Dr. Bloom

This medical negligence action, commenced in 2011, involved allegations of negligent treatment by the plaintiff against the defendant hospital and physicians.

The action had been administratively dismissed twice and case-managed since 2018 due to the plaintiff's failure to deliver expert reports.

Despite multiple court orders and extensions, the self-represented plaintiff failed to provide expert evidence on standard of care and causation, which is required to establish negligence.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment, which the court granted, dismissing the action due to the absence of a genuine issue for trial without expert opinions supporting the plaintiff's claims.

The appellant purchased a home constructed by the respondent in 1997.

Mould was discovered in 2002 due to faulty construction and water leakage.

The mould was remedied and the house was sold without loss in value.

The appellant claimed damages for psychological and emotional injuries and out-of-pocket expenses.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the psychological injuries were too remote and not reasonably foreseeable.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing the claims for psychological and emotional injuries and that the contractual warranty limitations were irrelevant to the negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the motion judge properly applied the test from Mustapha v. Culligan and correctly concluded that a person of ordinary fortitude would not have suffered the serious psychiatric injury claimed in these circumstances.

The appellant mother appealed a custody and access order that granted the respondent father generous access to their children, arguing that the father had attempted to kill her during a vacation in Jamaica.

The trial judge had found the mother's allegations not credible, relying heavily on hearsay evidence from a blood expert who testified at the father's Jamaican criminal trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay evidence without threshold reliability, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias through uneven scrutiny of the evidence, and failed to properly assess the best interests of the children, particularly regarding domestic violence.

A new hearing on custody and access was ordered.

The parties separated following a trip to Jamaica in December 2010, during which the applicant alleged the respondent attempted to kill her by slashing her throat, while the respondent alleged the applicant attacked him with a knife.

The respondent was acquitted in a Jamaican criminal trial.

In this family law trial, the court could not determine on a balance of probabilities who attacked whom.

Given the extreme conflict, the court awarded sole custody to the applicant but ordered increasing, unsupervised access for the respondent, culminating in a week-about shared parenting schedule.

The court also addressed child support, found the applicant in contempt for denying telephone access, and ruled that the applicant's family cottage qualified as a matrimonial home.

The appellant lawyer appealed the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division's decision to revoke his licence for professional misconduct.

The appellant argued that the penalty was disproportionate because the most serious charge of misappropriation was dismissed, and his misconduct was caused by severe depression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable.

The Court noted that the appellant's failure to acknowledge his dishonest conduct undermined his psychiatric evidence and failed to reassure the public and the profession of his integrity.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against a hospital, nurses, and doctors following the birth of a child who suffered severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation prior to an emergency Caesarean section.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that while there were shortfalls in care, the cause of the oxygen deprivation was unknown and therefore not caused by the defendants' negligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on liability, holding that the trial judge erred in law by deciding the issue of factual causation before determining whether the standard of care was breached, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient to explain why the plaintiffs' theory of liability was rejected.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for the killing of his mother.

He raised three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in dismissing a mistrial application based on a reasonable apprehension of bias after the appellant allegedly overheard the judge discussing expert evidence with a deputy; that the trial judge erred in finding the appellant failed to establish the defence of not criminally responsible; and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a sufficient factual inquiry regarding the bias allegation, that the weighing of conflicting medical opinions on the NCR defence was within the trial judge's exclusive province, and that the sentence was fit given the brutal nature of the killing.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after a second trial, the first having resulted in a hung jury on that count but a finding of guilt on the included offence of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing autrefois convict and errors in the jury charge.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's dismissal of a dangerous offender application and the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeals, holding that autrefois convict requires a final adjudication including a sentence.

The Court allowed the Crown's dangerous offender appeal, ordering a new hearing because the trial judge failed to properly assess the brutality threshold and the psychiatric evidence regarding the appellant's sexual sadism.

The Crown's sentence appeal was dismissed.