Douglas B. Maund

The accused, Carly Delorme, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with a blood-alcohol concentration over 80 mg%.

The trial judge dismissed both charges.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in officer testimony and the accused's normal behaviour on video.

Regarding the "over 80" charge, while the Certificate of Analysis was admitted (the court held that virtual exhibits could be "duplicate originals" and satisfied legal requirements), the Crown failed to prove that the operation occurred within the two-hour timeframe preceding the officer's arrival, which is a necessary element of the re-worded offence.

The presumption of care and control was also rebutted as the vehicle was inoperable and the accused was trapped.

The accused was charged with impaired driving offences.

A pretrial voir dire was held to determine if three proposed unaccredited interpreters possessed the necessary skills to interpret the proceedings for the accused, whose primary language is the rare Digoron dialect of Ossetian.

Applying the principles from R. v. Tran, the court assessed the competency of the proposed interpreters.

The court found that none of the candidates, despite their qualifications in other dialects or languages, could provide the required level of continuous and accurate interpretation for the accused.

Consequently, the court ruled that the proposed interpreters were not suitable, necessitating a renewed search for a qualified interpreter.

The applicant sought to transfer her criminal trial from the Ontario Court of Justice at Orangeville to the Davis Courthouse in Brampton pursuant to Section 599 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant was charged with five criminal offences including impaired operation and breach of probation arising from an incident in the Town of Caledon.

The court dismissed the motion, upholding a longstanding regional policy established in 1997 that transfers Caledon criminal trials to Orangeville.

The court found that the policy was expedient to the ends of justice and that the applicant's personal inconvenience did not warrant departure from the established practice.

The Crown sought a warrant to obtain bodily substances for forensic DNA analysis from the respondent pursuant to Section 487.05(1) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was charged with break and enter of a dwelling house and mischief by wilful damage.

The Crown's evidence consisted of a DNA profile obtained from a half-consumed can of Fruitopia found at the crime scene, which had been matched to the respondent through the National DNA Data Bank.

The respondent argued that there was insufficient evidence that he was a party to the offence and that it was not in the best interests of justice to issue the warrant given the Crown already possessed the original DNA match.

The court granted the DNA warrant, finding reasonable grounds to believe the respondent was a party to the offence based on the inference that the beverage can was introduced to the secured property during the break-in period.

The accused brought an application to strike his guilty pleas to sexual assault and failure to appear.

The accused pleaded guilty on April 11, 2014, after receiving new disclosure moments before trial.

The court found that the accused, who suffered from attention deficit disorder, dyslexia, and a borderline IQ, did not fully understand the plea procedure or his legal options despite appearing articulate.

The new allegations created time pressure to accept a plea bargain.

The court granted the application, finding a real doubt as to the validity of the plea, and permitted the accused to strike his plea and re-elect to his original mode of trial.

A police sergeant was charged with assault causing bodily harm under Section 267(b) of the Criminal Code for striking a complainant in the face during an arrest at a police station.

The complainant had attended the station to dispute a traffic ticket, became agitated, made threatening statements about arsons, and physically resisted arrest by locking his shoulder and keeping his hands apart to prevent handcuffing.

The sergeant delivered an open-hand distraction strike to the complainant's face, causing dental injuries.

The court found the sergeant's use of force was reasonable and necessary under Section 25 of the Criminal Code, as the complainant was actively resisting arrest and the second handcuff had not been fully secured at the time of the strike.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application at a preliminary inquiry for an order permitting audio/video recording of testimony from certain witnesses in a first-degree murder case.

The Crown argued that the evidence of witnesses directly involved in the alleged offence or closely associated with the accused was vulnerable and that videotaping would preserve a complete record for potential use under Criminal Code section 715(1) if witnesses became unavailable or hostile at trial.

The defence argued the court lacked jurisdiction to order videotaping.

The court granted the application in part, permitting videotaping of witnesses directly implicated in the offence but denying it for family members and associates not implicated in the crime.

The Crown brought a motion to admit hearsay statements made by the accused's two children (ages 12 and 8) immediately after his arrest at the family home.

The children told police that their father had been drinking and speeding while driving them home, and that they were afraid.

The Crown sought to admit these statements under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused was charged with impaired operation, over 80, operation of a motor vehicle while disqualified, and two offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court found the statements admissible under both the res gestae exception and the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of eighty milligrams percent contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to have a trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The overall delay from the swearing of the information on September 5, 2013 to the second scheduled trial date on November 6, 2014 was approximately fourteen months.

The court found that institutional and Crown delay totaled approximately ten months and twenty-five days, with significant delay attributable to late disclosure.

The accused established actual prejudice, as he was caring for his wife who had been paralyzed in an accident on the same day he was charged.

The court found that the delay, exacerbated by the real prejudice, was excessive and offended section 11(b) of the Charter, and ordered a judicial stay of proceedings.

The accused, a Finnish national residing illegally in Canada, was charged with nine offences including assaults and threats against Amanda Rayburn, unlawful use of a credit card belonging to Charmaine Thomas, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The trial revealed a pattern of deception whereby the accused simultaneously maintained romantic relationships with three women, misrepresenting his identity, employment, and personal circumstances.

The court found the accused guilty of unlawful use of the credit card and assault and threat charges relating to the February 9 incident with Amanda Rayburn, but acquitted on other counts.

A guilty plea was entered on one count during trial.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon (backhoe) contrary to Section 267(a) of the Criminal Code.

The incident occurred at a construction site in Orangeville where the accused was operating an excavator and the complainant approached to report damage to a truck.

Following a confrontation, the accused rotated the excavator while the complainant was holding onto it, causing him to be spun around multiple times before falling to the ground.

The court found the accused guilty of the included offence of common assault contrary to Section 266, rejecting the assault with a weapon charge and the defence of self-defence.

The accused was charged with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that a warrantless search of the residence constituted a breach of the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

The court found that while a breach occurred, the police acted in good faith based on legitimate public safety concerns arising from a volatile domestic dispute involving references to a firearm.

Applying the section 24(2) Charter exclusion analysis from R v. Grant, the court balanced the seriousness of the police conduct, the impact on the accused's privacy interests, and society's interest in adjudicating the case.

The court concluded that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and admitted the evidence.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired and having a blood alcohol content in excess of eighty milligrams percent while operating a motor vehicle.

The offences allegedly occurred on October 28, 2012 in the Town of Caledon.

The accused struck a tree in a residential area after proceeding through a stop sign.

The court dismissed a Charter Section 8 application challenging the arrest and breath sample demand, finding sufficient grounds existed.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges, relying on expert toxicology evidence projecting a blood alcohol concentration of 165 to 215 milligrams percent at the time of driving, corroborated by the circumstances of the accident and police observations.

A judicial stay was imposed on the impaired charge pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The Crown brought a forfeiture application seeking to forfeit a New Holland T6050 Tractor and F250 Loader used by the offender when he was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from doing so.

The offender's father, who claimed a partnership interest in the farm equipment, opposed the forfeiture.

The court applied the three-step test for forfeiture under Section 490.1 of the Criminal Code and found that while the equipment was offence-related property and all interested parties were properly notified, the forfeiture would be disproportionate under Section 490.41(3).

The court concluded that the tractor was essential to the family farm operation and that forfeiture would cause undue economic harm to the legitimate farming enterprise beyond the offender alone.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on two intoxilyzer breath tests showing readings of 161 and 166 milligrams percent.

The defence argued that the accused's moderate to severe gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), combined with consumption of a large meal and alcohol, could have caused regurgitated stomach alcohol to produce false high readings on the breath tests.

The court found that the defence evidence established a reasonable doubt regarding the proper functioning of the instrument and that the accused's blood alcohol concentration was likely below the legal limit at the time of the offence.

The applicant, an unrepresented accused charged with robbery, aggravated assault, and uttering threats, sought the appointment of amicus curiae to represent his interests at a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant's Legal Aid certificate was denied after his previous counsel withdrew due to a conflict of interest.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae and whether such an appointment was necessary to prevent a failure of justice.

The court found that the Ontario Court of Justice has jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae in limited circumstances where necessary to prevent a failure of justice, and that the imminent preliminary inquiry with one co-accused in custody for eight months necessitated the appointment.

The court appointed counsel as amicus curiae at a rate of $180 per hour.

The accused, charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information was approximately 13 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, attributing much of it to the defence's failure to accurately estimate trial time after raising new constitutional issues.

The court found the institutional delay to be 7 to 8 months, which was within the administrative guidelines, and found no prejudice to the accused.

The application was dismissed.