John E. Johnson

The plaintiff alleged misuse of a joint bank account by his spouse and conversion of a workplace insurance care payment issued in his name.

The court rejected the claim relating to the spouses’ joint bank account, finding the account was managed consistently with the parties’ longstanding intention that the spouse handle household finances.

However, the court found that the spouse and her parents wrongfully converted a WSIB cheque issued to the plaintiff by concealing the payment and depositing it into an account in the mother’s name.

The defendants’ claim that the funds represented compensation for caregiving services failed due to lack of contractual consideration and the equitable doctrine of clean hands.

Judgment was granted for the amount of the cheque plus modest punitive damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard two appeals concerning the property and financial rights of common law partners upon the breakdown of their relationships.

The Court held that the 'common intention' resulting trust has no further role in resolving domestic property disputes.

Instead, the law of unjust enrichment is the primary vehicle.

The Court clarified that a monetary remedy for unjust enrichment need not always be calculated on a quantum meruit (fee-for-services) basis.

Where the parties were engaged in a 'joint family venture' and there is a link between the claimant's contributions and the accumulation of wealth, the remedy should be calculated based on the share of the accumulated wealth proportionate to the claimant's contributions.

In Vanasse, the Court restored the trial judge's award based on wealth accumulation.

In Kerr, the Court ordered a new trial for the unjust enrichment claims and restored the trial judge's order for spousal support effective from the date proceedings commenced.

The parties lived in a common-law relationship for 12 years.

After separation, the respondent was awarded $996,500 for unjust enrichment based on the trial judge's blurring of the 'value received' and 'value survived' approaches to quantify her contribution to the appellant's business success.

The appellant appealed the quantification method.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in blurring the two approaches and that the correct method was to determine the 'value received' and perform a quantum meruit calculation.

The award was set aside and the matter remitted for a new trial on quantification.

The appellant father appealed a Divisional Court decision that overturned a motion judge's finding denying the respondent mother retroactive child support.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly concluded that a 1997 amending agreement continued in force until 2005 and provided reasonable child support.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's finding that the father had shared custody of the son more than 40% of the time, making section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines applicable.

The appellant mother appealed a motion judge's order varying child support and dismissing her claim for retroactive support.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in applying the 40% shared custody rule without a trial, improperly averaging the father's income over five years under section 17(1) of the Guidelines, and dismissing the retroactive support claim.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in D.B.S., the Court awarded the mother $40,879.73 in retroactive child support dating back to her effective notice in 2001.

The appellant appealed a guardianship order that was granted without notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order to permit a new hearing, noting that while everyone acted out of concern for the appellant, the order was obtained without notice.

The court ordered that the status quo be maintained and that the appellant not be moved from his present residence without further court order.

The appeal concerned whether an Ontario court retained jurisdiction to vary a spousal support order made under the former Divorce Act when neither former spouse resided in Ontario and one former spouse did not attorn to jurisdiction.

The court held that the Divorce Act, 1985, including its transitional provisions, governed the variation application, and that the moving party had not commenced any variation proceeding before repeal of the former statute.

The court further held that s. 43(c) of the Interpretation Act did not preserve any acquired, accrued, or accruing right to seek variation because no steps had been taken before repeal to exercise that statutory entitlement.

As neither residency nor acceptance of jurisdiction under s. 5(1) was established, Ontario lacked jurisdiction and the variation application was dismissed.

The appellant was found guilty of both impaired driving and driving over .08, but the trial judge only registered a conviction for driving over .08.

After an acquittal at the Court of Queen's Bench, the Court of Appeal remitted the matter to determine if an impaired driving conviction should be entered.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that not registering a conviction is equivalent to entering a stay, and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court judge to consider whether to register a conviction and impose a sentence.