Lynda E. Morgan

The applicant, an alleged participant in a price-fixing conspiracy in the fresh commercial bread industry, sought a non-publication order to protect their identity in four Informations to Obtain (ITOs) used to secure search warrants.

The applicant was not a target of the search warrants and had not been charged.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and section 487.3 of the Criminal Code, finding that the applicant was an 'innocent person' whose reputation and livelihood would suffer serious and irreversible prejudice if their identity were disclosed.

The court granted the non-publication order in large part, concluding that the salutary effects of protecting the applicant's identity outweighed the deleterious effects on the open court principle, while still allowing public access to the majority of the ITOs.

The applicant, Kevin Wallace, charged under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) used to secure an authorization for private communications interception.

This application was part of a Garofoli challenge to the authorization.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on two specific areas: alleged misrepresentations and omissions regarding tipsters #1 and #4, and the asserted involvement of the applicant in a meeting in Dubai, particularly concerning conflicting travel information.

Leave was denied for questions regarding independent investigation/corroboration of tipster information and investigative necessity, as sufficient information was already available or cross-examination would not materially assist.

The moving party, a dental surgeon, sought a stay of the revocation of his licence pending his appeal of a Discipline Committee decision finding him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a patient.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay.

The court found that while there were weak but arguable grounds regarding the existence of a doctor-patient relationship at the time of one incident, the overwhelming evidence of subsequent sexual abuse made a finding of misconduct and a period of suspension inevitable.

As the moving party would not suffer irreparable harm by beginning to serve an inevitable suspension, the motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that his statements to police were involuntary and that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated.

The appellant contended that police failed to facilitate his right to counsel of choice, failed to offer a second consultation when new allegations of child abuse were raised, and improperly induced a confession by suggesting consensual sex with a minor was not a crime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breaches and upholding the trial judge's ruling that the confession was voluntary.

The accused brought an application to strike his guilty pleas to sexual assault and failure to appear.

The accused pleaded guilty on April 11, 2014, after receiving new disclosure moments before trial.

The court found that the accused, who suffered from attention deficit disorder, dyslexia, and a borderline IQ, did not fully understand the plea procedure or his legal options despite appearing articulate.

The new allegations created time pressure to accept a plea bargain.

The court granted the application, finding a real doubt as to the validity of the plea, and permitted the accused to strike his plea and re-elect to his original mode of trial.

Accused charged with bribery of foreign public officials sought production of investigative records from the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency in support of a Garofoli challenge to wiretap authorizations.

The World Bank asserted immunity as an international organization and refused to produce additional materials.

The court held that by initiating and actively assisting the Canadian criminal investigation, the organization had impliedly waived immunity and must accept the procedural burdens of a criminal prosecution.

The applicants established likely relevance under the first stage of the O’Connor framework.

Production was ordered for certain investigative materials for judicial review.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 7.5-year sentence for four bank robberies and related firearms offences.

He argued the trial judge erred in accepting eyewitness identification from four bank tellers and recognition evidence from a police officer, citing discrepancies and flawed photo line-up procedures.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the criteria for assessing photo identification evidence and was alive to the frailties of eyewitness testimony.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range and the trial judge did not err in applying the totality principle to the mandatory consecutive sentences.

During pre-trial proceedings involving allegations of abuse of process related to police handling of solicitor-client privileged communications intercepted under Part VI wiretap authorizations, the court had ordered production of privileged materials for judicial review under the McClure framework.

The Crown sought a judicial stay rather than comply with the order, asserting that compliance would require disclosure of solicitor-client privileged communications between police and Crown counsel.

The defence agreed to the requested remedy.

Considering the public interest in preserving solicitor-client privilege and the lengthy procedural history of the case, the court exercised its discretion to terminate the prosecution by entering a judicial stay of proceedings.

The applicants brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, alleging widespread police misconduct in the execution of wiretap authorizations, particularly regarding the interception of privileged solicitor-client communications.

During the motion, police witnesses testified about their handling of intercepted communications, prompting the applicants to seek disclosure of the legal advice the police received from Crown counsel.

The Crown asserted solicitor-client privilege over the advice.

The court held that while the individual officers did not waive privilege, the applicants met the threshold to pierce the privilege under the 'innocence at stake' exception as adapted for an abuse of process motion.

The court ordered a stage-two in-camera review of the privileged communications to determine if they should be disclosed to the defence.

The respondent Board brought a motion for directions in advance of an appeal, seeking to redact personal and confidential information concerning the victim from both its Reasons and the Hearing Brief.

The appellant, who was found by the Board to have sexually assaulted the victim, opposed the redactions.

The Divisional Court held that the Board must provide an unredacted copy of its Reasons to ensure transparency and procedural fairness, but upheld the majority of the redactions in the Hearing Brief to protect the victim's privacy interests.

The accused, a project supervisor for a construction company, was charged with criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm following the collapse of a swing stage on December 24, 2009, at a Toronto construction site.

Five workers fell 13 stories to their deaths, one suffered debilitating injuries, and one survived because he was tied to a lifeline.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial based primarily on his failure to ensure that workers were properly tied to lifelines while working on the suspended platform, despite clear regulatory requirements and training standards.

The accused brought a successive application seeking declarations that certain police-intercepted communications were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court reviewed audio recordings of intercepted telephone sessions and the supporting affidavit filed under seal.

It held that most of the communications involved discussions between the accused and his solicitor within the context of a professional retainer and therefore attracted solicitor-client privilege.

However, two intercepted sessions consisting only of a solicitor leaving voicemail messages requesting a return call did not contain privileged legal communications.

The court declared privilege over the substantive communications and ordered the supporting affidavit sealed to protect the privilege.

During pre‑trial proceedings, the accused advanced a Charter challenge alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from an alleged unreasonable search and seizure.

The court addressed issues relating to production of third‑party banking records held by a financial institution.

To facilitate the ongoing motion, the court clarified the scope of a subpoena duces tecum issued to a bank employee and specified categories of internal bank materials to be produced, including anti‑money laundering manuals, online instructions to branches, and training materials relevant to the relevant time period.

The endorsement was issued to ensure production of the documentation necessary for the continuation of the pre‑trial Charter application.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to quash their committal for trial.

They argued the preliminary inquiry justice lost jurisdiction by refusing to allow them to call witnesses who had provided information relevant to judicial pre-authorizations, which they intended to use to establish Charter breaches.

The preliminary inquiry justice and the appeal judge treated the proposed witnesses as sub-affiants who could only be cross-examined with leave.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the witnesses were properly characterized as sub-affiants and that the refusal to allow their cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry did not impair the appellants' right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges of breach of trust, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to obstruct justice.

The appellant argued that the evidence from the preliminary inquiry only showed he attempted to assist a friend navigate the criminal justice system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the totality of the evidence, including intercepted communications and the appellant's use of his position to access court officials, was sufficient to justify the committal to stand trial.