Atrisha S. Lewis

The plaintiff moved to not enter judgment in accordance with a jury verdict that dismissed his personal injury and racial profiling claims arising from an arrest by mall security for trespassing.

The plaintiff argued there was no evidence to support the jury's findings that the defendants had reasonable grounds to arrest him, did not use racial stereotypes, used reasonable force, and that he suffered no damages.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants led 'some evidence' on each issue, including expert testimony on use of force and medical causation, which the jury was entitled to accept.

Judgment was ordered to be entered in accordance with the jury's verdict.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class action against the Toronto Police Services Board and several Chiefs of Police regarding the practice of 'carding' or street checks.

The plaintiffs alleged that the practice disproportionately targeted Black and Indigenous individuals, violating their Charter rights and constituting systemic negligence and intrusion upon seclusion.

The court found that the plaintiffs met all the criteria for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including establishing a valid cause of action, an identifiable class, common issues, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiffs.

The motion for certification was granted.

The applicants sought judicial review of administrative decisions dismissing disciplinary charges against two police officers for lack of jurisdiction.

The hearing officers and the Ontario Civilian Police Commission found that the six-month statutory deadline under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act for serving a notice of hearing had expired.

The applicants argued that the deadline should be paused during a review by the Complaints Director.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that the administrative decision-makers reasonably interpreted the plain wording of the statute, which contained no exception for a Director's review.

This ruling addresses requested changes to the jury charge in a medical negligence trial concerning the standard of care and the admissibility and weight of evidence regarding minority medical practice, usual practice, and the distinction between buttock numbness and saddle anaesthesia.

The court reviews the law on minority practice, the role of expert evidence, and the proper approach to weighing conflicting testimony, ultimately declining to make certain amendments requested by the defendant and clarifying the law for the jury.

The defendant, Farm Mutual Reinsurance Plan Inc. (FMRP), brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, 2496300 Ontario Inc. (249), under Rule 56.01(1)(d) due to 249's insufficient assets. 249 did not dispute its lack of assets but argued against the order due to FMRP's unreasonable delay in bringing the motion, FMRP's alleged causation of 249's financial state, and 249's strong chance of success.

The court found FMRP's delay unreasonable, limiting the security to future costs.

The court also found that 249 failed to establish a "good chance of success" in overturning its independent contractor agreement.

The motion was granted in part, ordering 249 to post $50,000 for FMRP's future partial indemnity costs and to pay $15,000 in partial indemnity costs for the motion itself.

This appeal addresses issues of jurisdiction simpliciter and forum non conveniens in a complex international insurance coverage dispute.

Vale and RSA initiated actions in Ontario seeking coverage for environmental liabilities, primarily in Ontario, after Travelers commenced a similar action in New York.

The motion judge largely found Ontario had jurisdiction and was not forum non conveniens, except for North River.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurers' appeals, affirming Ontario's jurisdiction over them, and allowed Vale's appeal, finding Ontario also had jurisdiction over North River.

The court emphasized that a comprehensive general liability insurer underwriting Ontario risks connects itself to Ontario for jurisdictional purposes, and that the "first-to-file" rule does not automatically determine the appropriate forum.

The appellants appealed a decision granting a Certificate of Pending Litigation against their property after they terminated an Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The appellants argued the motion judge failed to consider a schedule requiring direct deposit, improperly considered their subjective intentions, and erroneously assessed the property's uniqueness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants could not raise the schedule interpretation for the first time on appeal, and that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding errors in assessing the equities or the uniqueness of the property.

This is an appeal from a medical negligence judgment.

The appellants, two doctors, challenged the trial judge's findings on standard of care and causation after Ms. Stevenhaagen suffered severe neurological injuries following an angioplasty procedure and subsequent aortic rupture.

The trial judge found the doctors liable for failing to consult a cardiovascular surgeon promptly and for transferring the patient to the Coronary Care Unit instead of directly to the operating room after temporary stabilization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's conclusions that the standard of care was breached and that this breach caused Ms. Stevenhaagen's injuries, applying the 'but for' test for causation.

The applicant, Vale Canada Limited and related entities, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario to expedite the hearing of their appeals.

These appeals stem from a lower court decision regarding jurisdiction and forum non conveniens in a complex insurance dispute with parallel proceedings in New York.

The motion judge dismissed the request for expedition, emphasizing that judicial comity requires avoiding an "unseemly race" between jurisdictions and that the issue of forum non conveniens should be determined on its merits by the respective appeal courts, not by the speed of litigation.

The court-appointed Liquidators of Days Hong Kong sought a Norwich Order against two Ontario corporations (Days Canada Limited and Days Holdings Limited) and their director, Scott McPhail (Third Parties), to obtain information for tracing assets and investigating potential fraudulent conveyances by Mahesh Dayaram, a convicted fraudster.

The Third Parties argued the Liquidators had sufficient information and the request was a fishing expedition.

The court granted the Norwich Order in part, finding the test for such an order was met due to the suspicious timing of share redemptions and property transfers, the need for asset tracing in a large-scale fraud, and the Liquidators' broad investigative powers under a Recognition Order.

The court also addressed the scope of indemnity for the Third Parties' costs of compliance.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and awarded costs of $2,500 to the moving parties.

The plaintiff professional corporation brought an action against the Law Society of Ontario, several individuals, and a Superior Court judge, seeking damages and declarations related to a previous unsuccessful application.

The defendants requested the action be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding that the judge had absolute immunity, the plaintiff corporation had no cause of action, the issues had already been decided in the previous proceeding, and the pleadings contained inflammatory and bellicose language.

Supplemental reasons issued to correct an error in the court's previous decision (2022 ONSC 12).

The court corrected paragraph 4 to clarify that Lloyds should not have been listed as a party challenging the forum of the action.

Vale Canada and its primary insurer, RSA, brought actions against numerous excess insurers for coverage of environmental remediation costs incurred primarily in Ontario.

Several foreign excess insurers brought motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Ontario court or seeking a stay based on forum non conveniens in favour of an action in New York.

The court found it had jurisdiction over all moving insurers except North River Insurance Company, concluding that the insurers were 'carrying on business' in Ontario by participating in a global insurance program for an Ontario-based company.

The court declined to stay the actions for forum non conveniens, finding Ontario to be the 'centre of gravity' for the dispute.

Claims by Vale Canada against two UK insurers were stayed pending arbitration.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's proceeding, the successful respondents sought costs.

The court found the application to be scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious, noting the applicant, a self-represented lawyer, engaged in egregious misconduct including racist and personal attacks against the respondents and their counsel.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the Law Society of Ontario in the amount of $33,000 and to the individual respondent in the amount of $12,742.86, emphasizing the need to sanction the applicant's abuse of the justice system.

The applicant lawyer commenced an application seeking to halt a Law Society of Ontario investigation into complaints regarding his social media posts, and claiming damages against the LSO and the individual complainants.

The respondents moved to strike the application.

The court dismissed the application on the basis that it was improperly commenced by Notice of Application rather than a Statement of Claim.

In the alternative, the court held it would have struck the applicant's pleadings in their entirety without leave to amend under Rule 25.11, finding them to be scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The self-represented applicant lawyer brought an application against the Law Society of Ontario and several individuals following online disputes and subsequent professional complaints.

The matter came before the court on a regular motions list but was plagued by procedural irregularities, including improper service, failure to file application records, and disputes over representation.

The court adjourned the matter to a special appointment hearing, provided strict timetables for the filing of materials, and dismissed the applicant's request to remove opposing counsel from the record for alleged sharp practice.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following a balloon angioplasty procedure that resulted in a ruptured thoracic aorta.

The patient survived but suffered paraplegia and cognitive deficits, eventually passing away years later.

The court found that the interventional cardiologist and vascular surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to consult with a cardiac surgeon and by transferring the patient to the coronary care unit instead of directly to the operating room after an interim endovascular repair.

The court concluded that this delay in obtaining open cardiac surgery caused the patient's neurological injuries.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs for an agreed-upon amount of damages.

Following a 70-day medical malpractice jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $3.75 million in damages, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The plaintiff sought over $3.3 million in costs and disbursements, while the defendants argued for a significantly lower amount, citing proportionality and excessive hours.

The court analyzed the Rule 57 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the necessity of extensive preparation by plaintiff's counsel, and the fact that defence costs themselves exceeded $3.2 million.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $2,404,765 for fees and $628,387 for disbursements, totaling $3,033,152.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action sought to adduce opinion evidence from two treating cardiac surgeons as participant experts.

The defendants brought a motion to exclude portions of the proposed evidence of one of the surgeons, arguing it went beyond the scope permitted by Westerhof and that the surgeon lacked impartiality and specific expertise.

The court allowed the motion in part, excluding opinions on the standard of care prior to the surgeon's involvement and on whether earlier surgery would have changed the outcome, as these were not based on his observation or participation.

However, the court permitted the surgeon to opine on matters arising directly from his involvement, holding that concerns about his partiality should go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.