Robin Y. Tremblay

The plaintiff professional corporation brought an action against the Law Society of Ontario, several individuals, and a Superior Court judge, seeking damages and declarations related to a previous unsuccessful application.

The defendants requested the action be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding that the judge had absolute immunity, the plaintiff corporation had no cause of action, the issues had already been decided in the previous proceeding, and the pleadings contained inflammatory and bellicose language.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to trial on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000, while consenting to committal on a breach of recognizance charge.

The court found that the preliminary inquiry judge made a jurisdictional error by committing the applicant on the possession and proceeds of crime charges, as there was a complete absence of evidence to reasonably infer knowledge and control of the items found in the vehicle's trunk.

The court determined that the inference drawn by the preliminary inquiry judge was based on speculation rather than reasonable evidence.

However, the court dismissed the application to quash the committal for breach of recognizance, finding sufficient evidence to support the inference that the applicant was not residing at his specified address.

The applicants sought an injunction to prevent the respondents from trespassing on their portion of Silver Lake by navigation.

A preliminary issue arose regarding whether the application should be decided using the new, broader definition of "navigable water" from the Canadian Navigable Waters Act (CNWA) enacted in 2019, or the common law definition.

The court ruled that the new definition in s. 2 of the CNWA must be used, as Parliament's intention was to protect navigation rights on more bodies of water.

This interpretation was deemed to produce a just and reasonable result, effectively replacing the common law "aqueous highway" test.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment, claiming constructive dismissal and seeking damages for the unexpired term of her fixed-term employment contract, plus punitive damages.

The court found that the plaintiff was constructively dismissed when the defendant placed her on an unauthorized, indefinite administrative suspension without pay, which constituted a fundamental breach of her employment contract.

The defendant's subsequent attempt to terminate for just cause was rejected as an impermissible retrospective dismissal based on pre-existing or discoverable grounds.

The court granted summary judgment for constructive dismissal and awarded damages for the unexpired contract term.

However, issues regarding the plaintiff's mitigation efforts and entitlement to punitive damages were deemed to require a mini-trial and a full trial, respectively, due to conflicting evidence.

The Crown appealed a decision staying charges against the respondents under the Occupational Health and Safety Act due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge found a 23-month delay and concluded the Crown failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay in a complex case.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown's failure to secure a trial date in a timely manner and its problematic case management fell below the standard required by Jordan.

The appellant appealed her conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle.

She was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of her parked, running vehicle facing oncoming traffic.

The trial judge found she rebutted the presumption of care and control by proving she did not intend to drive, but convicted her on the basis that the vehicle's position posed a realistic risk of danger.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by shifting the burden of proof and requiring the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that she did not present a realistic risk of danger.

A new trial was ordered.

The mother appealed a trial decision ordering that her child be made a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

She argued the trial judge over-relied on a parenting capacity assessment and erred by not admitting a psychiatric report.

She also sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, including notes regarding her interactions with her second child and a new psychiatric report.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error by the trial judge.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered all evidence, correctly excluded the improperly tendered psychiatric report, and that the fresh evidence, while admissible, would not have altered the outcome given the mother's cognitive limitations and lack of support.

On a contempt motion arising from repeated denial of child access, the court considered whether a custodial parent may rely on a 12-year-old child's refusal to attend visits with the access parent.

Applying the contempt test, the court held that an earlier order lacked the clarity required for contempt, but a later order directing a specific drop-off date, time, and location was clear and unequivocal.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother deliberately and wilfully failed to comply by leaving the access decision to the child rather than exercising normal parental authority.

A finding of contempt was made, with sanction to be determined later.