Christine Elinor Mary Bartlett-Hughes

The appellant, H.P., appealed his sexual assault conviction, raising three grounds: whether his s. 276 voir dire testimony was compelled and improperly used against him contrary to s. 13 of the Charter; whether the cross-examination on the voir dire was overly broad; and whether the trial judge erred in finding corroboration of the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that s. 276 voir dire evidence is not compelled, the cross-examination was not unfair given the scope of the affidavits, and the trial judge's assessment of corroborative evidence was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellants, Alton Grant and Shaqwan Kawano, appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess exculpatory eyewitness identification evidence, specifically regarding a key witness whose testimony arguably contradicted the Crown's theory of identity.

This error was deemed serious and not curable.

The court dismissed Grant's Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay and found the verdict against him was not unreasonable.

However, due to the misdirection on eyewitness identification, the appeals were allowed, and new trials were ordered for both appellants.

The appellant, J.C., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching related to K.M., while he was acquitted of charges related to C.M. The appeal raised four main issues: the admission of similar act evidence from C.Y., the consideration of cross-count similar act evidence between K.M. and C.M., the lack of a jury instruction on the prohibited use of bad character evidence from Facebook communications, and the refusal to permit a challenge for cause during jury selection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's decisions regarding the admissibility and use of similar act evidence, the jury instructions, or the refusal to allow a challenge for cause.

The appellant, R.C., appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal raised six grounds of trial judge error and a seventh ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, supported by fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors by the trial judge in her credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The fresh evidence did not establish that trial counsel's performance fell below a reasonable standard or occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

Leave to appeal the sentence was refused as it was not pressed and found not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant (L.S.) met on a dating app.

The trial judge found the appellant had an honest but mistaken belief that L.S. was 18, but failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain L.S.'s age, leading to conviction.

On appeal, the appellant argued errors in the fault element analysis and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction.

The court clarified that while the trial judge's reasoning on the "alternative pathway to conviction" was erroneous in light of new authorities (R. v. Morrison, R. v. Carbone), the ultimate conclusion of guilt was proper.

The failure to take all reasonable steps to ascertain age, combined with recklessness, was sufficient to establish the mens rea for sexual interference.

The misapprehension of evidence claim also failed to meet the stringent threshold for appellate intervention.

The appellants, Jermaine Gager and Corey Leonard Smelie, appealed their murder convictions, with Mr. Smelie also seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

They raised several grounds, including errors in qualifying an expert witness on street gangs, inadequate jury instructions, erroneous dismissal of disclosure applications, inconsistent verdicts, and reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or conduct, and affirmed the fitness of the sentence imposed on Mr. Smelie.

Two appellants were convicted of first degree murder in the death of Jagtar Gill, who was beaten with a metal bar, stabbed multiple times, and had her throat slashed.

The Crown's theory was that Bhupinderpal Gill (the victim's husband) and Gurpreet Ronald (with whom Gill was having an affair) conspired to commit the murder, with Ronald as the perpetrator.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of second degree murder for Ronald, leaving only verdicts of guilty of first degree murder or not guilty.

The appellants appealed on the basis that this instruction was erroneous and prejudicial to both their defences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to leave second degree murder as a possible verdict for Ronald, and that this error tainted the verdict against Gill as well, as it undermined his defence that Ronald acted alone without planning and deliberation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a 21-year-old complainant.

The appellant, aged 53, had invited the complainant to a motel room where he had planned a sexual encounter.

He provided alcohol to the complainant, who became severely intoxicated.

The appellant engaged in sexual contact with the complainant, who testified she was semi-conscious or in and out of consciousness throughout.

The appellant claimed the encounter was consensual and that he honestly believed the complainant was consenting.

The trial judge found the complainant was intoxicated and semi-conscious, to the appellant's knowledge, and therefore could not consent.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance to the self-represented appellant by disallowing cross-examination regarding potential collusion; (2) the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons regarding the appellant's honest but mistaken belief in consent; and (3) the trial judge misapprehended evidence resulting in an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of human trafficking, procuring a person to offer or provide sexual services for consideration, and advertising sexual services for consideration.

The trial judge misdirected the jury on the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing these offences.

Specifically, the trial judge erred by: (1) instructing the jury to read the disjunctive conduct elements conjunctively, requiring proof of near-total control over the complainant's movements; (2) failing to distinguish between "direction" and "influence" as different degrees of coercion; and (3) improperly extending the immunity provision for advertising one's own sexual services to those who assist in such advertising.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The applicant was convicted of two counts of careless storage of a firearm/ammunition, two counts of possession of a firearm/ammunition unauthorized, possession of a firearm knowing, possession as the occupant of a vehicle, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and possession of a Schedule 1 substance for the purpose of trafficking.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment less time served.

The applicant appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the defence's alternate suspect theory regarding a third party present in the vehicle at the time of arrest.

The motion judge granted bail pending appeal, finding that the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and that the applicant's history of bail compliance supported release.

The appellant Crown appealed the acquittal of a high school teacher charged with voyeurism under s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after he used a concealed pen-camera to surreptitiously record female students engaged in ordinary school activities in common areas of the school.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had upheld the acquittal on the basis that the students were not in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, holding that circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 162(1) are circumstances in which a person would reasonably expect not to be the subject of the type of observation or recording that in fact occurred, taking into account the entire context.

The majority (Wagner C.J.) adopted a multi-factor contextual test informed by s. 8 Charter jurisprudence, while a concurring minority (Rowe J.) proposed a conjunctive test requiring both loss of control over one's image and infringement of sexual integrity.

The appellant was convicted of accessing and possessing child pornography contrary to sections 163.1(4.1) and 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant claimed the defence under section 163.1(6), arguing he accessed and possessed the material as research for a book he was writing.

The trial judge found that while the appellant may have initially had a legitimate purpose related to art, he subsequently accessed and possessed the material to satisfy his fascination and morbid curiosity.

The trial judge also found no objectively verifiable connection between the appellant's conduct and his stated purpose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions and rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding dual purpose, credibility findings, and objective connection.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of H.E. on a charge of sexual assault against his wife.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant's testimony regarding the assault but acquitted the accused based on a reasonable doubt about whether he possessed the required mens rea, citing factors including the complainant's delay in reporting and continued sexual relations with the accused.

The appellate court found that the trial judge committed reversible errors by considering an honest but mistaken belief in consent defence that was not raised at trial, by relying on a shared mistaken belief about marital rights that cannot form the basis for such a defence, and by considering factors that were irrelevant to the accused's state of mind.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

A motion for directions brought by counsel in an appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant sought access to transcripts of cross-examinations on affidavits to assess potential intervener status and to clear his professional reputation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the intervener application and no basis to provide transcripts to a non-party to support a collateral issue unrelated to the core appeal.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code, which mandates lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) for offenders convicted of more than one designated sexual offence.

The appellant argued the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of overbreadth and gross disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the provision was neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate.

The court held that conviction of multiple sexual offences is a reasonable proxy for enhanced risk of re-offending, and that the modest impact on liberty is proportionate to the important objective of public safety.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of a fellow inmate at the Don Jail.

The Crown's case was that the appellant was part of a group that assaulted the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct and the failure to adequately relate evidence to the mens rea element of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions were proper and that the evidence was fairly presented to the jury.

A high school teacher was acquitted at trial of voyeurism contrary to s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after using a camera pen to surreptitiously record videos of female students focusing on their chests and cleavage.

The Crown appealed the acquittal on three grounds: whether the trial judge erred in finding no sexual purpose; whether evidence from a warrantless search should have been admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter; and whether the students had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The majority (Feldman and Watt JJ.A.) allowed the Crown's appeal on the sexual purpose issue but dismissed it on the privacy issue, finding that students in public areas of a school do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Huscroft J.A. dissented, arguing the students did have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial.

He appealed on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in admitting a hearsay statement made by the deceased victim identifying the appellant as the shooter under the principled hearsay exception, and (2) that the trial judge erred by failing to give a "no probative value" instruction regarding the appellant's post-offence flight.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the hearsay statement should have been admitted under the spontaneous statement exception and that a no probative value instruction was unnecessary in the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted by jury of first degree murder in the death of Clifford Fair.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the first degree murder conviction unreasonable and entering an acquittal on that charge.

The court ordered a new trial on second degree murder due to errors in the trial judge's instruction on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The evidence established that the appellant struck the deceased with an aluminum pipe during a confrontation in the appellant's apartment, but the court found insufficient evidence to support findings of planning and deliberation required for first degree murder.

The trial judge's misdirection permitted the jury to improperly use after-the-fact conduct (burial, dismemberment, and statements) as evidence of intent and planning, rather than limiting its use to establishing that the appellant unlawfully caused the death.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual assault, and failing to comply with a recognizance, as well as his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the complainant's evidence, which was corroborated by medical findings and DNA evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W. (R.) regarding assessment of child witness testimony.

On sentencing, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider Gladue factors and section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, proper application of the legal principles, and that Gladue considerations would not have altered the dangerous offender designation given the appellant's incurable personality disorder and paraphilias.