Maurice J. Neirinck

This decision concerns cross-applications to set aside or enforce two arbitral decisions relating to a commercial property dispute between the Moscone Parties and Edenrock Holdings Inc. and Anthony Marrese.

The Moscone Parties sought to set aside or appeal the arbitral decisions on grounds of procedural unfairness, natural justice, and bias, or in the alternative, to remit the matter to a new arbitrator.

The court dismissed the Moscone Parties’ application, finding no breach of natural justice or procedural fairness, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the arbitration agreement precluded any right of appeal.

The application by Edenrock and Marrese to enforce the arbitral decisions was granted.

This decision concerns cross-applications to set aside or enforce two arbitral decisions relating to a commercial property dispute between the Moscone Parties and Edenrock Holdings Inc. and Anthony Marrese.

The Moscone Parties sought to set aside or appeal the arbitral decisions on grounds of procedural unfairness, natural justice, and bias, or in the alternative, to remit the matter to a new arbitrator.

The court dismissed the Moscone Parties’ application, finding no breach of natural justice or procedural fairness, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the arbitration agreement precluded any right of appeal.

The application by Edenrock and Marrese to enforce the arbitral decisions was granted.

This decision addresses a claim for partial indemnity costs by intervenors Terence Tse and Best Motoring Fine Cars Ltd. ("Mr. Tse") against Rosemont Management Inc. and McCaul Leasehold Management Limited ("Rosemont").

Mr. Tse sought costs for successfully intervening in the main application and for resisting Rosemont's motion to enforce a settlement.

The court found Rosemont's argument that the costs award was premature to be without merit.

Despite Mr. Tse's initial claim of over $108,000, the court assessed a reasonable award of $50,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable forthwith by Rosemont to Mr. Tse.

The court clarified its jurisdiction to award costs for both motions, including the intervenor motion whose costs had been deferred by a previous judge.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a 2008 Quebec default judgment against the defendants in Ontario.

The defendants raised a two-year limitation period defence under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued that the action was not prescribed due to acknowledgment of debt, discoverability, or promissory estoppel.

The court found no valid written acknowledgment, rejected the discoverability argument as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the defendants were domiciled in Ontario and had means to enforce the judgment, and dismissed the promissory estoppel claim due to a lack of evidence of an intention to affect legal relations regarding the limitation period.

The action was dismissed as prescribed, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 32.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order to permit their consultant to conduct a Phase Two Environmental Site Assessment of a property.

The plaintiffs argued the assessment was necessary to determine if the property was contaminated, which was relevant to their claims of misrepresentation by the defendants regarding the property's environmental status and to the remedies sought (specific performance with abatement or return of deposit).

The defendants opposed, arguing the plaintiffs had waived an environmental condition in the agreement of purchase and sale and that the motion was delayed and an abuse of process.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding the inspection necessary and probative for the trier of fact, noting no prejudice to the defendants, and deeming the delay not unreasonable.

The court also provided directions for the parties to agree on a timetable for the inspection, mediation, and trial, and on the terms of the inspection.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against their property, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure on the ex parte motion to obtain the CPL, that there was no triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' claim to an interest in the property, and that equitable factors favored discharge.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing delay and disputing the defendants' grounds.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the defendants' extensive delay in bringing the motion was sufficient grounds for dismissal.

The court further found that the plaintiffs had made full and fair disclosure and that there was a triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' claim for specific performance, with equitable factors favoring the plaintiffs.

Loukia Georgiou, mother of a convicted U.S. fraudster, applied for a declaration of entitlement to CAD$9.3 million, which were subject to a U.S. forfeiture order and frozen in Canada via a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request.

She claimed the funds were either held in trust for her or due to her from a commercial agreement.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish a valid interest in the funds and that her claim, supported by highly suspicious documents and implausible oral agreements, was a transparent attempt to avoid forfeiture.

The court found the applicant and her son's evidence lacked credibility.

The plaintiff obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction against his brothers and their jointly owned corporations amidst a family business dispute.

On the return motion, the defendants argued the injunction should be set aside due to the plaintiff's failure to provide full and frank disclosure of material facts, including his involvement in prior litigation and his control over a corporate mortgage.

The court agreed that the plaintiff breached his duty of full and frank disclosure and discharged the Mareva injunction over the defendants' personal assets.

However, the court exercised its discretion to grant an alternate interim injunction securing specific corporate cash accounts and real properties pending trial.

The appellant, King Square Limited (KSL), appealed a trial judgment that found it liable to pay further commissions to the respondent mortgage broker, OMJ Mortgage Capital Inc. (OMJ), for additional loan advances obtained from Firm Capital Corporation (FCC).

KSL argued these were new loans made outside the commission agreement's term.

The Court of Appeal, applying a deferential standard of review to contract interpretation, upheld the trial judge's finding that the additional advances were not new loans but rather further advances under the original loan commitment, which was secured during the currency of the commission agreement.

The court found the trial judge's interpretation commercially reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The Receiver brought a motion seeking approval of its activities, approval of a sales process for two properties, and an order requiring a tenant to disclose tenancy documentation.

The court declined to grant a generic approval of the Receiver's activities, finding it unnecessary.

The court ordered the tenant to comply with its disclosure obligations, rejecting the tenant's confidentiality objections.

The court approved the proposed sales process and listing agreements, subject to conditions including a time-limited sealing order for appraisals and the circulation of redacted listing proposals to the parties.

The moving parties, Thomas Patrick Farrell and The Midas Investment Corporation, appealed an order dismissing their action concerning the validity of two mortgages and sought a stay of the declaration of validity and enforcement of the mortgages pending the outcome of the appeal.

The court applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for stays pending appeal.

While a serious issue was found to exist (though barely), the court determined there would be no irreparable harm to the moving parties and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting a stay.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The plaintiff mortgage broker, OMJ Mortgage Capital Inc. (OMJ), sued the defendant, King Square Limited (KSL), for commissions on three loans extended by Firm Capital Corporation (FCC).

OMJ claimed commissions on two loans to KSL and one loan to King Square Hotel Corporation (KSHC), arguing they were further advances under an original loan commitment or covered by the holdover period of their commission agreement.

KSL contended the loans were new and outside the agreement's terms, and that it was not liable for a loan to KSHC, a separate entity.

The court found the two loans to KSL were further advances under the original commitment, entitling OMJ to commissions, and that KSL breached its duty of good faith by not disclosing these advances.

However, the court dismissed OMJ's claim for commission on the KSHC loan, finding it was a distinct loan not covered by the agreement's terms or the definition of "Borrower."

The plaintiffs brought two actions against their insurer for business interruption and property losses following an Indian meal moth infestation and the subsequent receivership of related companies.

In the first action, the court found the claimed losses were not 'direct losses' under the policy and that the receivership was not a covered peril.

In the second action, the court held that the property loss claim was barred by the one-year contractual limitation period, but the rolling business interruption claim beginning one year before the action was commenced could proceed.

The court granted the plaintiffs relief from forfeiture for inadequate proofs of loss and dismissed the insurer's abuse of process and vitiation defences.

An appeal concerning the interpretation of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The respondent was convicted in the United States of conspiracy and fraud, sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, and ordered to pay a $26 million USD forfeiture money judgment.

American authorities discovered $9.2 million CAD in a Canadian bank account believed to belong to the respondent and obtained a restraint order.

The respondent appealed the motion judge's decision upholding the restraint order, arguing the funds were not proceeds of crime or offence-related property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that "proceeds of crime" should be interpreted broadly in the context of mutual legal assistance to respect differences in foreign legal systems and to fulfill Canada's international treaty obligations.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision dismissing his wrongful dismissal action.

The appellant, who had worked for the respondent company for over 21 years as general manager of its heat treating division, claimed he had taken a leave of absence to wind up his father's estate in India rather than resigning.

The trial judge found that the appellant had resigned on January 22, 2010, based on evidence including the testimony of his supervisor and substantial circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The Interim Receiver, A. Farber & Partners Inc., moved for approval of its fees and disbursements, and those of other professionals, incurred over a 15-year receivership, along with its discharge and other related orders.

The plaintiff, Nyaz Jethwani, opposed the motion, primarily objecting to the quantum of fees and certain actions of the Interim Receiver.

The court found the Interim Receiver's fees and actions to be fair, reasonable, and commercially prudent, dismissing all of Jethwani's objections.

The court approved the fees, discharged the Interim Receiver, and ordered reimbursement for personal payments made by Farber.

The Interim Receiver requested a case conference to clarify the scope of cross-examinations on its fee affidavits and those of its counsel, and sought to limit the production of invoices.

The Plaintiff, representing investors, challenged the Interim Receiver's fees and alleged negligence by its counsel, seeking broad cross-examination and full disclosure.

The court reiterated that when an Officer of the Court seeks fee approval, they become a litigant with an economic interest and are subject to cross-examination like any other party.

The court declined to provide further directions to limit the scope of cross-examination and ordered the production of all relevant invoices, emphasizing transparency.

The Bank of Montreal moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action brought by The Midas Investment Corporation, which alleged negligence by the Bank in allowing fraudulent account activity.

Midas claimed the Bank was negligent in opening and operating an account used by two individuals, Kavanaugh and Commisso, to defraud Midas of over $3 million, arguing the Bank should have been put on inquiry due to irregularities, thus disentitling it from relying on the indoor management rule.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the Bank was put on inquiry by inconsistencies in corporate documentation and account activity, and noting incomplete document production and the absence of expert evidence.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing a fraudulent conveyance and knowing assistance action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action arose from efforts to enforce a substantial divorce judgment where assets were allegedly transferred through corporate structures to defeat execution.

The court held that the material facts underlying the claims were not discoverable until an equitable receiver, appointed in aid of execution, obtained corporate records in 2010 that had previously been withheld.

The action commenced in 2012 was therefore within the limitation period.

The court also ruled that the defendant named as estate trustee of a deceased individual was not in fact the estate trustee but appointed her as litigation administrator of the estate under Rule 9.03(2).

The plaintiff municipality brought a motion seeking a declaration that the defendant was in civil contempt of court for failing to comply with an earlier order requiring removal of a berm constructed on his property that allegedly caused flooding in a municipal drainage ditch.

The court reviewed the three-part test for civil contempt requiring a clear order, deliberate and wilful disobedience, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

While the evidence indicated that the berm had not been fully removed and flooding continued, the court was not satisfied that the breach was deliberate or wilful.

Instead of a contempt finding, the court ordered the defendant to provide access to the property for surveying to determine the remaining berm and to facilitate compliance with the prior order.