Amber Pashuk

The applicant was charged with possessing psilocybin for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He filed a Notice of Constitutional Question challenging the constitutionality of section 5 of the CDSA as it relates to psilocybin, alleging violations of section 2(b) (freedom of thought) and section 7 (liberty and security of the person) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the prohibition on trafficking infringes the rights of others to access psilocybin for its thought-related benefits.

The court found that section 5(2) of the CDSA does not infringe either section 2(b) or section 7 of the Charter.

The court rejected the applicant's broad interpretation of freedom of thought and found that psilocybin, as an unpredictable and scientifically nascent substance, does not constitute a protected tool of thought under the Charter.

The appellant was pulled over in a traffic stop and subjected to an investigative detention and sniffer dog search that breached his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Following the sniffer dog's positive indication, police arrested the appellant and searched his vehicle, seizing over 100 pounds of cannabis and cash.

The trial judge found initial Charter breaches but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal to the SCC, the majority held that the subsequent arrests and searches were consequential Charter breaches but that, absent additional or independent state misconduct, consequential breaches are unlikely to significantly increase the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct, and the Grant factors on balance favoured admission.

The appeal was dismissed, with Martin and Kasirer JJ. dissenting on the ground that the cumulative seriousness of all breaches and their substantial impact on the appellant's protected interests warranted exclusion.

This is a sentencing decision for O.S., a youth offender who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that O.S.'s actions, motivated by incel ideology and deemed terrorism, demonstrated a level of maturity and sophistication rebutting the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The defence argued for a youth sentence, citing O.S.'s age and mental health challenges.

The court found that O.S.'s meticulously planned and deliberate attack, his deep research into extremist ideology, and his lack of genuine insight or responsibility (blaming the incel culture) rebutted the presumption.

Furthermore, O.S.'s refusal to participate in rehabilitative programs rendered a youth sentence insufficient for accountability and public protection.

Consequently, the court imposed an adult sentence.

The Crown sought a declaration that the respondent's admitted offences of first-degree murder and attempted murder, committed in the name of involuntary celibate ("incel") ideology, constituted terrorist activity under s. 83.01 of the Criminal Code.

The court examined the statutory definition of terrorism, specifically the "ideological purpose" and "intention to intimidate" clauses.

The court found that incel culture is an ideology and that the respondent's actions were motivated by this ideology and intended to intimidate the public, particularly women.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ruling that the offences met the definition of terrorism.

The appellant, Stephen Tello, appealed his convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine, trafficking cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime, and his 15-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's instructions on multiple counts, the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, or the PGP messages.

The court also refused to allow a new Charter issue regarding the PGP messages to be raised on appeal, finding the decision not to raise it at trial was tactical and no miscarriage of justice would result.

The sentence was deemed fit, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for large-scale drug offences.

The applicant, Maisum Ansari, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, seeking a stay of proceedings due to alleged unreasonable delay in the delivery of the trial judge's reasons for conviction.

The original trial judge was medically unable to continue, and the application was heard by a different Regional Senior Justice.

The court found that the period of judicial delay in delivering reasons was 7.2 months, calculated from the completion of all submissions after the re-opened trial.

Applying the test from R. v. K.G.K., the court determined that the delay was not "markedly longer than it reasonably should have in all of the circumstances" and that the applicant failed to rebut the presumption of judicial integrity.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The appellants, Vito Buffone and Jeffrey Kompon, appealed their convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine and several substantive offences following a 50-day jury trial.

The appeal raised four grounds: the admissibility and scope of analyst's certificate evidence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), the trial judge's instructions on conspiracy (specifically the three-step Carter analysis), the instructions regarding inferences to be drawn from a third party's actions concerning an encrypted cellphone, and the instructions on the substantive counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions.

The accused, facing serious charges for trafficking carfentanil and possessing numerous firearms, applied for a second bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

The accused proposed a novel release plan involving 24/7 physical surveillance by a private security firm, GPS monitoring, and strict house arrest with multiple sureties.

The court found that this enhanced plan, combined with the severe difficulties the accused faced in preparing for trial due to COVID-19 restrictions in custody, constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that the stringent conditions sufficiently attenuated the primary, secondary, and tertiary ground concerns, and ordered the accused's release.

The appellant Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal overturned terrorism convictions and ordered a new trial on the basis that the jury was improperly constituted due to a jury selection error.

The trial judge had erred by refusing to exercise his common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors while using rotating triers, instead imposing static triers against the respondents' preferred procedure.

The Supreme Court confirmed the jury was improperly constituted but held that the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code can apply to cure jury selection errors.

The Court interpreted 'jurisdiction over the class of offence' to refer solely to the statutory jurisdictional capacity of the trial court to try the relevant class of offence, not to whether the jury was properly constituted.

Finding no prejudice to either respondent because the static triers procedure was a Parliament-sanctioned method and was implemented with care and attention, the Court restored the convictions and remitted the remaining grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The applicant sought a stay of charges for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, arguing the 42-month delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan threshold.

The Crown contended that defence delay and the COVID-19 pandemic, an exceptional circumstance, reduced the net delay below the threshold.

The court dismissed the application, finding that after deducting 42 days for defence unavailability in setting the preliminary inquiry and 8 months for the defence's waiver of 11(b) rights, plus 5.5 months for pandemic-related delay, the net delay was approximately 27 months and one week, which was reasonable and below the presumptive ceiling.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to import cocaine, brought a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel after being refused Legal Aid.

The Crown conceded the complexity of the trial and the Legal Aid refusal, but challenged the financial requirement.

The court found that despite earning approximately $70,000 per year, the applicant could not afford the estimated $140,000 private retainer for the complex 10-week trial.

The court granted the application, imposing a conditional stay subject to the Attorney General funding counsel, with the applicant agreeing to contribute $12,000 towards his legal fees.

The appellant was convicted on 18 counts relating to drug trafficking and firearm possession following an undercover police operation.

He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment (three and one-half years on firearm offences and four years on drug offences, made consecutive and then reduced on a global basis).

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on three main grounds: alleging a breach of section 8 Charter rights regarding the search warrant, claiming the trial judge's amended reasons constituted after-the-fact justification, and asserting the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, arguing the consecutive sentences were inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The Supreme Court clarified bail principles under s. 515 of the Criminal Code, including strict adherence to the ladder principle and the limited role of cash bail.

It held the bail review judge erred by insisting on a combined cash-plus-surety release and by relying on speculation rather than evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal, reversed the constitutional declaration against s. 515(2)(e), and replaced the release order with a cash-only release on the same terms.

The self-represented applicant, facing charges under the Criminal Code and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, brought an originating application seeking declarations that various provisions of those statutes violate the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that interlocutory Charter challenges during ongoing criminal proceedings should generally be declined absent special circumstances, which were not present here.

The court also rejected the applicant's arguments that s. 524(8) of the Criminal Code violates the presumption of innocence and that Part 18 of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional for failing to grant preliminary inquiry judges the jurisdiction to decide Charter issues.

The applicant corporation sought the return of $144,050 in cash seized by police during a drug and money laundering investigation targeting its former director.

The applicant argued it was the lawful owner of the funds, which it claimed were a business float, and that the funds were not required for the pending criminal proceedings.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that it was the lawful owner of the funds, and that the funds were required as evidence for the upcoming preliminary inquiry and trial.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to multiple counts of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The offender supplied large kilogram quantities of methamphetamine to an undercover police officer and was found with additional kilograms during the execution of search warrants.

The court rejected the defence claim that the offending was driven by a serious opioid addiction, finding instead that the offender was an experienced and sophisticated wholesaler motivated by profit.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for large-scale drug trafficking at a high level of the supply chain, the court imposed a global sentence of 12 years' imprisonment along with firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.