Melvyn Solomon

The plaintiffs brought two defamation actions against the defendants arising from tweets and emails that characterized the plaintiffs' own tweets as homophobic and transphobic.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the expressions related to matters of public interest and that, while the defamation claim had some merit, the defendants had a valid defence of fair comment given the highly politicized and hyperbolic nature of Twitter.

The actions were dismissed as strategic litigation against public participation.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded $741,000 in damages, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court denied substantial indemnity costs prior to the plaintiff's offer to settle, finding that the defendant's bad faith did not amount to egregious conduct.

However, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs from the date of the offer to settle, as the plaintiff obtained a judgment more favourable than its offer.

Costs were fixed at $159,666.62, with reductions made for disproportionate time spent by senior counsel.

The plaintiff mortgage broker, OMJ Mortgage Capital Inc. (OMJ), sued the defendant, King Square Limited (KSL), for commissions on three loans extended by Firm Capital Corporation (FCC).

OMJ claimed commissions on two loans to KSL and one loan to King Square Hotel Corporation (KSHC), arguing they were further advances under an original loan commitment or covered by the holdover period of their commission agreement.

KSL contended the loans were new and outside the agreement's terms, and that it was not liable for a loan to KSHC, a separate entity.

The court found the two loans to KSL were further advances under the original commitment, entitling OMJ to commissions, and that KSL breached its duty of good faith by not disclosing these advances.

However, the court dismissed OMJ's claim for commission on the KSHC loan, finding it was a distinct loan not covered by the agreement's terms or the definition of "Borrower."

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision enforcing a Separation Agreement dated October 30, 2012, between the parties.

The appellant sought to set aside the agreement, alleging non-disclosure of assets by the respondent and arguing he did not understand the nature or consequences of the agreement.

The motion judge found no basis to set aside the agreement under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge properly applied the legal test, made findings open to him, and that the parties were sophisticated individuals who had received independent legal advice.

The court noted that both parties had failed to fully disclose assets, making the appellant's claim disingenuous, and that the agreement itself contained acknowledgments of sufficient disclosure.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from interlocutory orders dismissing their motions to transfer the action from Hamilton to Toronto and to strike portions of an affidavit based on settlement privilege.

The court denied leave to appeal on both issues, finding no conflicting decisions, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the orders, and that the proposed appeals did not involve matters of general importance.