Sarah Weinberger

The applicant, an indigenous Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of a Justice of the Peace Review Council (JPRC) decision recommending her removal from office for judicial misconduct.

The misconduct involved a prolonged pattern of inappropriate intervention in her son's traffic ticket prosecution.

The applicant argued the JPRC majority failed to reasonably apply Gladue principles regarding her indigenous heritage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the JPRC majority reasonably concluded that the applicant's lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility meant that public confidence in the administration of justice could only be restored by her removal from office.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2003, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that continued his detention at a forensic psychiatric hospital.

He sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing the Board failed to apply the "significant threat" test and consider all relevant factors for a necessary and appropriate disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly applied the "significant threat" test and reasonably concluded that a detention order was required given the appellant's ongoing mental illness, lack of insight, and risk of aggression, despite some progress.

The appellant appealed convictions for obstructing a peace officer, firearm offences, breach of recognizance, and drug possession.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in determining the moment of the appellant's detention under the Charter.

The Court held that the appellant was psychologically detained when the police cruiser blocked his vehicle, and that this detention was arbitrary, leading to a breach of his s. 9 Charter rights.

Furthermore, the police failed to immediately advise him of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the Court concluded that the evidence obtained as a result of these breaches must be excluded, as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and acquittals were entered on all counts.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge ordered the NCR assessment without any evidentiary basis.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Superior Court of Justice held the proviso did not apply because the error was not harmless and the evidence of NCR was not overwhelming without the improperly ordered assessment.

The NCR finding was set aside, convictions were entered, and the appellant was sentenced to one day in jail, having already spent nine years in custody.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention order.

The Court of Appeal found the Board erred in its application of the "significant risk" test, concluding there was insufficient evidence to establish that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety.

The appeal was allowed, and an absolute discharge was granted.

The appellant, Bradley Cable, appealed a disposition from the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at the Southwest Centre for Forensic Mental Health Care, following a finding of not criminally responsible for various offences.

Cable argued the Board erred in not considering a conditional discharge as the least onerous option, despite conceding he posed a substantial public safety risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was amply supported by evidence, including psychiatric reports indicating severe untreated mental health issues and a high risk of reoffending, and that there was no air of reality to the possibility of a conditional discharge.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the responding parties' application for disclosure under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The responding parties sought disclosure of alleged out-of-court communications between the trial judge and an FBI handler, which were referenced in a book published by an undercover agent, to support a reasonable apprehension of bias claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's motion, finding it premature to conclude the bias claim could not succeed, and ordered the Crown to make further inquiries regarding the alleged communications.

The appellant Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal overturned terrorism convictions and ordered a new trial on the basis that the jury was improperly constituted due to a jury selection error.

The trial judge had erred by refusing to exercise his common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors while using rotating triers, instead imposing static triers against the respondents' preferred procedure.

The Supreme Court confirmed the jury was improperly constituted but held that the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code can apply to cure jury selection errors.

The Court interpreted 'jurisdiction over the class of offence' to refer solely to the statutory jurisdictional capacity of the trial court to try the relevant class of offence, not to whether the jury was properly constituted.

Finding no prejudice to either respondent because the static triers procedure was a Parliament-sanctioned method and was implemented with care and attention, the Court restored the convictions and remitted the remaining grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Appellant, Ibrahim Tshibola, appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing his s. 14 Charter right to a competent interpreter was violated.

He sought to admit fresh evidence from two independent interpreters detailing errors, omissions, and distortions in the trial interpretation, including issues with regional French dialects.

The court applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence, finding the evidence admissible and cogent, and that the due diligence requirement was satisfied given the compelling nature of the evidence and the defence counsel's inability to detect the issues at trial.

The court concluded that the interpretation fell below the constitutionally guaranteed standard, calling into question the integrity and fairness of the trial.

The appeal was granted, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the police violated his Charter rights during the execution of a search warrant at his home.

The police used a forced entry without knocking, handcuffed the appellant, and delayed his access to counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no breaches of s. 8 (search and seizure) or s. 9 (arbitrary detention), as the forced entry and handcuffing were justified for officer safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence.

However, the Court found two breaches of s. 10(b) (right to counsel) due to the police questioning the appellant before he could consult a lawyer and failing to facilitate contact with his counsel of choice.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the Court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, as the breaches were not causally connected to the discovery of the drugs and exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault against his wife.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence that the appellant punched her in the face, breaking her jaw, and rejected the appellant's claim that she fell down the stairs while intoxicated.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in her credibility findings, including relying on the lack of blood on the stairs and the absence of other bodily injuries without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were based on common sense and available on the record.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, appealed his ten-year global sentence for multiple violent in-custody assaults, including an aggravated assault that left a victim severely brain-damaged.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, including a post-sentencing diagnosis of schizophrenia and a Gladue report that was waived at the original sentencing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and reconsidered the sentence but concluded that the ten-year global sentence remained fit given the extreme violence, the custodial setting, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed, save for minor corrections to pre-sentence custody credit and the setting aside of victim fine surcharges.

The appellant, who was found not guilty by reason of insanity for multiple murders and sexual offences in the 1970s and 1980s, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a high-security facility.

At his annual review, all parties jointly submitted that he should be transferred to a less secure facility for a 90-day independent psychiatric assessment to explore a potential move to a less secure environment.

The Board rejected the joint submission.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to adequately explain its rejection of the joint submission, misapprehended the evidence regarding the utility of the assessment, and failed to fulfill its inquisitorial duty to explore the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

This is an appeal from convictions for first degree murder (Marcus Alexis) and manslaughter (Brian Funes) arising from an armed robbery and fatal shooting.

Alexis appealed on grounds of jury instruction errors regarding constructive first degree murder and the relation of evidence to legal issues.

Funes appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in leaving party liability under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code with the jury, arguing it was not available on the evidence.

The Court dismissed Alexis's appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate.

Funes's appeal was allowed, his conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on s. 21(1) liability for manslaughter, which was not supported by the evidence.