Richard Andrew Allman

This sentencing decision addresses the appropriate custodial sentence for D.S., convicted of multiple sexual offences against his stepchildren.

The court carefully weighs mitigating factors such as the offender's age, first-time status, and family support against significant aggravating factors including multiple victims, repeated offences over years, abuse of trust, and severe victim impact.

The judge rejects the defence's request for a Conditional Sentence Order (CSO), concluding that the gravity of the offences and the principles of denunciation and deterrence require a custodial sentence exceeding two years.

The global sentence imposed is 40 months, with ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA, firearms prohibition, DNA order, and lifetime prohibition.

This is a sentencing decision for a young person (H.W.) found guilty of sexual assault.

The court considered the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) principles, including the least restrictive sentence and the promotion of responsibility.

A key issue was whether the offence caused 'serious bodily harm,' which would preclude a deferred custody and supervision order under YCJA s. 42(5)(a).

The court found that the victim's profound and life-altering psychological impact, including PTSD, constituted serious bodily harm, thus precluding a deferred custody order.

Despite mitigating factors such as the offender's age and lack of prior record, the serious nature of the assault and the absence of remorse warranted a custodial sentence.

The court imposed a nine-month custody and supervision order, followed by fifteen months of probation, along with a DNA order and firearms prohibition.

The defendant, a young person, was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the complainant consented to the sexual conduct and, if not, whether the defendant knew of the lack of consent.

The court assessed the credibility of both the complainant and the defendant, considering their relationship history, physical evidence of injury to the complainant, her emotional state after the incident, and post-incident text messages exchanged between the parties.

The court found the defendant's testimony regarding consent to be unbelievable and accepted the complainant's evidence, concluding that she did not consent and the defendant was aware or wilfully blind to this lack of consent.

Christian Dean faced a charge of driving with excess alcohol.

He brought a Charter application to exclude breath test evidence, alleging violations of his rights under sections 8 and 9 due to a delay in the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The court found the delay (approximately 5-7 minutes) was "reasonably necessary" in the context of the stop, applying the principles from R. v. Quansah.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no breach of rights.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty.

The appellant, Leigh McQuat, appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The trial judge had found him guilty despite excluding evidence related to a breath sample due to a Charter s. 10(b) infringement.

The appeal raised issues regarding the application of the R. v. W.(D.) test, the trial judge's adoption of the breathalyzer technician's opinion on impairment, palpable errors in assessing witness evidence, and the weight given to the appellant's medical issues.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) test, his independent assessment of impairment based on all evidence, his credibility findings, or the weight given to medical issues.

The court reiterated that any degree of impairment, however slight, is sufficient for a conviction.

The offender was convicted of intimidating a justice participant and breaching a recognizance following his conduct at a preliminary inquiry.

While testifying as a witness in domestic violence charges against the offender, the victim was subjected to a cut-throat gesture and threatening words by the offender.

The court imposed a sentence of eight months custody on the intimidation charge and two months concurrent on the breach charge, followed by 18 months probation with strict conditions including non-association with the victim.

DNA orders and a lifetime firearms prohibition were also imposed.

The court emphasized the seriousness of offences against the administration of justice and the need to protect witnesses and the integrity of the judicial process.

During a criminal trial for historical sexual offences, the accused sought to question character witnesses about whether he had a disposition to commit sexual assault or acts of violence.

The Crown objected, arguing that character evidence from lay witnesses must be limited to evidence of general reputation rather than personal opinions about specific traits or conduct.

The court held that questions about sexual morality or peaceful disposition would elicit impermissible opinion evidence and had minimal probative value in the context of private historical allegations involving a child.

Relying on appellate jurisprudence regarding the limited value of such evidence in sexual offence cases, the judge concluded that the prejudicial effects and trial inefficiency outweighed any probative value.

The proposed questioning was therefore disallowed.

The accused, charged with historical indecent assaults from the 1970s, brought a motion to introduce evidence of an alternate suspect.

The accused sought to introduce evidence that his daughters were sexually assaulted by their cousin during the same time period and in the same locations.

The court applied the air of reality test and found that the proposed evidence was sufficiently connected to the charges to be relevant and probative.

The court concluded that the probative value of the alternate suspect evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect, and the application was granted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to child luring and making sexually explicit material available to a child.

The offences involved online grooming of a 13-year-old American girl in 2012 when the defendant was 25 years old.

The defendant misrepresented his age as 19 and engaged in sexual acts on webcam and obtained a nude photograph of the complainant.

The court imposed a sentence of four months incarceration on each count to be served concurrently, followed by three years of probation with strict conditions including restrictions on contact with minors, internet access, and electronic devices.

A lifetime SOIRA registration order and DNA order were also imposed.

The Crown brought a motion to admit hearsay statements made by the accused's two children (ages 12 and 8) immediately after his arrest at the family home.

The children told police that their father had been drinking and speeding while driving them home, and that they were afraid.

The Crown sought to admit these statements under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused was charged with impaired operation, over 80, operation of a motor vehicle while disqualified, and two offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court found the statements admissible under both the res gestae exception and the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused, a Finnish national residing illegally in Canada, was charged with nine offences including assaults and threats against Amanda Rayburn, unlawful use of a credit card belonging to Charmaine Thomas, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The trial revealed a pattern of deception whereby the accused simultaneously maintained romantic relationships with three women, misrepresenting his identity, employment, and personal circumstances.

The court found the accused guilty of unlawful use of the credit card and assault and threat charges relating to the February 9 incident with Amanda Rayburn, but acquitted on other counts.

A guilty plea was entered on one count during trial.

Two defendants jointly charged with assault causing bodily harm brought separate applications under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings based on breach of their right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The offence occurred on April 18, 2010, and the application was heard on February 14, 2012, representing over 20 months of delay.

The court found approximately 12 months of unjustified delay after accounting for neutral time and inherent case requirements.

The delay was primarily attributable to the crown's failure to recognize that an essential witness required a Punjabi interpreter, leading to the adjournment of the first trial date set for May 19, 2011.

The court granted the applications and entered a stay of proceedings for both defendants.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving 'over 80'.

At trial, the defence failed to object to the admissibility of the Intoxilizer test results until closing submissions, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because she referred to the screening device as an 'Alcotest' rather than an approved screening device.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in entertaining the late Charter challenge.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that absent credible evidence to the contrary, an officer's testimony that they used an approved screening device is sufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for a breath demand.

The appeal was dismissed.