Brian H. Snell

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and incest against his daughter, committed between November 1998 and February 2002 when the victim was between 8 and 12 years old.

He was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the fairness of the trial based on the Crown's closing address and the reasonableness of the incest conviction.

He also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions, sufficient evidence to support the incest conviction, and that the sentence was fit and warranted given the appellant's prior conviction for similar offences against a young child.

The appellant, David Kawal, appealed his convictions for attempt murder, robbery with a restricted or prohibited weapon, and kidnapping with a restricted or prohibited weapon.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the jury verdicts reasonable and the trial judge’s instructions proper.

The court found no merit in arguments regarding the reasonableness of the verdicts, the instructions on circumstantial evidence, eyewitness identification, or the elements of the offences.

The sentence appeal was previously abandoned.

Lee Marrazzo appealed his conviction for trafficking in narcotics and his four-year global sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that circumstantial evidence left open an innocent inference that he did not know the transaction involved narcotics, suggesting he believed it was a loan-sharking deal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to infer Marrazzo's knowledge of the drug transaction based on his actions and intercepted comments.

For the sentence appeal, Marrazzo argued the trial judge erred in assessing his role and failed to credit him for medical hardships in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the assessment of his role but agreed that the trial judge failed to adequately address his unmet medical needs when calculating Duncan credit.

Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal sentence, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a reduced global sentence of 46 months.

The appellant, J.S., appealed convictions for sexual offences against three step-grandchildren and the imposed global sentence of 30 months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to intervene.

The sentence appeal was partially allowed, reducing a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order to 20 years with the Crown's consent, and imposing conditional stays of proceedings on three sexual assault counts, without altering the overall 30-month sentence.

The appellant, Noah King, appealed his convictions for 12 serious offences and a 7-year imprisonment sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

However, the court found the 7-year sentence to be demonstrably unfit, noting the trial judge's unclear reasoning for the sentencing range despite properly identifying Gladue principles.

The sentence was reduced to 5 years' imprisonment, with specific reductions applied to various counts.

The appellant, Alexander Lambert, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The conviction appeal was based on alleged errors in the trial judge's Browne v. Dunn instruction and instructions on the state of mind required for murder.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge overemphasized aggravating factors and underemphasized mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the Browne v. Dunn instruction, the murder intent instructions, or the sentencing judge's discretion in weighing factors for parole ineligibility.

This is a Crown appeal of an 18-month custodial sentence imposed on the respondent for making child pornography, distributing child pornography, and voyeurism involving two child victims.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by elevating the offender's age and rehabilitation potential over denunciation and deterrence, and by failing to recognize a breach of trust.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly balanced the sentencing objectives, including the principle of restraint for young first offenders, and did not err in not finding a breach of trust.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, arguing the sentencing judge erred in principle by prioritizing the offender's age and failing to address aggravating factors like the familial relationship, resulting in an unfit sentence.

The appellant, Candy Locey, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder, seeking to set aside her guilty plea.

She argued that the Agreed Statement of Facts, which she had accepted, did not support the conviction, specifically regarding the mens rea for murder.

The appellant contended that a question posed by the trial judge after her plea, but before conviction, and her answer to it, cast doubt on whether the mens rea was established.

The Court of Appeal found that the Agreed Statement of Facts fully supported the plea, establishing both the actus reus and mens rea for aiding and abetting second-degree murder.

The court concluded that the subsequent question and answer did not undermine the facts supporting the mens rea.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient as they did not provide an adequate pathway to support the convictions, particularly regarding the appellant's role as a party to the offences.

The trial judge's instruction on party liability under section 21 of the Criminal Code was found to be erroneous, and the reasons failed to specify how the appellant aided or abetted the commission of the offences.

The appellant, M.L., appealed convictions for four counts, including exercising control for exploitation, receiving financial benefit from exploitation, receiving financial benefit from prostitution, and advertising sexual services.

The Crown's case relied primarily on K.G.B. statements provided by the complainant, who later recanted at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's admissibility analysis of these statements or in his assessment of their reliability.

The trial judge's approach of seeking corroborative evidence, effectively treating the complainant as a Vetrovec witness, was upheld.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, R.W., appealed a global sentence of 15 years for sexual interference, making and making available child pornography, and possessing and accessing child pornography.

The appellant argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range and demonstrably unfit, proposing a sentence of 7-10 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the circumstances egregious, involving a massive breach of trust against his two-year-old daughter.

The court affirmed that sentences for sexual offences against children must increase, citing R. v. Friesen, and found the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors and the totality principle, imposing a consecutive sentence for child pornography counts.

The sentence was deemed not demonstrably unfit and entitled to deference.

The appellant, Gilbert Ryan Wilson, appealed a seven-year sentence for aggravated assault and unlawfully being in a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The appellant, along with two accomplices, received the same sentence for a brutal attack.

The appellant argued for a lesser sentence, asserting that his criminal record lacked prior violent offences, unlike his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's holistic analysis, which properly considered all relevant factors, including the appellant's mitigating circumstances and the Gladue factors applicable to his accomplices, in arriving at a proportionate sentence for all equally responsible offenders.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted due to s. 11(b) Charter delay.

The application judge had calculated the delay, subtracting periods for exceptional events and defence delay, resulting in a delay exceeding the *Jordan* ceiling by 16 days.

The Court of Appeal found an error in the application judge's failure to characterize a 65-day period as defence delay, which was implicitly and unequivocally waived by the defence.

Correcting this error brought the total delay well below the *Jordan* ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

This is an appeal of convictions for child luring, arrangement by telecommunication to commit a sexual offence against a child, and obtaining sexual services for consideration from a minor, arising from a police sting operation.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on cell phone tower data, arguing it created reasonable doubt about his identity, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence.

He also contended that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Morrison, which clarified the mens rea for child luring requires subjective belief in the victim's age, entitled him to a new trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of the cell phone data was reasonable and supported by evidence, and the fresh evidence lacked due diligence and cogency.

The court further held that the trial judge's finding of subjective belief in the victims' age, based on the totality of the evidence, complied with the Morrison standard, thus no new trial was warranted.

R.H. appealed sentences totaling six years for sexual interference, making child pornography, and accessing child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the global sentence, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge, who properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors and the principles of denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.

The court, however, modified a lifetime internet prohibition order to align with previous jurisprudence and granted credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, Archibald McKay, appealed his conviction for theft over $5,000, mischief to property, and possession of break-in tools.

He also appealed his sentence, which he had already served.

On conviction appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in determining his identification and in concluding that items in his possession were break-in tools.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of guilt were justified by the evidence, including extensive surveillance and the appellant’s proximity to the stolen goods.

The appellant, Antonio Ricciardi, appealed his convictions for 17 serious offences involving three women, including attempted kidnapping, confinement, criminal harassment, assault with disguise, and robbery, and his global sentence of 14 years incarceration.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's comprehensive and fair assessment of the evidence or in the global sentence imposed for the long list of criminal offences against vulnerable women.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Bruce Wilson, appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault, kidnapping, and uttering death threats, and his subsequent dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's corrective instruction to the jury regarding defence counsel's closing arguments about untested DNA samples.

The sentence appeal argued that "Lord Coke's principle," which generally prohibits relying on subsequent convictions to aggravate a prior offence's sentence, should apply to dangerous offender proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the corrective instruction and holding that Lord Coke's principle does not apply to dangerous offender determinations, as these proceedings are forward-looking and focus on future public safety and patterns of behaviour.

The appellant appealed his conviction on nine offences arising from an armed robbery of a salon, including use of a firearm, robbery, wounding, and assault.

The trial judge had upheld the validity of two search warrants (residential and digital video recorder) despite Charter challenges.

The Court of Appeal found that both warrants were issued without reasonable and probable grounds due to material non-disclosure in the Information to Obtain affidavits.

The affiant officer failed to make full and frank disclosure regarding the reliability of licence plate evidence, vehicle colour discrepancies, and other material facts.

The digital video recorder evidence, which was crucial to the Crown's case, should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Without this evidence, the Crown's case was gutted, and acquittals were ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for refusing to comply with a breath demand.

The Superior Court had dismissed his appeal.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the trial judge failed to address the appellant's disorientation and possible concussion following an accident as raising a reasonable doubt, and whether an alleged lie by a police officer provided grounds for leave to appeal.

The court found that the trial judge was clearly aware of the disorientation evidence, having acquitted the appellant on the impaired driving charge, and that any alleged police officer lie had no impact on the conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

Leave to appeal was denied.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed in part to strike the victim surcharge.