(D.), her analysis tracks its reasoning. She made it clear that she did not affirmatively believe the evidence of either man, identifying significant problems with their testimony, including both internal and external inconsistencies. Further, her reasons demonstrate that their testimony did not leave her in reasonable doubt.
10This can be observed by examining her assessment of the live issues in the case. The only contested issues related to whether Mr. Woods had control of the residence, and knowledge and control of all the contraband that was discovered in the residence. On the narcotics charges, it was not disputed that if Mr. Woods was found to have been in possession of all the narcotics found in the home, it could be inferred that he possessed these drugs for the purpose of trafficking.
11The reasons show that the trial judge entirely rejected Mr. Woods’ testimony. She provided detailed affirmative reasons why the evidence showed him not only to be residing in the home but also knowing that the contraband was there. Indeed, she said explicitly, “I do not accept Mr. Woods’ evidence that 419 Belair was not his home and that he was not in control of it, or aware or in control of the contents within it.” She added that she did not accept his testimony that he had “only seen plastic knuckles in his home previously”. She then went on to find that “[Mr. Woods’] evidence of others being in the home from time-to-time does not raise a reasonable doubt on his possession or knowledge and control over the contents of the home.” These conclusions, addressing both belief and reasonable doubt, demonstrate that the trial judge understood and considered the material components of the rule in W.(D.).
12The evidence of Mr. Woods’ brother was incapable of raising a reasonable doubt about Mr. Woods’ guilt and did not require close W.(D.) analysis. Contrary to Mr. Woods’ testimony, his brother confirmed that the home was Mr. Woods’. Additionally, although the brother initially testified that Mr. Woods did not stay the night before the controlled delivery, he retracted that testimony under cross-examination. Indeed, the trial judge found that even if the brother did own the weapons as he claimed, they were left in Mr. Woods’ control in the home he occupied and he would have known about them, as they were in plain view in the kitchen where Mr. Woods had been working. She went on to explain, “A person who has power over a place can decide what is kept there and what is not”. Put otherwise, even if the brother owned the weapons, Mr. Woods exercised control over them by knowingly permitting them to be there.
13We are not persuaded that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the rule in W.(D.).
14Mr. Woods’ third ground of conviction appeal relating to the unreasonable verdict and the overlapping insufficiency of reasons on the circumstantial evidence of the case must also be dismissed. It is evident from the trial judge’s reasons that she understood what is required for conviction under R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, and that she was persuaded that Mr. Woods’ possession and control of the contraband was the only reasonable inference.
15The trial judge cautioned herself explicitly in the language of Villaroman when addressing the possession for the purpose of trafficking counts noting that, “[Mr. Woods] may only be found guilty of trafficking if guilt is the only reasonable inference that the evidence permits”. And she applied this standard in convicting Mr. Woods whose defence depended upon there being a reasonable doubt that others may have had possession and control of most of the drugs. As discussed, the trial judge clearly concluded that “[h]is evidence of others being in the home from time-to-time does not raise a reasonable doubt on his possession or knowledge and control over the contents of the home”. This finding, together with powerful circumstantial evidence of Mr. Woods’ control and knowledge identified by the trial judge, are compelling indications that the trial judge did not overlook reasonable alternative inferences.
16As for the weapons charges, as indicated, the trial judge explained that even if the weapons did belong to his brother, Mr. Woods was in possession of them.
17We are therefore unpersuaded that the trial judge failed to apply the rule in Villaroman, or arrived at an unreasonable verdict, or that her reasons for decision are insufficient to enable appellate review.
18We therefore dismiss the conviction appeal.
2. Sentence Appeal
19We give leave to appeal the sentence and allow the sentence appeal, in part.
20We reject Mr. Woods’ submissions that the global five-year sentence is unfit. The trial judge accepted that he was street level trafficker whose offending was driven by addiction. She properly treated the presence of children in the residence and his serious, related criminal record as aggravating factors. The sentences she imposed were proportionate and within the usual range.
21However, the trial judge did fail to credit Mr. Woods for 48 days of pre-sentence custody. The Crown concedes that this error occurred. In fairness to the trial judge, the pre-sentence credit submissions were confusing. The lawyer that represented Mr. Woods during the sentencing hearing erroneously characterized as pre-sentence custody, a lengthy period of incarceration that Mr. Woods was serving after being sentenced for a subsequent offence. It appears that in the confusion of exposing that error no one confirmed that there were indeed 48 days of pre-sentence custody that he should be credited for from February 19 to April 7, 2020. Be that as it may, the parties agree that 72 days of presentence credit should be awarded, applying a ratio of 1.5 days of credit for each day served. We agree.
DISPOSITION
22We grant leave to appeal the sentence, allow the sentence appeal on this one ground, set aside the four-year sentence imposed in Count 6 for possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl, and substitute a net sentence of three years and 293 days, after credit for presentence custody of 72 days.
“David M. Paciocco J.A.”
“J. George J.A.”
“J. Dawe J.A.”