Lynda E. Morgan

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his five-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal bifurcated the sentence appeal to allow the appellant to seek Legal Aid funding.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, which are owed particular deference.

The applicant sought severance from her co-accused on the basis that a joint trial would result in significant prejudice and an unfair trial.

The applicant faces a charge of first degree murder while her co-accused faces second degree murder, despite the Crown alleging the same conduct of planning and deliberation against both.

The applicant argued that the differential charges would improperly lead the jury to conclude she is more culpable.

The Crown opposed severance, arguing that any prejudice would be eliminated through proper jury instructions.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding that the presumption of joint trial applies with particular force where co-accused are blaming each other, that the evidence is the same against both, and that jury instructions would adequately protect against any risk of prejudicial reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and breach of probation, as well as his sentence of 30 months in custody less 7 months credit for presentence custody, followed by 18 months' probation.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence on the basis that the trial judge erred in failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the sentencing judge and dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the circumstances did not warrant a conditional sentence and that the sentence fell within the applicable range.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of Centa J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay agreed costs of $4,000 to the responding party.

The appellant, Rashawn Salmon, appealed his convictions for various drug and firearms offences, arguing that the reviewing judge erred in dismissing his pre-trial Charter motion.

Specifically, he challenged the lawfulness of search warrants for his condo unit and vehicle, alleging s. 8 breaches regarding CCTV footage and the sufficiency of grounds for the warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the reviewing judge's conclusions that the police obtained information from authorized persons, that there were reasonable grounds for the search warrants, and that the vehicle seizure was lawful.

The court reiterated that a piecemeal approach to warrant review is inappropriate and that property management can consent to police access to common areas.

The appellants, convicted of murder, appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and violation of their right to be present.

The trial judge repeatedly encouraged guilty pleas in chambers and directly to the accused, expressing strong opinions on the evidence and linking rulings to plea outcomes.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and infringed the accused's right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, compromising the fairness and integrity of the trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The defendant, a young person, was charged with sexually assaulting and choking a young woman.

The central issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant's and defendant's testimonies, particularly concerning an "apology conversation" via Snapchat.

The defendant claimed consensual sex and that his apology was for bringing another friend along, while the complainant asserted non-consensual sexual activity.

The court found the defendant's explanation for the apology unpersuasive and accepted the complainant's account, despite minor inconsistencies in her testimony regarding non-remarkable details.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

The applicants brought a pretrial motion challenging a search warrant and a Part VI wiretap authorization.

The court found that the applicant had standing to challenge the search warrant for a short-term rental unit, as he could rely on the affiant's theory in the Information to Obtain (ITO) which alleged he rented the unit.

The court also held that the applicants do not require leave to cross-examine officers regarding the 'resort-to' provision of the wiretap authorization, as the Crown bears the burden of establishing lawful interception when a Charter challenge is raised.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the dismissal of his "faint hope" application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had applied the 2011 amendments, which increased the judicial screening threshold from "reasonable prospect" to "substantial likelihood." Relying on R. v. Dell, the appellant argued this retrospective application violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the violation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ruling that the "reasonable prospect" threshold applies to s. 745.6 applications for offences committed between January 9, 1997, and December 2, 2011, and remitted the application for a new screening hearing.

D.M. appealed convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The complainant had an intellectual disability.

The Court of Appeal found several errors in the trial judge's conduct and jury instructions, including the Crown's improper use of expert evidence to bolster the complainant's credibility, misdirection on the W.(D.) rule regarding exculpatory evidence, improper cross-examination of the accused regarding motives for false allegations, and misdirection on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, Hubert Nathanial Shilling, appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his four-and-a-half-year sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, the rejection of a motive to fabricate, and the use of corroborating evidence.

The appellant also brought a fresh evidence motion, citing his contraction of COVID-19 and a PTSD diagnosis during incarceration, seeking a reduced sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, the conviction appeal, and the sentence appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning or the fitness of the sentence.

The appellant, Ali Amiri, brought two appeals from Superior Court decisions concerning certiorari applications related to his criminal trial for threatening his wife.

The first appeal (C70004) challenged the dismissal of his certiorari application to quash a procedural order, which was deemed moot as the trial judge had since decided the underlying issues.

The second appeal (C70051) challenged the granting of certiorari applications by two subpoenaed witnesses (a lawyer and a Legal Aid Ontario employee) to quash their subpoenas, based on solicitor-client privilege and statutory privilege, respectively.

The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed both appeals under s. 685(1) of the Criminal Code, finding them frivolous or vexatious, emphasizing the limited scope of certiorari in criminal proceedings and the lack of merit in the appellant's arguments regarding privilege exceptions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by using inflammatory language in a supplementary ruling on a recusal motion, after defence counsel observed the judge with a draft judgment during submissions.

The appellant also alleged errors in the trial judge's Charter analysis under ss. 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) regarding the roadside screening device and the right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's comments about counsel were problematic, they did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also upheld the trial judge's Charter findings, concluding there was no misapprehension of evidence and the police waited a reasonable time for counsel of choice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, mischief, criminal harassment, uttering threats, and breach of probation, arising from incidents involving his former girlfriend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions reasonable and supported by strong circumstantial evidence, including text messages.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to correct a Kienapple error, setting aside a duplicative conviction for uttering threats based on the same evidence.

The Court also set aside the victim surcharges as unconstitutional.

The appellant appealed her 8.5-year custodial sentence and a $185,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture following convictions for human trafficking and related sex trade offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious aggravating circumstances and the paramountcy of denunciation and deterrence.

The court also upheld the fine, concluding it was amply supported by evidence of the profits the appellant derived from her crimes.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment for the sexual assault of his estranged spouse and use of an imitation firearm.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by treating premeditation as an aggravating factor, by granting insufficient enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and by imposing an overly long probationary period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the agreed statement of facts supported the finding of premeditation, the sentence was within the appropriate range, and the enhanced credit and probation orders were reasonable exercises of discretion.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision staying regulatory charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act on the basis of unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges arose from a workplace fatality at a gold mine where a worker was poisoned by cyanide.

The Ontario Court of Justice found that the net delay of 23 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months and that the Crown failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Crown sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on four grounds relating to the calculation of delay and the application of the Jordan framework.

This ruling addresses the scope of redactions to be applied to public court documents related to a prior non-publication order granted to "Person X." The court balanced the applicant's privacy interests in preventing direct or indirect identification with the public's right to access information, particularly as advocated by media interveners.

The judge approved most of the applicant's proposed redactions but rejected some, allowing general, non-identifying information about Person X's personal circumstances, professional reputation, and the fact of being a target of a Competition Bureau investigation to remain in the public record.

The ruling also vacated a previous sealing order and varied an *in camera* order.

The applicant sought clarification on the form of redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) documents following a non-publication order protecting their identity.

The court ordered that gender-identifying pronouns in specific paragraphs be redacted or replaced with 'it' to ensure consistency and protect the applicant's identity.

The court also rejected a proposed 'Warning' format that would leave identifying information visible but subject to a publication ban, ordering instead that the identifying information be fully redacted from the public versions of the ITOs pursuant to section 487.3 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed a decision staying charges against the respondents under the Occupational Health and Safety Act due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge found a 23-month delay and concluded the Crown failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay in a complex case.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown's failure to secure a trial date in a timely manner and its problematic case management fell below the standard required by Jordan.