Angela Chaisson

The defendants sought costs of $41,082.45 on a full indemnity basis after successfully dismissing the plaintiffs' defamation action as a SLAPP suit.

The plaintiffs agreed the amount was reasonable but argued it should be reduced by approximately $14,000, which the defendants allegedly raised through a GoFundMe campaign, citing the principle of indemnity.

The court rejected this argument, holding that costs inquiries are restricted to examining the lawyer's bill, not the successful party's means of payment.

The court awarded the defendants $41,000 in costs.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The applicant, the Integrity Commissioner, was found substantially successful in the underlying application, despite not succeeding on all allegations.

The court considered the applicant's claim for partial or substantial indemnity costs and the respondent's arguments regarding excessive time and junior counsel fees.

The court awarded the applicant $25,000.00 for fees plus $2,125.42 for disbursements, including HST, finding the respondent's conduct intentional and persistent, which warranted more than a nominal costs order.

The plaintiffs brought two defamation actions against the defendants arising from tweets and emails that characterized the plaintiffs' own tweets as homophobic and transphobic.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the expressions related to matters of public interest and that, while the defamation claim had some merit, the defendants had a valid defence of fair comment given the highly politicized and hyperbolic nature of Twitter.

The actions were dismissed as strategic litigation against public participation.

The Integrity Commissioner applied for a determination that a municipal councillor contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The councillor had declared a conflict of interest regarding a fire department service charge levied against her son, but remained in the council meeting and actively questioned the fire department representative about practices and procedures.

The court found the councillor intentionally used her position to attempt to obtain a financial advantage for her son, contravening the Act.

The court declared the councillor's seat vacant but declined to disqualify her from seeking re-election in the future.

The appellant, Bradley Kennedy, appealed his conviction for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred by admitting and relying on anecdotal expert testimony regarding typical personal use quantities of methamphetamine, citing R. v. Sekhon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion was grounded in objective facts, not inadmissible anecdotes, and that the trial judge did not rely on the impugned testimony.

The court also found the verdict was reasonable, as the trial judge was entitled to draw an inference of guilt after rejecting the appellant's testimony, given the significant quantity of drugs and lack of indicia of personal use.

The defendants, correctional officers, sought summary judgment to dismiss an action by the plaintiffs for intrusion upon seclusion and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional/economic harm.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants unlawfully accessed and disseminated confidential information about one plaintiff's criminal convictions, leading to family law disputes and public shaming.

The court dismissed the action, finding no genuine issue for trial, as the information accessed was publicly available, the defendants' actions were not "highly offensive," and no economic harm or sufficient mental suffering was proven.

The defendant in a civil action for sexual assault brought a motion seeking a declaration that he had not breached the deemed undertaking rule (Rule 30.1.01) or, alternatively, an order to exempt certain documents from it.

The defendant's civil counsel had provided the plaintiff's compelled documentary productions, including sensitive medical and counselling records, to his criminal defence counsel for use in parallel criminal proceedings to impeach the plaintiff's credibility, without prior notice or court directions.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the impeachment exception in Rule 30.1.01(6) is not automatic and requires parties to seek directions from the civil court, ordinarily on notice to the producing party, before using discovery evidence for impeachment in another proceeding.

The court found that the defendant had breached the deemed undertaking.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit a photograph of the deceased, Dwayne Thompson, taken at the coroner's office, through Sgt. Raymond Linton, who was not present at the autopsy.

The accused objected, arguing the Crown reneged on an agreement not to introduce autopsy photographs through Sgt. Linton and that the photograph was prejudicial.

The court ruled the photograph admissible, clarifying it was not an "autopsy photograph" in the agreed-upon sense, and that its probative value, particularly in authenticating paper bags placed on the deceased's hands at the scene, outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The court also issued directives for future disclosure of electronic evidence to prevent similar misunderstandings.

The Crown sought to admit a modified summary of cellphone records, replacing phone numbers with the names of the accused, to simplify evidence for the jury.

The accused objected, arguing identity and phone number association were disputed, making the summary prejudicial.

The court ruled that while summaries are generally admissible to clarify evidence, the proposed modified summary was inadmissible as evidence because replacing phone numbers with accused names on a disputed issue of identity would be unfairly prejudicial and amount to impermissible advocacy, potentially misleading the jury.

The Crown could use the summary as an aid in closing arguments but not as evidence.

This endorsement addresses several pre-trial procedural issues in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

The court provides directions on the order of peremptory challenges, the procedure for challenging jurors for cause, disclosure of electronic records and aids (Excel spreadsheets, PowerPoints, maps), and the examination of a key witness, Cassandra Hudson.

The court also sets out non-sitting dates and addresses miscellaneous requests regarding nourishment and clothing exchanges for the accused.

Key rulings include declining to prohibit Crown counsel from preparing a witness and denying a request to videotape witness testimony for discovery purposes.

This is a ruling on the admissibility of documentary evidence in a criminal trial involving allegations of fraud at a Salvation Army distribution facility.

The Crown sought to admit thousands of documents obtained through internal audits and police investigations, including business records from the Salvation Army's Railside facility, emails, manifests, driver logs, invoices, and tax receipts.

The defendants challenged the admissibility of these documents on various grounds.

The court conducted a comprehensive voir dire to determine which documents could be admitted as business records under the Canadian Evidence Act, common law exceptions, or the principled approach to hearsay.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action arising from an internet article that repeated and endorsed allegations originally published in a national newspaper accusing the plaintiff of fabricating racist material to support human rights complaints.

The defendant republished the article on a website and added commentary portraying the plaintiff as corrupt and engaged in “phony-racism.” The court found the publication clearly defamatory and rejected the defences of fair comment, qualified privilege, and responsible communication, holding that the article primarily asserted defamatory facts and that internet publication to the world was not an occasion of privilege.

The defendant had relied on a previously retracted newspaper article without conducting further verification.

General damages of $10,000 were awarded, and the defendant’s posted retraction and apology were found inadequate to reduce the damages.

Following a judgment in favour of the plaintiff in a defamation action, the court determined the quantum of costs and pre-judgment interest.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $121,000, while the defendant argued for partial indemnity costs of $30,000 to $40,000.

The court considered the plaintiff's offers to settle, post-judgment conduct, and the use of the simplified procedure, ultimately fixing costs at $65,000 for fees and $8,000 for disbursements.

The court also held that defamation is not a 'personal injury' for the purposes of the 5% pre-judgment interest rate under s. 128(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, and applied the default rate of 1.3%.

The plaintiff, a law student, sued the defendant, a blogger and political commentator, for defamation arising from nine blog posts.

The posts related to a British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal hearing involving Maclean's magazine, where the plaintiff testified.

The defendant repeatedly called the plaintiff a 'liar' and an 'anti-Semite' in his posts.

The court found the words were defamatory and that the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege failed, largely due to factual inaccuracies and the defendant's express malice toward the plaintiff's perceived associate.

The court awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and $30,000 in aggravated damages, and ordered the removal of the defamatory words from the defendant's website.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges, including attempted murder, were laid in 2002 but the accused was not arrested until 2009 while residing in South Korea, resulting in approximately 11 years of delay before trial.

The court held that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to bring the accused to trial despite knowing his whereabouts and having extradition options available.

Most of the delay was attributable to Crown inaction rather than inherent requirements or actions of the accused.

Given the exceptional delay and resulting prejudice to liberty, security, and fair trial interests, the court concluded that the accused’s s. 11(b) rights were violated.

The plaintiff brought a libel action against a municipal councillor arising from statements made to a newspaper editorial board concerning an untendered municipal contract awarded to a corporation associated with the plaintiff.

The court held that although the statements could in law be capable of referring to the plaintiff, the reasonable reader would not conclude that they did so.

The defendant spoke only about the corporation and repeatedly stated he could not accuse anyone or pinpoint wrongdoing.

The court further found that the statements expressed suspicion of corruption without factual assertion and, when read in context, did not convey a defamatory meaning.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish two essential elements of defamation: reference to the plaintiff and defamatory meaning.

The applicant brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) seeking to declare the respondent's seat on Toronto City Council vacant.

The respondent, the Mayor of Toronto, had previously been found to have violated the Code of Conduct and was ordered to reimburse $3,150 to donors.

At a subsequent Council meeting, the respondent spoke and voted on a motion to rescind that repayment obligation.

The court found that the respondent had a pecuniary interest in the matter and breached s. 5(1) of the MCIA.

The court rejected arguments that the MCIA did not apply to Code of Conduct violations, that the repayment order was ultra vires, or that the interest was too insignificant to influence him.

The court also found the breach was not committed through inadvertence or an error in judgment.

The application was granted and the respondent's seat was declared vacant.