Najma Jamaldin

The accused was charged with dangerous operation and failing to stop when pursued by police.

After being pulled over, the accused sped away, but the officer decided not to initiate a pursuit in accordance with police policy.

The court convicted the accused of dangerous operation but acquitted her of failing to stop when pursued.

The court held that a 'pursuit' requires police to actually follow a vehicle with the intent to stop it, and disagreed with recent caselaw suggesting that fleeing from an initial traffic stop constitutes failing to stop while pursued even if police do not give chase.

The appellant, Blake Robson, appealed a global sentence of five years' incarceration for drug trafficking and breach of a release order, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his Métis heritage (Gladue factors).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's analysis, noting that while the judge considered the principles from R. v. Kehoe and R. v. F.H.L. regarding the relevance of Indigenous heritage even if disconnected or not causally linked to the offence, there was no evidence on the record that systemic, background, or intergenerational factors related to the appellant's Indigenous heritage contributed to his involvement in the criminal justice system or impacted his moral blameworthiness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of two counts of break and enter, appealed his 3-year sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by incorrectly applying Gladue principles.

Specifically, the appellant contended the trial judge failed in her duty to fill evidentiary gaps regarding rehabilitation options.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach.

The court held that the trial judge was not obligated to grant further adjournments, as defence counsel had provided significant information about the appellant's Indigenous background, and the judge had inquired about rehabilitation programs, which the appellant declined.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to file an appeal of his conviction and sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued that he was unaware of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and that he was unfit to stand trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was aware of the immigration consequences, the delay was unexplained, and the proposed appeal lacked merit as he had been properly found fit to stand trial and a conditional discharge was disproportionate to the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical beliefs, misapprehended evidence, and applied an unequal standard of scrutiny to the competing narratives.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) test, gave thorough reasons for disbelieving the appellant, and correctly accepted the complainant's evidence, which was partially corroborated by photographs.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Abadula Biya, appealed his conviction and sentence for charges including unauthorized possession of a firearm and ammunition, possession of a Schedule I controlled substance for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence in rejecting the appellant's third-party suspect defence, specifically regarding the time available for a co-accused to hide contraband and his propensity.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence was material, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl, raising three grounds: a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel, an unlawful search of a co-accused's cellphone under s. 8, and a misapplication of the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant repeatedly waived his right to counsel until 1:30 a.m., and that the subsequent breach was minor.

The court declined to consider the s. 8 claim due to an inadequate evidentiary record, as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Finally, the court found the circumstantial case for trafficking was strong and the trial judge's reasons were unassailable.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a fatal stabbing and challenged the admission of his police statement, the exclusion of images from the deceased’s phone, and the jury charge on bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 146(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act was not triggered because the appellant was neither detained nor subject to reasonable grounds for belief that he committed the offence when interviewed, and the statement was voluntary under the confessions rule.

The court also upheld the exclusion of phone images as minimally probative and unduly prejudicial, and found no error in the limiting instruction on bad character evidence.

On sentence, the court upheld the adult life sentence, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s factual findings, YCJA analysis, or treatment of IRCS, and rejected the proposed fresh evidence as lacking cogency.

The appellants appealed their convictions for drug and weapons offences based on fresh evidence.

The evidence revealed that an essential police witness was the adoptive brother of one of the appellants, who had previously alleged he sexually assaulted her.

The Crown conceded that the failure to disclose this relationship and the resulting impact on the appellant compromised the fairness of the trial.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, noting the Crown's undertaking not to re-prosecute.

This is an appeal from convictions for sexual assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to admit expert evidence on false memories and in assessing witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decision to exclude the expert evidence, noting the judge's explicit consideration of false memories.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessments, emphasizing deference and the probative value of similar fact evidence.

The appeals from convictions were dismissed.

The appellant was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine after a police officer peered into a public washroom stall and observed him preparing drugs.

At trial, the judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), noting the appellant's reduced privacy interest because he was using the stall solely for illicit purposes.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in considering his unlawful use of the stall in the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that while the nature of the activity does not affect the existence of a privacy interest under s. 8, it is highly relevant to assessing the seriousness of the breach under s. 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of offences related to a home invasion robbery and appealed on the grounds of multiple alleged errors in the trial judge's instructions and charge to the jury.

The primary submissions concerned whether the Crown improperly invited jury speculation regarding a firearm discharge and whether an impermissible inference was drawn regarding the appellant's origin.

The Court of Appeal found the jury was properly instructed, the Crown's remarks were not improper, and the verdict was available on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a young person, appealed their conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his credibility analysis by failing to consider inconsistencies in the complainant's account and by not considering the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, was not required to address every inconsistency, and correctly determined that there was no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence given the diametrically opposed versions of events presented by the parties.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for importing heroin and conspiracy to import heroin.

At the hearing, the appellant abandoned the conviction appeal.

The sentence appeal concerned a 15-year custodial sentence (less credit for 200 days presentence custody) imposed for conspiracy to import heroin and a concurrent 12-year sentence for the substantive importation count.

The sentencing judge found the appellant was part of a broad ongoing conspiracy to import heroin on multiple occasions between October 2010 and March 2011, involving the importation of 2.5 kilograms of heroin valued between $200,000 and $750,600.

The appellant played a significant role well beyond that of a courier, recruiting and organizing multiple couriers to travel to African countries to facilitate importations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in law or principle and concluding the sentence was fit.

The applicant was convicted of two counts of careless storage of a firearm/ammunition, two counts of possession of a firearm/ammunition unauthorized, possession of a firearm knowing, possession as the occupant of a vehicle, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and possession of a Schedule 1 substance for the purpose of trafficking.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment less time served.

The applicant appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the defence's alternate suspect theory regarding a third party present in the vehicle at the time of arrest.

The motion judge granted bail pending appeal, finding that the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and that the applicant's history of bail compliance supported release.

The applicant sought to set aside guilty pleas entered on April 13, 2016, to three counts of knowingly using forged documents, totalling $138,807.01 in losses.

The applicant claimed the pleas were involuntary and uninformed, alleging his counsel pressured him to plead guilty and failed to inform him that the Crown would seek a freestanding restitution order.

The court rejected the applicant's evidence as lacking credibility and accepted the counsel's evidence that the plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The applicant was aware of the Crown's intention to seek restitution and had multiple opportunities to disclose any improper pressure.

The application was dismissed and the guilty pleas were upheld.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his common law spouse following a ten-week jury trial.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years.

The appeal raised multiple grounds including challenges to the admissibility of statements, after-the-fact conduct evidence, prior discreditable conduct evidence, and evidence obtained through search warrant.

The primary focus was on the jury charge, particularly regarding the treatment of circumstantial evidence, the cause of death, and the use of evidence of the appellant's history of violence and abuse toward the victim.

The Court of Appeal found that while certain aspects of the jury charge contained problematic instructions, the overall charge adequately directed the jury on the proper approach to circumstantial evidence and the use of character evidence.

The conviction and sentence were upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions on seven counts for various offences against his former domestic partner, including sexual assault with a weapon, and his three-year custodial sentence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, arguing uneven scrutiny of evidence, improper application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and sentence, finding the trial judge fairly assessed the evidence, that any error regarding Browne v. Dunn did not materially affect the outcome, and that the appellant failed to meet the threshold for ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for smuggling approximately three kilograms of cocaine from Jamaica into Canada and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant was detained at Pearson Airport during a secondary customs inspection where CBSA officers discovered cocaine hidden in plastic bags containing a dried food product.

The appellant challenged whether he was detained and whether his Charter rights were breached.

The trial judge found no detention occurred until after the cocaine was discovered, and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the six-and-a-half-year sentence was appropriate and within the established sentencing range for cocaine importation offences.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to quash his committal to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry.

He argued there was no evidence that he forcibly confined the deceased distinct from the act of killing during a robbery in a small washroom.

The reviewing judge dismissed the application, finding there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could conclude the applicant unlawfully confined the deceased for a period of time beyond what was integral to the killing.