Enoch Samuel Guimond

The self-represented accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging that he could not receive a fair trial.

He claimed that the judges who dismissed his previous applications exhibited bias and were part of a widespread conspiracy against him.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was an impermissible collateral attack on the prior rulings and that the accused failed to provide any cogent evidence to rebut the presumption of judicial integrity or substantiate his claims of bias and conspiracy.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The trial was scheduled for December 9 and 10, 2025, nearly 23 months after arrest.

The accused argued that delayed core disclosure at the outset of the prosecution caused significant delays.

The Crown argued that once disclosure was made, the accused's actions led to adjournments of the first two trial dates due to scheduling errors and unavailability.

The court found that after deducting defence delay from the total delay, the net delay was 12.5 months, well below the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months for Ontario Court of Justice summary conviction cases.

The application was dismissed.

Summary conviction appeal from convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation.

The appellant was convicted based primarily on the testimony of a developmentally delayed complainant who functioned cognitively at the level of an 8-9 year old.

The complainant alleged multiple assaults and sexual assaults occurring during his employment with the appellant in a landscaping and snow plowing business between August 2015 and October 2018.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based largely on credibility findings regarding the complainant.

The appellate court identified significant errors in the trial judge's treatment of inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, including a legal error regarding hearsay classification and a misapprehension of evidence regarding statements to a third-party observer.

The court found these errors, combined with insufficient reasons addressing major inconsistencies, constituted a miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial.

The accused, C.G., was charged with sexual assault against M.A. and G.M. The charge related to G.M. was dismissed during the trial.

The judge-alone trial proceeded on the charge concerning M.A., which allegedly occurred between 1984 and 1987.

The court found the evidence of the defence witness, D.G. (the accused's daughter and complainant M.A.'s cousin/roommate), to be credible and reliable, particularly her testimony that she did not witness the alleged assaults despite sharing a small room with M.A. during the relevant period.

This created a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal for C.G.

M.C. was found guilty of accessing child pornography.

The Crown sought an 18-month custodial sentence, while the Defence proposed an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court considered significant mitigating factors, including M.C.'s history as a victim of childhood sexual trauma, extensive ongoing counselling, recovery from substance addiction, and strong family support.

The judge found M.C.'s cumulative circumstances to be exceptional, concluding that a custodial sentence would be highly problematic as it could interrupt his rehabilitation and risk relapse, thereby undermining the objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

An 18-month conditional sentence was imposed, followed by 18 months probation, along with ancillary orders (DNA, SOIRA for 20 years, and a s.161 order for 10 years), with strict conditions designed to ensure continued therapy and community safety.

The applicant, Mathew Cohen, sought a stay of proceedings under Section 24(1) of the Charter as a remedy for unreasonable delay under Section 11(b).

The total delay was 63 months.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, subtracting defence-attributable delay and exceptional circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the defence's prolonged pursuit of disclosure regarding a police officer's notes was futile and attributed some delay to the defence.

The court also determined that the pandemic's impact on court operations constituted a significant and long-lasting discrete exceptional circumstance, extending beyond the defence's concession.

Ultimately, the net delay was calculated at just over 25 months, which is below the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

Edward Dienaar, a 63-year-old man, was sentenced for two offences: failure to comply with a Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by not reporting a change in his domestic situation, and possession of child pornography (CP).

The court considered the massive and depraved nature of the CP collection (313,482 images and 5,098 videos), Dienaar's prior convictions for similar offences, and the significant victim impact statements.

Despite mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, health issues, and community support, the court imposed a sentence of six years for possession of CP and one year and three months consecutive for the breach of the LTSO, resulting in a net sentence of 4 years and 15 days after pre-trial credit.

Additionally, a 10-year LTSO was imposed, along with a lifetime Section 161 order, DNA order, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act reporting requirements.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court determined the total delay was 19 months and 19 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found the delay was primarily attributable to the Crown's failure to provide timely and complete disclosure, despite diligent efforts by the defence.

Even if the delay fell below the ceiling, the court found it unreasonable given the defence's proactive steps and the Crown's apathy.

The application was granted, and the charges were stayed.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence and 12 months' probation imposed on the respondent, a first-time offender who pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm for choking his domestic partner to the point of unconsciousness.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found the sentence demonstrably unfit and held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to give sufficient weight to denunciation and deterrence.

The court determined the fit sentence was 60 days' imprisonment less pre-trial custody, plus 12 months' probation.

However, given the appellate delay and the respondent's rehabilitative gains, the court permanently stayed the execution of the custodial sentence.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm and mischief to property following a physical altercation with his common-law partner.

The court heard conflicting evidence from the complainant and the defendant.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.) regarding credibility assessment and reasonable doubt, the judge found the complainant's testimony lacked specific details regarding the mechanics of the alleged assault and phone damage.

Conversely, the defendant's version of events was deemed credible and plausible, indicating he acted in self-defence and that any injuries or property damage were unintentional.

The court concluded that the prosecution had not proven the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant's acquittal on all charges.

The defendant, Fortunato Zappone, brought a second application to stay proceedings for delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, facing assault-related charges.

The court analyzed the total delay, deducting periods attributable to defence delay (14 days) and COVID-19 as a discrete exceptional circumstance (4 months 3 days for the first period, and 3 months 18 days for the second period due to the complainant's grandmother's death and the Crown's failure to mitigate).

The court found the net delay was below the presumptive ceiling, concluding that the defendant's right to trial within a reasonable time was not infringed.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for assault arising from an altercation at a shopping mall.

She argued the trial judge erred by inferring her nails caused the complainant's facial injuries, misapprehending her evidence regarding the word 'disengaged', and treating the fact that the parties were strangers as an aggravating factor on sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inference about the injuries was reasonable, the misapprehension of evidence was peripheral and did not cause a miscarriage of justice, and there was no reversible error in the sentencing analysis.

The applicant sought specific school records of the complainant relating to an inquiry by school administrators about an allegation that the complainant had been raped by her cousin.

The court conducted a stage one analysis under section 278 of the Criminal Code to determine whether the records met the threshold of "likely relevance." The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate case-specific information showing the records were likely relevant to an issue at trial.

The evidence was inconsistent and insufficient to establish that the records would contain information of value to the defence.

The application was dismissed at the first stage.

The defendant sought to adduce evidence of school rumours from March 2017 in which the complainant allegedly made false allegations of sexual assault against her cousin.

The defendant sought to cross-examine the complainant about her involvement in these rumours to suggest she has a propensity to fabricate sexual allegations.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that any questions about the rumours would constitute other sexual activity evidence under section 276 of the Criminal Code and would require compliance with the statutory regime.

The court found that questions about the rumours and the complainant's involvement were inextricably linked to communications of a sexual nature and therefore triggered section 276 protections.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence lacked significant probative value and was substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC).

Police received a complaint of a possibly impaired driver, identified the vehicle by license plate, and arrested the defendant at his home.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and the breath sample demand under the Charter.

The court found the arrest was lawful based on reasonable grounds, dismissed the Charter application, and acquitted the defendant on the impaired driving charge but convicted him on the excess BAC charge.

In a drug trafficking prosecution arising from covert entries into two condominium units and a vehicle under a general warrant, the accused brought a Charter application challenging the searches and seeking exclusion of the seized cocaine and cash.

The court held that the accused had standing and a reasonable expectation of privacy in the condominium units and vehicle, but not in the common underground garages or the limited occupancy and fob information voluntarily provided by condominium staff.

Applying the reviewing standard for warrant validity, the court found the information to obtain did not establish reasonable and probable grounds as against the accused, rising only to reasonable suspicion despite his meeting with a known trafficking target and subsequent police observations.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admission of the seized evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.

Following the ruling, the prosecution sought a stay of the charges under s. 579 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision to return a vehicle seized as offence-related property under the Criminal Code and Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA).

The Justice of the Peace had refused detention, considering irrelevant factors such as the accused's presumption of innocence and potential financial hardship.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by failing to apply the correct legal test under s. 490(1) of the Criminal Code, which provides limited discretion for detention orders, particularly when property is required for a future forfeiture hearing.

The court granted the application, quashed the return order, and remitted the matter for proper consideration.

The plaintiff sued the police and Crown Attorneys for negligent investigation, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an acquittal on a murder charge that involved a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Crown Attorneys moved to strike the plaintiff's claim and a crossclaim brought by the police for negligent legal advice.

The court struck the plaintiff's claim against the Crown Attorneys, finding it barred by absolute common law immunity, which only allows claims for malicious prosecution.

However, the court refused to strike the police crossclaim for negligent legal advice, finding it was not plain and obvious that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police when providing legal advice during an investigation.

The court also held that statutory immunity under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act applied to the plaintiff's claim but not the crossclaim.