OCA 2026

The proposed intervener brought a motion for leave to intervene in the Crown's appeal against the respondent's acquittal for public incitement of hatred.

The respondent had been acquitted on the basis that his online statements were not communicated in a "public place" as required by s. 319(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the motion, finding that the interpretation of "public place" in the context of online communications is an issue of wide-reaching impact.

The court concluded that the proposed intervener's submissions on statutory interpretation were sufficiently distinct from the Crown's and would provide useful assistance to the panel.

The appellants failed to complete the sale of their home in 2016.

The respondent was awarded $715,000 in damages in lieu of specific performance at trial.

On appeal, the self-represented appellant requested an adjournment, which the court denied due to the lengthy history of the litigation and lack of evidence supporting the request.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and fact-finding.

The court also rejected the argument that the appellant wife was not a proper party, noting she signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale as a consenting spouse under the Family Law Act.

The Ontario Association of Architects (OAA) appealed a motion judge's order finding it in civil contempt of a 2023 consent order and imposing a $30,000 fine.

The consent order prohibited the OAA from issuing licences to architectural technologists based on an internal policy.

The motion judge found the OAA breached the order when its Registration Committee directed the issuance of limited licences under section 25 of the Architects Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the contempt finding, holding that the motion judge failed to establish that the consent order clearly and unambiguously prohibited the statutory exemption process, failed to find intentional disobedience, and failed to properly exercise discretion regarding the appropriateness of a contempt finding.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion under Rule 51.06 for judgment on alleged admissions regarding a limitation period defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's order did not finally dispose of the rights of any parties or any issue, as the limitation defence could still be argued at trial.

Consequently, the order was interlocutory, and jurisdiction to hear the appeal lay with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed an equalization order and sought leave to appeal an elevated costs award.

He argued a $78,000 shareholder loan should have been excluded from his net family property as it was unlikely to be repaid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the loan was outstanding at the date of separation and its inclusion was within the trial judge's discretion.

Leave to appeal costs was denied, as the trial judge's finding of bad faith justified costs on an elevated basis under the Family Law Rules.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the same reasons given by the motion judge who previously refused to stay enforcement pending appeal.

The court also rejected the appellant's submission regarding title and the respondent's standing, noting the mortgage and its transfer were clearly reflected on the parcel abstract.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and weapons offences, as well as his sentence.

He argued that the search of his residence was unreasonable, the trial judge failed to apply the rule in W.(D.), and the verdict was unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Charter issue was not properly before the court and the trial judge correctly applied the relevant legal standards.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to credit the appellant for 48 days of pre-sentence custody, reducing his sentence on one count.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 12-year sentence for human trafficking, assault, forcible confinement, and related offences.

He argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons by failing to address inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and improperly relied on a co-worker's testimony as corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge clearly understood the credibility issues, acknowledged the co-worker's motive to lie, and reasonably relied on independent video evidence and the co-worker's testimony to confirm the complainant's account.

Leave to appeal the sentence was denied as no basis for intervention was identified.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple child sexual offences, including sexual interference, sexual assault, possession of CSAEM, making CSAEM, and making CSAEM available, arising from abuse of children known to him and his role administering a dark web CSAEM website.

The Court of Appeal rejected the offender’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and upheld the dangerous offender designation, finding no reversible error in the sentencing judge’s treatment of intractability, burden of proof, or the expert evidence.

The court held, however, that the sentencing judge erred in principle in sentencing by failing to meaningfully account for the offender’s administrator role in a global CSAEM enterprise, by treating a prior comparator case as a sentencing ceiling, and by failing to impose some statutorily required consecutive sentences.

Re-sentencing afresh under the Bertrand Marchand approach and subject to totality, the court increased the global determinate sentence from 17 years to 25 years, with a net sentence of 20 years after presentence credit.

The parties separated after a 32-year marriage.

Before the marriage, the respondent wife received shares in her father's business.

During the marriage, an estate freeze was executed, transferring the growth value of the shares to a new family trust settled by her father for $100.

The trial judge, feeling bound by prior appellate jurisprudence, excluded the wife's interest in the trust from her net family property as a gift after marriage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, distinguishing the prior case and holding that the trust interest was traceable to the pre-marital gift.

The trust interest was included in net family property, but the equalization payment was reduced to $18 million under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act due to unconscionability.

Retroactive spousal support was ordered, but prospective support was denied.

The trial costs award against the appellant husband was upheld.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash an appeal on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the motion judge's decision dismissing a motion for summary judgment and to strike pleadings was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the motion judge's decision regarding the 2020 limitation issue was a final determination under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant commenced an action in Ontario for breach of a share purchase agreement.

The respondent successfully moved to stay the action in favour of an ongoing International Chamber of Commerce arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in a subsequent agreement to which it was not a named party.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding an arbitration agreement existed between the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding an 'arguable case' that the respondent was an affiliate entitled to benefit from the arbitration clause, thereby engaging the competence-competence principle.

The appellant appealed his five-year sentence for firearms offences, seeking to admit fresh evidence of harsh pretrial detention conditions, specifically an incident involving excessive use of force by correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the sentencing judge would have given greater mitigating effect to the punitive character of the pretrial detention had she been aware of the incident.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by six months.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a judge-alone trial.

The Crown had conceded it could not prove the appellant inflicted the fatal stab wound based on the evidence of a key witness alone, and advanced a theory of manslaughter.

The trial judge rejected this concession without notice and convicted the appellant of murder based on co-principal liability under s. 21(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's failure to clearly notify counsel that he was considering co-principal liability for murder, and his rejection of the Crown's concession without inviting submissions, deprived the defence of a meaningful opportunity to respond.

This lack of notice amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing her application for adverse possession of a narrow strip of land behind the respondents' garage.

The application judge found that the appellant failed to prove actual possession of the disputed strip between 1998 and 2008, noting insufficient evidence of a fence restricting access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law were entitled to deference and were open to her on the record.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action to enforce a 2008 Quebec judgment in Ontario, which was commenced over eight years later.

The trial judge found the action was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding promissory estoppel, delayed discoverability, and written acknowledgment of debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to set aside a separation agreement on the basis of duress under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant's vulnerabilities were compensated by independent legal advice.

On the respondent's cross-appeal regarding costs, the Court found the application judge erred in principle by using a 'cost equalization' methodology rather than applying the proper purposes of a costs award.

The cross-appeal was allowed, and the respondent was awarded $80,000 in costs for the proceeding below, plus $12,500 for the appeal.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of intimidation by blocking or obstructing a highway under s. 423(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, arising from his leadership role in the 'Freedom Convoy' protests in Ottawa.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the offence required proof of threats or violence and an intent to intimidate individuals when occurring in the context of a political protest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by reading in elements not found in the text of the provision and by treating the political protest context as a defence to otherwise criminal conduct.

The Court substituted a conviction, finding that the respondent's conduct in blocking highways to compel the government to change its COVID-19 policies satisfied all elements of the offence.

The appellant appealed his sentence for multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences.

He argued the 14-year sentence was crushing and that the sentencing judge erred by treating his flight from police as an aggravating factor, given the presentence report detailed his negative experiences with police, including anti-Black racism.

The Court of Appeal rejected the first ground but agreed the trial judge's findings on flight were incongruent with her acceptance of his negative police experiences.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the net sentence was reduced from 11.5 years to 11 years.

The appellant sought a panel review of a motion judge's order that granted him an extension of time to perfect his appeal.

The appellant failed to perfect the appeal by the extended deadline and sought a further extension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the panel review motion, finding no error by the motion judge, and dismissed a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Registrar was directed to dismiss the appeal for failure to perfect.