Karen Heath

The appellant, Margaret Lee Cole, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder in the death of Richard Humble, who died in a house fire.

The Crown's case was based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's financial motive (forged documents and will), the presence of a sedative (Alprazolam) in the victim's system (prescribed to the appellant), a false alibi, and other suspicious circumstances.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting extrinsic misconduct evidence (the "Chapman letters") and in the jury's instruction on its use, as well as in the jury's instruction on the fabricated alibi.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the Crown's case was overwhelmingly strong and that the errors did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction upheld.

The applicants sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing their application for leave to appeal under s. 131(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, arguing jurisdictional error.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding it barred by s. 131(3) of the POA, which prohibits appeals or reviews from leave decisions.

The court also found no jurisdictional failure even if the cited precedent applied.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance following a complex multi-party prosecution involving 23 individuals charged on a 65-count information.

The trial took place approximately 41.5 months after the charges were laid.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: first, that the delay breached his Charter rights under s. 11(b) pursuant to the principles established in R. v. Jordan; and second, that evidence obtained from wiretap authorization should have been excluded because the issuing justice for the initial dial number recorder warrants demonstrated reasonable apprehension of bias by providing correspondence to the police officer seeking clarification on the Information to Obtain.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly attributed the delay and that the delay fell below the presumptive ceiling when accounting for discrete exceptional circumstances, complexity, and transitional circumstances.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias, as the issuing justice's correspondence sought appropriate clarification to assess the reliability of information rather than directing the drafting of the warrant application.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and related allegations in June 2017, with trial scheduled for March 2019, resulting in a gross delay of 21.5 months.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging the right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

After deducting 1.5 months of defence delay, the net delay was 19.5 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The court found that systemic disclosure failures, particularly the late disclosure of a key witness's statement on the morning of trial, could not be justified as exceptional circumstances.

The charges were stayed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for aggravated assault and breach of probation.

Following sentencing discussions, counsel had agreed on a sentencing range of 18 to 24 months less pretrial custody credit.

However, due to inadvertence during submissions, the appellant's counsel asked for 15 months in addition to pretrial custody rather than less pretrial custody, resulting in an effective sentence of over 28 months.

The Crown agreed that the sentence should be set aside and that the agreed-upon range was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and imposed a sentence of 18 months less pretrial custody credit (414 days), resulting in a final sentence of four months from the date of sentencing.

The appellant was convicted on 18 counts relating to drug trafficking and firearm possession following an undercover police operation.

He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment (three and one-half years on firearm offences and four years on drug offences, made consecutive and then reduced on a global basis).

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on three main grounds: alleging a breach of section 8 Charter rights regarding the search warrant, claiming the trial judge's amended reasons constituted after-the-fact justification, and asserting the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, arguing the consecutive sentences were inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The accused pleaded guilty to four serious offences: making child pornography, possessing child pornography, sexual assault, and counselling a person under 16 to touch her with an object.

The offences involved her very young son and were discovered through international cooperation between American and Canadian authorities.

The Crown sought a long-term offender designation and a sentence of six to eight years.

The defence sought a five-year sentence with no long-term offender order.

The court imposed a six-year sentence (apportioned as 3.5 years for sexual assault concurrent with 3.5 years for invitation to sexual touching, 2.5 years consecutive for making child pornography, and 2 years concurrent for possession of child pornography) and declined to impose a long-term offender designation, finding the accused posed a low risk of reoffending based on psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, as well as his sentence.

The offences occurred at a detention centre where the appellant and three co-accused attacked a fellow inmate in his cell.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by drawing inferences to fill evidentiary gaps regarding what occurred inside the cell where there was no video surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for aggravated assault but set aside the convictions for assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace on the basis of the Kienapple principle.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in law by bifurcating the sentence, ordering part of it to be served concurrently and part consecutively.

The sentence was varied to two and one-half years to be served consecutively to the appellant's existing sentences.

This appeal addressed whether informer privilege can protect an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip made to obstruct a police investigation.

The Court held privilege does not apply where, on a balance of probabilities, the caller intended to further criminal activity or interfere with the administration of justice.

It confirmed judges should presume privilege exists and determine applicability through in camera proceedings, often ex parte, with fairness safeguards for the defence.

The Court also confirmed judges may review the tip record and may require a preliminary exclusion or probity showing before full litigation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted robbery and his 20-month sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to adequately account for the frailty of Crown witness evidence and applied more rigorous scrutiny to the appellant's evidence than to Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of the accomplice and victim witnesses and did not reverse the onus of proof.

On sentencing, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding trial counsel's suspension, the co-accused's role in adjournments, and the appellant's bail variation application.

The Court also considered the appellant's extraordinary rehabilitation efforts since sentencing.

The sentence was varied to time served.

The applicant sought leave to reopen his sentence appeal on sexual assault and voyeurism convictions, arguing that a subsequent overturning of related domestic assault convictions constituted a change in circumstances warranting reconsideration.

The applicant sought credit for pre-sentence custody previously applied to the now-quashed domestic assault conviction and argued the sentencing judge had improperly considered the domestic assault conviction as an aggravating factor.

The court dismissed the application, holding it lacked jurisdiction to reopen an appeal already decided on its merits and that, even if jurisdiction existed, the interests of justice would not support reopening.

The defendant, charged with second-degree murder, sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence on the "fight or flight" reaction and the effects of marijuana to support self-defence and provocation.

The court dismissed the application, finding an insufficient evidentiary foundation for the proposed expert testimony to be relevant and necessary to the specific facts of the case.

The court also expressed obiter doubts about the necessity of such evidence, particularly regarding the "fight or flight" response, which is generally within the common experience of a jury.

The applicant, charged with Assault Causing Bodily Harm arising from an incident at a nightclub where the complainant allegedly fell down stairs, sought a Conditional Stay of prosecution on the basis that he required state-funded defence counsel to receive a fair trial.

The applicant had been denied Legal Aid and exhausted all appeals.

The court applied the Rowbotham test, examining whether the accused had exhausted legal aid efforts, lacked personal financial resources, and whether his right to a fair trial would be infringed without counsel.

The court found that the case presented significant complexity involving eyewitness identification and potential self-defence issues, and that the accused's ability to defend himself without counsel was insufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The court granted the Conditional Stay pending provision of state-funded counsel.