Colleen Hepburn

The accused was charged with possessing and accessing child pornography.

He brought a Charter application alleging violations of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and sought exclusion of computer-related evidence.

The court found that the police conducted a warrantless search of the accused's home computer relying solely on the consent of his common-law spouse, which was insufficient as a third party cannot waive another's Charter rights.

The police also failed to comply with sections 489.1 and 490 of the Criminal Code regarding the detention and reporting of seized property.

Additionally, the information to obtain the search warrant was misleading and incomplete.

The court excluded all computer-generated evidence and any derivative evidence.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol or drugs contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that on May 9, 2014, the accused drove while impaired.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the investigation, alleging Charter breaches under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make a breathalyzer demand, that the drug evaluation demand was made as soon as practicable, and that the accused's Charter rights were not infringed.

The court found the accused guilty based on evidence of impairment by both alcohol and drugs.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on multiple sexual offence charges involving a child complainant.

The appeal court held that, read in the context of the evidence and submissions, the trial judge's reasons did not disclose why he found a conflict of equally credible evidence or how he arrived at reasonable doubt.

Applying the governing framework on sufficiency of reasons and the principles associated with W. (D.), the court found the verdict could not be meaningfully reviewed on appeal.

The acquittal was set aside and the matter remitted for a new trial, but convictions were not substituted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of his rights under sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the accused was unlawfully arrested without reasonable and probable grounds, subjected to unlawful breath and blood demands, and that his privacy interests were violated during hospital detention.

The court also found that the search warrant used to seize the blood sample was invalid due to material non-disclosure and misleading information in the Information to Obtain.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these breaches, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown appealed acquittals on charges including theft over $5,000, possession of stolen property, fraud, false pretences, and making a false statement to obtain a loan arising from a business loan secured by equipment.

The trial judge concluded there was reasonable doubt regarding the accused’s intent to breach the criminal law, largely because the accused intended to repay the loan.

The appellate court held the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review and failed to explain how credibility findings or the evidence supported the acquittals.

The court also found an error of law in treating an intention to repay as negating fraudulent intent, contrary to established jurisprudence.

The Crown appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea, seeking to withdraw the plea.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and found that a combination of factors, including retained counsel's failure to meet with the appellant for 8 months, substitute counsel's lack of preparation, the appellant's difficulties in custody, language barriers, and his consistent assertions of innocence, resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing the defence of colour of right applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence did not arise on the facts, as the appellant demanded the money, pointed an imitation firearm, and never asserted a right to the money.

The appellant appealed convictions for making child pornography and possession of child pornography arising from sexual activity with two complainants and images later found on a computer in his bedroom.

The court rejected the argument that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, holding that the basis for conviction was reasonably intelligible.

The court held that it was open to the trial judge to accept one complainant's detailed evidence that photographs were taken and to reject the appellant's denial.

The court also held that the inference of possession of child pornography on the bedroom computer was available on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving 'over 80'.

At trial, the defence failed to object to the admissibility of the Intoxilizer test results until closing submissions, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because she referred to the screening device as an 'Alcotest' rather than an approved screening device.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in entertaining the late Charter challenge.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that absent credible evidence to the contrary, an officer's testimony that they used an approved screening device is sufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for a breath demand.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for defrauding a financing company of approximately $90,000 using an altered invoice for non-existent forestry equipment.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the equipment did not exist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, and concluding the combination of the false invoice and non-existent equipment was sufficient to found a conviction for fraud.

The appellant appealed his convictions for eight firearm-related offences, arguing the convictions were unreasonable and the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) principles.

The appellant was arrested after police found a bag containing a firearm and ammunition in the back seat of a car he was leaning into.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude based on circumstantial evidence that the bag belonged to the appellant and that he was in possession of it.

The court also found no merit in the W.(D.) ground of appeal.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender following convictions for attempted murder and aggravated sexual assault, arguing he should have been designated a long-term offender.

He submitted the trial judge erred by restricting his expert's testimony and rejecting the expert's opinion on his prospects for controlling his alcoholism.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly qualified the expert and was entitled to prefer the Crown expert's evidence that the appellant's prospects for treatment were extremely poor.

The appellant appealed from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision upholding his convictions for impaired driving and blowing over.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the appellant's evidence regarding the amount he drank and appropriately evaluated the evidence for each charge independently.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment arising from three threatening documents sent to his former spouse's lawyer during family proceedings.

He argued the letters were not 'directed' at the complainants and that there was insufficient evidence the former spouse feared for her safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant intended the documents to reach the complainants, satisfying the requirement under s. 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code, and that there was a basis for the trial judge's findings regarding the former spouse's fear.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his claim of self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was not unreasonable for the trial judge to conclude that the appellant, who produced and used a weapon immediately upon being attacked, lacked reasonable grounds to believe he could not otherwise preserve himself.

The appellant was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

The trial judge found the appellant honest but rejected his evidence regarding alcohol consumption, relying on breathalyzer results.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons failed to meet the functional test in Sheppard, as they did not explain the basis for the conviction or whether the breathalyzer results were improperly used to assess credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of having care and control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

He appealed to the summary conviction appeal court, which dismissed his appeal.

He then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, noting that although the appellant initially had no intention to drive, he was found in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition, and his intention had changed.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a priest, appealed his five-year sentence for the repeated, long-term sexual abuse of two young altar boys.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a significant penitentiary term was required given the circumstances and that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was not manifestly excessive.