Bruce Duncan

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal from his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court quashed the appeal, holding that it was not based on a question of law alone.

Criminal appeal concerning destruction by a third-party sexual assault crisis centre of counselling notes made during the complainant’s initial disclosure before charges were laid.

The majority held that where destroyed material met the disclosure or production threshold, the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 was breached without any additional requirement to prove actual prejudice at the breach stage.

Applying both the Stinchcombe and O’Connor frameworks, the Court found the notes were likely relevant to credibility and cross-examination and would have been producible.

A stay of proceedings was restored because the deliberate destruction of the only independent contemporaneous written account caused irremediable prejudice and continuing the prosecution would damage the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and choking with intent to commit an indictable offence.

At trial, the Crown called rebuttal evidence to counter the appellant's alibi, which also served as similar fact evidence going to identity.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Crown improperly split its case, the verdict was unreasonable, and the Crown abused its stand-by power to empanel an all-female jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Crown improperly split its case by adducing evidence in rebuttal that should have been presented in its case in chief, prejudicing the defence.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and received a mandatory firearms prohibition under the Criminal Code.

Before his appeal was heard, the Criminal Code was amended to make the prohibition discretionary.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the word 'adjudged' in section 44(e) of the Interpretation Act includes appellate review of a sentence.

Therefore, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment provided by the amended legislation.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the trial judge.

The respondent choreographed and took neo-Nazi photographs in a Jewish cemetery, featuring a young male simulating urinating on identifiable gravestones.

He was charged with offering indignities to human remains under s. 182(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted him, but the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that physical contact with the remains was required.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that physical interference is not necessary and that offering indignities to monuments marking human remains constitutes offering indignities to the remains themselves.

The Court also amended the charges to accurately reflect the respondent's conduct in choreographing the event.

The appellant was convicted of raping a 13-year-old girl.

The complainant's testimony contained inconsistencies regarding the number of assaults and her sexual history, which she explained as resulting from repressed memory.

The appellant did not testify.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant argued the jury drew an improper inference from his failure to testify and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to accept the complainant's explanations for the inconsistencies and that the verdict was one a properly instructed jury could reasonably render.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the cross-examination of the complainant's mother constituted impermissible oath-helping.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no violation of the oath-helping rule.

The Chief Justice and Justice McLachlin dissented, finding that the rule had been violated and would have ordered a new trial.

The appellants appealed from the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision quashing a stay of proceedings on narcotics charges.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge did not properly deal with the issue of whether section 7 of the Charter was violated and the appropriate remedy.

A new trial was ordered, with the accused permitted to renew their applications for a stay.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from an order staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the complexity of the case was an important factor justifying the delay, and ordered an expedited trial.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of break, enter and theft.

The trial judge found that the respondents were arbitrarily detained contrary to s. 9 of the Charter and excluded the resulting evidence (statements, stolen goods, fingerprints) under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that absent an error of law or unreasonable finding, it should not substitute its opinion for that of the courts below on a s. 24(2) application.

The appellant was convicted of having sexual intercourse with a female under fourteen years of age, contrary to s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code.

The conduct occurred before the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into force, but the trial took place after.

The appellant argued that the statutory denial of a defence of mistake of age violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that applying s. 7 to the substantive elements of an offence committed before the Charter came into force would constitute an impermissible retrospective application of the Charter.

The appellant was found guilty of both impaired driving and driving over .08, but the trial judge only registered a conviction for driving over .08.

After an acquittal at the Court of Queen's Bench, the Court of Appeal remitted the matter to determine if an impaired driving conviction should be entered.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that not registering a conviction is equivalent to entering a stay, and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court judge to consider whether to register a conviction and impose a sentence.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder but successfully appealed, resulting in an order for a new trial.

At the second trial, the Crown introduced the appellant's testimony from the first trial as part of its case-in-chief.

The appellant objected, arguing this violated his right against self-incrimination under s. 13 of the Charter.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal allowed the evidence, holding that a retrial was not 'any other proceedings'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 13 precludes the Crown from using an accused's previous testimony as part of its case in a retrial, as a retrial constitutes 'any other proceedings' and allowing such evidence would indirectly compel the accused to testify.

The appellant was convicted of rape after the trial judge admitted evidence of fourteen other sexual assaults as similar fact evidence.

Eleven of these episodes had no direct evidentiary link to the appellant, but were admitted based on their similarity to three other episodes where the appellant was identified.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that similar fact evidence must have some evidentiary link, direct or circumstantial, to the accused to be admissible.

The admission of the eleven unconnected episodes was highly prejudicial, and the appeal was allowed, directing a new trial.