Christopher G. Walsh

The Crown sought to introduce expert opinion evidence from an RCMP analyst comparing camouflage clothing seized from the accused's residence with clothing worn by a masked individual in a terrorist propaganda video.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the comparison evidence.

The court excluded the comparison evidence, finding it was not necessary as the trier of fact could make the comparison without expert assistance.

The court also found the proposed expert was not duly qualified to opine on camouflage patterns due to limited and dated training, and noted concerns regarding confirmation bias and reliability.

The appellant was convicted of possessing cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime following a police investigation that began with a confidential informant tip.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the police violated his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), and that evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no violation of sections 8 or 9, acknowledging a section 10(b) breach but finding the evidence admissible under section 24(2) analysis.

The decision concerns the prosecution of Rasim Kaba and Hassan Talebi for importing and possessing opium for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to commit those offences.

The court reviews the evidence, including the defendants' backgrounds, their relationship, the importation process, intercepted communications, and the police investigation.

The court finds both defendants' explanations implausible and concludes that the only reasonable inference is that both knew of the opium and conspired to import and traffic it.

Both are found guilty on all counts.

The applicant, Shamar Cole, challenged the validity of search warrants executed at a residence and a vehicle under section 8 of the Charter, seeking to exclude seized firearms and drug evidence.

The court first determined that the applicant had standing to challenge the residential search because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy as a temporary resident who slept there and exercised some control over the space.

After resolving the Charter application and a Crown motion to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct, the court proceeded with the trial on the merits.

Ultimately, the court found the applicant guilty of multiple firearm and ammunition possession offences but acquitted him of the remaining charges.

The appellant appealed convictions for drug and proceeds of crime charges, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding a s. 8 Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant.

The appeal focused on counsel's failure to challenge the accuracy of GPS tracking data relied upon by police and counsel's agreement to allow the Crown to introduce amplification evidence from the affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from counsel's tactical decisions and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that there were sufficient grounds for the search warrant.

The appellants, Floriano Sylvester Daponte and Vivian Lee Hamilton, appealed their joint convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The convictions stemmed from a search of their farm property where a large quantity of drugs and cash were found.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in assessing an alternative suspect (Mr. Colpaert), finding his access to the residence speculative, and improperly using their failure to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Daponte's appeal, finding the evidence against him cogent and the trial judge's conclusions reasonable.

However, Ms. Hamilton's appeal was allowed, and acquittals were substituted, as there was insufficient evidence to infer her knowledge or control of the buried drugs, and her connection to the drive shed was tenuous.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceedings, alleging a violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court analyzed the delay, including a 'gap period' where the Crown had temporarily stayed the charges under section 579 of the Criminal Code to protect a larger ongoing investigation.

The court found that the Jordan clock did not run during this gap period, as the stay was not an illegitimate end-run around the presumptive ceiling.

After deducting 90 days for the exceptional discrete event of the COVID-19 pandemic, the net delay was calculated at 13 months and 7 days, well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, citing a delay of over 20 months.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional complexity of the case, which involved a large-scale drug investigation with multiple co-accused, wiretaps, and voluminous disclosure.

The court adopted a conservative approach, attributing three months of delay to the COVID-19 backlog as a discrete exceptional event, bringing the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found the case was particularly complex, justifying the overall delay.

The application for a stay of proceedings was denied.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of cocaine and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, arguing she was denied a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant alleged her trial counsel failed to seek a severance or mistrial despite knowing the appellant was being actively abused by her co-accused, and failed to properly advise her on whether to testify.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence, including trial counsel's notes, and found that counsel's failure to explore severance and properly advise the appellant on testifying fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance and caused prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Brandi Mascarenas, appealed her conviction for importing cocaine.

She had received a controlled delivery of appliances containing cocaine.

At trial, her explanation for her involvement was rejected by the judge, who concluded she was a willing participant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of knowledge, application of circumstantial evidence principles (R. v. Villaroman), or the burden of proof.

The court found the trial judge's reasons, though not lengthy, were adequate.

The appellant, Justice Okojie, appealed his convictions for importing and possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The primary ground of appeal concerned when the offence of importing is complete, particularly in controlled delivery scenarios, arguing it was complete before his involvement.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, asserting that his knowledge of the package containing a controlled substance was not the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, clarifying that importing is complete when the contraband is no longer under the control of customs authorities, and upholding the trial judge's finding of knowledge based on circumstantial evidence.

The Attorney General for Ontario and the Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario (CLA) sought leave to intervene in an upcoming appeal concerning the scope of the actus reus of importing contraband.

The Attorney General sought to argue the impact of the definition on provincial prosecutions of importing firearms and child pornography.

The CLA sought to argue that extending the actus reus beyond the immediate entry point disproportionately impacts racialized communities, relying on social context evidence.

The court granted both applications for leave to intervene, finding the proposed arguments and materials relevant and non-controversial.

The applicant, facing multiple charges including drug trafficking, firearms offences, and first-degree murder, applied under s. 462.34(4)(c) of the Criminal Code for the release of $459,595 seized by police to pay his legal expenses.

While the Crown conceded the applicant had an exclusive interest in the funds, the court found the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he lacked other financial resources to retain counsel.

The application was dismissed due to a dearth of financial information provided by the applicant.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance following a complex multi-party prosecution involving 23 individuals charged on a 65-count information.

The trial took place approximately 41.5 months after the charges were laid.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: first, that the delay breached his Charter rights under s. 11(b) pursuant to the principles established in R. v. Jordan; and second, that evidence obtained from wiretap authorization should have been excluded because the issuing justice for the initial dial number recorder warrants demonstrated reasonable apprehension of bias by providing correspondence to the police officer seeking clarification on the Information to Obtain.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly attributed the delay and that the delay fell below the presumptive ceiling when accounting for discrete exceptional circumstances, complexity, and transitional circumstances.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias, as the issuing justice's correspondence sought appropriate clarification to assess the reliability of information rather than directing the drafting of the warrant application.

The offender was convicted of four counts of trafficking crack cocaine and four counts of possession of property obtained by crime after selling to an undercover officer.

The Crown sought 18 months custody, while the defence sought one year.

The court weighed the offender's prior related record and profit motive against mitigating factors including stringent bail conditions and an arbitrary arrest.

The court imposed a sentence of 14 months incarceration, followed by three years of probation, with 189 days of pre-sentence credit.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The offences occurred while the accused was on bail and seeking treatment for his own addiction.

The Crown sought a 7-year sentence, while the defence sought a 3-year sentence, arguing for a reduction based on the accused's addiction and his surrender of a firearm to police.

The court found that the accused was a mid-level trafficker selling for profit, not merely an addict-trafficker.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years, reduced by 44 months for pre-trial custody and 4 months for surrendering the firearm, resulting in a remaining sentence of 3 years imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, MDMA, and marijuana), possession of a prohibited device, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was sentenced to five years imprisonment, less credit for pre-disposition custody, resulting in a net sentence of 42 months.

On appeal, the appellant challenged: (1) the trial judge's decision to apply section 653.1 of the Criminal Code to bind the parties by a prior ruling refusing leave to cross-examine the ITO affiant; (2) the correctness of that prior ruling; and (3) the trial judge's rejection of the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of trafficking heroin in a commercial dial-a-dope operation.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the nature of the drug and the commercial enterprise, against mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of a relevant criminal record, remorse, and community support.

The court imposed a sentence of 3.5 years, reduced to 2.5 years after granting 1 year of credit for time spent on strict house arrest bail.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and related firearms offences following his arrest on March 19, 2014.

He appealed on the grounds that his arrest was unlawful because it lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that evidence seized incident to arrest should be excluded under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the arrest was lawful based on a reliable confidential informant's tip that was corroborated by independent police observation.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding misapprehension of evidence concerning the seizure of a cellular phone.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine into Canada.

She challenged the trial judge's decision to admit statements she made to Canada Border Security officers at the airport.

The appellant argued that she was detained before making these statements and that her Charter rights were engaged, requiring exclusion of the statements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not detained during routine questioning and luggage searches, and that detention only occurred after x-ray images revealed suspicious tins and the appellant asked what was in them.

The court found no error in admitting the pre-detention statements and dismissed the appeal.