Brian H. Snell

The appellant appealed the imposition of a lifetime driving prohibition following his guilty pleas to several offences, including driving while disqualified.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in imposing a lifetime prohibition, as the maximum available under the Criminal Code at the time was five years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lifetime prohibition, and substituted a five-year driving prohibition, noting the appellant's criminal record and the nature of the offences.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing her appeal from convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief to property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the appellant failed to raise a question of law alone as required by section 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

However, with the consent of the Crown, the court vacated the $300 victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed sentences totaling 32 months and a forfeiture order for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of marijuana and cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by giving no weight to the guilty plea and the absence of a commercial motive.

The court reduced the sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking to 28 months, reduced the sentence for possession of marijuana to 10 days concurrent, and set aside the forfeiture order of $320.00 as there was no finding it was drug-related.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, as well as his 40-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting a hearsay statement and by finding intercourse occurred despite a lack of forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the statement was properly admitted as part of the narrative and the lack of forensic evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 40-month term was fit given the aggravating factors, including the appellant's position of trust and the complainant's age.

The appellant, Bruce Wilson, appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault, kidnapping, and uttering death threats, and his subsequent dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's corrective instruction to the jury regarding defence counsel's closing arguments about untested DNA samples.

The sentence appeal argued that "Lord Coke's principle" which generally prohibits relying on subsequent convictions to aggravate a prior offence's sentence, should apply to dangerous offender proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the corrective instruction and holding that Lord Coke's principle does not apply to dangerous offender determinations, as these proceedings are forward-looking and focus on future public safety and patterns of behaviour.

The appellant appealed his conviction on nine offences arising from an armed robbery of a salon, including use of a firearm, robbery, wounding, and assault.

The trial judge had upheld the validity of two search warrants (residential and digital video recorder) despite Charter challenges.

The Court of Appeal found that both warrants were issued without reasonable and probable grounds due to material non-disclosure in the Information to Obtain affidavits.

The affiant officer failed to make full and frank disclosure regarding the reliability of licence plate evidence, vehicle colour discrepancies, and other material facts.

The digital video recorder evidence, which was crucial to the Crown's case, should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Without this evidence, the Crown's case was gutted, and acquittals were ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for refusing to comply with a breath demand.

The Superior Court had dismissed his appeal.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the trial judge failed to address the appellant's disorientation and possible concussion following an accident as raising a reasonable doubt, and whether an alleged lie by a police officer provided grounds for leave to appeal.

The court found that the trial judge was clearly aware of the disorientation evidence, having acquitted the appellant on the impaired driving charge, and that any alleged police officer lie had no impact on the conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

Leave to appeal was denied.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed in part to strike the victim surcharge.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 46 months imposed for three robberies of vulnerable businesses, arguing the sentence was too harsh and that the sentencing judge had double-counted by treating offence elements as aggravating factors and had given insufficient weight to the guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit, finding that the sentencing judge was correct in emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation given the nature of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, the use of weapons and threats, and the appellant's criminal history.

Two appellants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to traffic heroin and cocaine, and their sentences.

The appellants argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, rendering the verdicts unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and sentences, finding that the trial judge properly applied the three-stage test from R. v. Carter for the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found sufficient evidence that both appellants were members of the conspiracies, with McGean playing an instrumental role and Lucas acting as an enforcer.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the quantum of drugs and the scope of the conspiracy.

Victim surcharges were set aside for both appellants.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction on firearms offences and a verbal threat charge.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the facts underlying the firearms offences were less serious than those in comparable cases establishing a 7 to 11 year sentencing range.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in imposing a 7-year sentence and reduced the concurrent sentence for the firearms and threat offences from 7 years to 6 years, resulting in a global sentence of 7 years.

The appellant was convicted by jury of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to the life or safety of another person and occupying a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm present.

He did not testify at trial.

On appeal to the SCC, the appellant argued unreasonable verdict based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court held that the strong circumstantial case permitted the Court of Appeal to consider the appellant's silence when assessing his unreasonable verdict argument, and affirmed that the trial judge's clear jury instructions against using silence as a makeweight for the Crown preserved the accused's right to silence.

Appeal dismissed and convictions upheld.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice for conviction on charges including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, break and enter with intent to steal a firearm, breach of an undertaking, and breach of a probation order.

The original global sentence was 5½ years less credit for 30 months served.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence too harsh, particularly given the appellant's age (19 years old), his substantial rehabilitative efforts while in custody, his genuine remorse, and his motivation to reunite with his young son.

The court reduced the global sentence to four years by reducing the consecutive sentence for break and enter with intent to steal a firearm from 30 months to 12 months.

The appellant abandoned his appeal against conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant was convicted by jury of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to the life or safety of another person and occupying a motor vehicle while knowing there was a firearm in the vehicle.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant counselled an unknown SUV driver to shoot at the victim as retaliation for damage to the appellant's mother's vehicle.

The appeal raised the issue of whether the convictions were unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal was divided: one judge would have allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, finding insufficient evidence to support the convictions; the majority dismissed the appeal and affirmed the convictions, finding the jury verdicts reasonable on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his conviction appeal to pursue orders for production of records not produced at trial and to advance a ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment and authorized limited counsel under section 684 of the Criminal Code to investigate the ineffective assistance of counsel ground and the records sought.

The Court noted that Legal Aid Ontario had previously denied funding for a conviction appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel in 2014.

The Court determined it was inadvisable to hear the sentence appeal before the conviction appeal and ordered that the sentence appeal remain in the regular appeal stream and not be rescheduled until the conviction appeal was disposed of.

Appeal from conviction for robbery and sentence imposed by Justice Eugene Ewaschuk on June 14 and June 29, 2010.

The appellant was convicted of robbery but acquitted of using an imitation firearm.

The appeal raised five grounds challenging the trial judge's conduct during cross-examination of the Crown's key witness, jury instructions on memory loss due to fear, absence of motive to fabricate, elements of the offence, and criticism of defence counsel's closing analogy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the Truth in Sentencing Act to calculate pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

The sole issue was whether the complainant consented to the sexual touching, as the appellant admitted to the touching itself.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the jury charge was unfair and unbalanced, as the trial judge spent significantly more time summarizing the Crown's theory than the defence's theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the charge appeared facially imbalanced, when considered holistically with counsel's closing submissions, the jury was adequately instructed on the factual issues, applicable law, and positions of both parties.

The court emphasized that a functional approach to reviewing jury charges requires consideration of the entire trial context, not the charge in isolation.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of conspiracy to possess heroin for the purposes of trafficking and his sentence of 12 years imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal addressed three grounds of appeal: an erroneous instruction on the conspiracy count, an erroneous Vetrovec instruction regarding a witness who testified under an immunity agreement, and inadequate guidance on assessing the witness's inconsistent statements.

The court found that while the trial judge misspoke on one aspect of the conspiracy instruction, the error did not warrant a new trial as the real issue—whether the appellant was a member of the conspiracy—was clearly explained to the jury.

The Vetrovec instruction and guidance on inconsistent statements were found to be satisfactory.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge imposed a sentence well within the appropriate range, considering the appellant's personal and family circumstances.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences, as well as his sentence of 13.7 years.

He argued the trial judge erred by prohibiting cross-examination of the complainant regarding a conflict in her evidence about recent sexual activity, and by granting pre-trial custody credit at a 1:1 ratio and apportioning only half of it to the current charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant failed to pursue the mandatory application process under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's decisions on pre-trial custody credit and apportionment were discretionary and revealed no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient to justify the conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole and in context, clearly showed that he accepted the complainant's evidence of forced sexual intercourse and lack of consent.

The appeal was dismissed, as the reasons were sufficient to allow the appellant to understand his conviction and to permit meaningful appellate review.