Leonard Max

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and criminal harassment against his estranged spouse, as well as his 42-month global sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of divorce proceedings and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) principles to his testimony.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence from family court proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and rejecting the fresh evidence as it failed the Palmer test.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court affirming that the sentence was fit and that the trial judge properly considered the abusive domestic context and parental alienation as aggravating factors.

The plaintiffs sold a retirement home and alleged that their lawyer and the purchaser's lawyer failed to ensure $109,000 was held in trust for tax liabilities.

The defendant lawyers moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred.

The court granted the motions, finding the plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability and had knowledge of the material facts more than two years before commencing the action.

The court also dismissed the fraudulent misrepresentation claim due to a lack of evidence.

The applicant tenant brought an urgent application under the Commercial Tenancies Act regarding a dispute over additional rent and a threatened eviction.

The court found the cited sections inapplicable but utilized the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure to avoid technical irregularities.

The court ordered the tenant to pay base rent plus an estimated amount for additional rent and arrears to avoid eviction, directed the landlord to provide an architect's certificate and actual figures, and converted the matter to a Rule 14 application.

The plaintiffs sued the lawyer who represented the purchaser in a share sale, alleging he falsely stated that funds had been deposited in a trust account.

The lawyer and his firm moved to strike the claims against them.

The court struck the claim for negligent misrepresentation, finding that a lawyer owes no duty of care to an opposing party who is represented by their own counsel.

However, the court refused to strike the claim for intentional misrepresentation, finding the plaintiffs had pleaded all necessary elements.

The court also declined to strike a cross-claim for contribution by a co-defendant bank.

The respondent brought a motion to strike portions of the applicant's Change Information Form filed in support of a motion to vary a final spousal support order.

The respondent argued that the impugned paragraphs contained allegations of events predating the final order and offended the principles of issue estoppel or res judicata.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the paragraphs raised a question of law regarding issue estoppel, the trial judge was in a better position to determine the relevance of the evidence in the context of the objectives of spousal support under the Divorce Act.

The appellant appealed an order regarding funds held in court related to an estate.

The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the appeal, alleging the real litigant was a declared vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the underlying application had not been advanced for over 10 years, the beneficiaries were elderly, and the appellant's agent could not justify retaining the funds in court.

The appeal was found to be devoid of merit.

In an estate proceeding commenced in 2003 with minimal progress, the moving respondents sought dismissal of the application and payment out of estate funds being held in court.

The court found the application was not being seriously pursued and had become an abuse of process, particularly in light of repeated adjournments and the control of the litigation by a person previously declared a vexatious litigant.

Given the age of the beneficiaries and the urgency of distribution, the court was prepared to direct payment out of the full estate proceeds to the entitled beneficiaries.

The applicant was granted 90 days to seek leave to continue the proceeding, failing which it could be dismissed by ex parte motion in writing.

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondents were not entitled to treat the retirement of his transition support loan as a taxable benefit and issue a T4.

The applicant argued that the loan documents, specifically a Q&A document, implied the loan would be retired without financial consequence to him.

The court found no ambiguity in the loan documents and held that they did not restrict the manner in which the respondents could retire the loan.

The application was dismissed, as the court could not rewrite the contract to impose an obligation to retire the loan tax-free.

The court determined costs following a motion arising from an examination in aid of execution related to a judgment exceeding $500,000.

The moving parties had obtained orders requiring the responding party to answer undertakings, respond to questions taken under advisement, produce third‑party records, and pay third‑party production costs.

In assessing costs under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the importance of recovery, the conduct of the parties, and the time spent by counsel and support staff.

Although the moving parties sought $7,418 on a partial indemnity basis, the court held that amount was high for a simple motion involving a discrete issue.

Costs were fixed at $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax payable by the responding party.

Judgment creditors brought a motion to compel answers to undertakings and production of financial records following an examination in aid of execution under Rule 60.18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The responding party argued he lacked funds to pay the costs of obtaining historical banking records from financial institutions.

The court held that a debtor’s alleged lack of financial means does not excuse compliance with production obligations and that the party with possession or control of relevant documents generally bears the cost of production.

The court ordered the responding party to answer outstanding undertakings, produce specified financial records, and facilitate production of third‑party files, including accountant and lawyer files subject to removal of solicitor‑client privileged communications.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order that varied his access to his children.

Following the initial trial judgment, the respondent sought a further hearing due to the appellant's inappropriate conduct during his first visit.

The appellant requested an adjournment but left the courthouse, and the trial judge proceeded in his absence, ordering no access except by further court order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decision to proceed or to vary the order, noting the appellant could have applied to the trial court to regain access but failed to do so.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appeal concerned whether an Ontario court retained jurisdiction to vary a spousal support order made under the former Divorce Act when neither former spouse resided in Ontario and one former spouse did not attorn to jurisdiction.

The court held that the Divorce Act, 1985, including its transitional provisions, governed the variation application, and that the moving party had not commenced any variation proceeding before repeal of the former statute.

The court further held that s. 43(c) of the Interpretation Act did not preserve any acquired, accrued, or accruing right to seek variation because no steps had been taken before repeal to exercise that statutory entitlement.

As neither residency nor acceptance of jurisdiction under s. 5(1) was established, Ontario lacked jurisdiction and the variation application was dismissed.