Michael Nathan Bernstein

The applicant sought release pending appeal from serious firearm-related convictions and a lengthy penitentiary sentence.

Applying s. 679(3) criteria and public-interest balancing, the court held detention remained necessary and dismissed the application.

The appellant, Terrance Nahmabin, appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible on account of Mental Disorder (NCRMD) for various offences.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found procedural deficiencies in the original NCRMD proceedings, including an improper plea, lack of inquiry into the appellant's understanding of the NCRMD consequences despite his expressed distress, and insufficient reasons from the trial judge explaining the application of s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court emphasized the strict requirement for procedural fairness in NCRMD cases due to the serious liberty deprivations involved.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD finding was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Andre Appleton, was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated assault following a stabbing incident.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that evidence regarding a potential third-party suspect (Ibrahim Muhia) was irrelevant and in effectively directing that another individual (SHG) was the second man involved in the fight.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly restricting the jury's consideration of evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt about the appellant's guilt, particularly concerning the identity of the stabber and co-participants.

The Court held that no formal third-party suspect application was required as the Crown had already made Muhia's potential involvement a live issue.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Christopher Husbands, appealed the life sentences imposed for two counts of manslaughter and other related offences stemming from a 2012 shooting at the Eaton Centre.

The appeal raised four main categories of error: misapplication of social context evidence (IRCA), incorrect test for PTSD link to conduct, misapplication of delayed parole test and failure to remedy Charter breaches, and demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the legal principles, including those related to social context evidence (consistent with Morris), mental disorder as a mitigating factor (consistent with Prioriello and Hilbach), and the two-stage Zinck test for parole eligibility.

The court concluded that the life sentences were not demonstrably unfit, emphasizing the seriousness of the crimes, the profound victim impact, and the paramountcy of general deterrence and denunciation in such cases.

The appellant, Candy Locey, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder, seeking to set aside her guilty plea.

She argued that the Agreed Statement of Facts, which she had accepted, did not support the conviction, specifically regarding the mens rea for murder.

The appellant contended that a question posed by the trial judge after her plea, but before conviction, and her answer to it, cast doubt on whether the mens rea was established.

The Court of Appeal found that the Agreed Statement of Facts fully supported the plea, establishing both the actus reus and mens rea for aiding and abetting second-degree murder.

The court concluded that the subsequent question and answer did not undermine the facts supporting the mens rea.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Shaquille Collins, was previously convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, the attempted murder conviction was set aside and a conviction for aggravated assault was substituted.

This decision addresses the sentence to be imposed for the aggravated assault.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, including the planned attack and use of a firearm, and the appellant's criminal record and misconduct.

Despite the appellant's youth, the court found that the principles of denunciation and general deterrence necessitated a sentence outside the typical range for aggravated assault with a firearm.

The court imposed the maximum sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the life sentence for first-degree murder, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

This appeal concerns a wrongful conviction for manslaughter, stemming from the unreliable expert evidence of disgraced pathologist Dr. Charles Smith.

The appellant, convicted in 1997 for the death of a 17-month-old, sought an acquittal based on fresh expert evidence that contradicted the original "shaken baby syndrome" theory, proposing a "complex fall" as the cause of death.

The court admitted the fresh evidence, including a 911 call transcript and new expert opinions, finding that the modern forensic science undermined the trial evidence.

The court also discounted the appellant's police interview due to coercive interrogation techniques.

Given the lack of reasonable prospect for conviction, the appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed convictions for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for first-degree murder, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions on contemporaneity and mens rea for murder.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the mens rea for attempted murder, as it failed to specify the requirement of a specific intent to kill.

The court substituted the attempted murder conviction with aggravated assault.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to deny a mistrial application, finding that the remedial instructions were sufficient to cure any prejudice from a witness's improper reference to a previous conviction.

This appeal concerned convictions for second-degree murder and discharge of a firearm with intent.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's jury charge was unfair and unbalanced due to alleged errors in presenting evidence and failing to adequately relate evidence to the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions.

The court concluded that the charge, read as a whole, was fair and adequately conveyed the defence's position and the relevant legal principles, upholding the convictions.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred by not providing a specific corrective instruction to the jury regarding a co-accused's counsel's speculative theory of the case.

The co-accused's counsel had suggested, without evidentiary basis, that the appellant was involved in an illegal marijuana operation and owed money, contradicting the appellant's defence that he was extorted by the deceased.

The Court of Appeal found that while the co-accused's counsel's comments were improper and lacked evidentiary foundation, the trial judge's general cautionary instructions to the jury about avoiding speculation and relying only on evidence were sufficient.

The court emphasized the high degree of deference owed to a trial judge's assessment of the impact of improper remarks and the chosen remedial steps.

The appeal was dismissed, as the court concluded that the comments did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that a W.(D.) instruction was required for a defence witness's testimony and that the trial judge inadequately treated her evidence.

The court found that a W.(D.) instruction was not warranted as the witness's evidence, while helpful, did not compel acquittal, and the trial judge's review of her evidence was accurate and even-handed.

The sentence appeal challenged the 12-year parole ineligibility period.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction and sentence for willfully promoting hatred against identifiable groups (Jews and women) and bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds, including challenges to the videoconference hearing, findings on the elements of the offences, and application of aggravating factors, did not raise questions of law alone or lacked sufficient merit/significance to the administration of justice.

Consequently, the application for bail pending appeal was also dismissed.

This is an appeal from convictions for first degree murder (Marcus Alexis) and manslaughter (Brian Funes) arising from an armed robbery and fatal shooting.

Alexis appealed on grounds of jury instruction errors regarding constructive first degree murder and the relation of evidence to legal issues.

Funes appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in leaving party liability under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code with the jury, arguing it was not available on the evidence.

The Court dismissed Alexis's appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate.

Funes's appeal was allowed, his conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on s. 21(1) liability for manslaughter, which was not supported by the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a seven-week jury trial.

This was his second trial on the charge; his prior conviction had been overturned by the Court of Appeal in 2013.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of Mark Yegin, a witness of questionable credibility who testified that he witnessed the appellant and Shant Esrabian shoot the victim, Hussein El-Hajj Hassan, in a secluded rural area west of Ottawa in August 2004.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant orchestrated the murder in retaliation for the victim's decision to purchase drugs directly from a supplier, thereby cutting the appellant out of the sales chain.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding multiple legal errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder in the fatal shooting of a victim inside a bar.

The critical evidence was security camera footage showing two men in a stairwell moments before the shooting.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was one of the men and was holding a gun.

The trial judge opined in his jury charge that the dark object appeared to be a gun, despite the Crown's earlier concession that the object was not clearly identifiable as a gun.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's opinion compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial by improperly intervening on a critical factual issue and emboldening the Crown to withdraw its concession.

The court also addressed issues regarding identification evidence and improper Crown speculation about a disabled security monitor.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

Two brothers were convicted of second degree murder in the shooting death of a gang member.

The Crown's theory was that the brothers acted pursuant to a joint venture to hunt down and kill the victim.

One brother testified he was the shooter and raised defences of self-defence and provocation; the other testified he had no involvement in the killing.

The trial judge's jury instructions improperly conflated the two accused into a single entity by repeatedly using the phrase "John and/or Mato" when describing elements of the offence and defences, failing to distinguish between liability as a perpetrator and liability as an aider or abettor, and assigning the shooter's defences to the non-shooter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the cumulative errors created a significant risk that the jury would approach the liability of the brothers jointly rather than separately.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud-related offences involving possession of fraudulent and forged credit cards and identity information.

The central issue was whether evidence obtained from warrantless searches of a USB key and a stolen vehicle should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to breaches of s. 8 rights.

The trial judge admitted the evidence, finding no Charter violation.

On appeal, the court found that the two searches of the USB key were unreasonable and violated s. 8 rights, as they were not truly incidental to the arrest for which the appellant was charged.

However, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), balancing the seriousness of the breach against the minimal impact on the appellant and society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to consider rehabilitation.

Leave was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of Keith Brissett.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on four grounds: (1) the instruction on the use of a KGB statement containing hearsay evidence of motive; (2) the provision of Vetrovec warnings regarding two disreputable witnesses despite defence objection; (3) the handling of third party suspect evidence regarding Curtis Murray; and (4) the treatment of eyewitness evidence regarding the shooter's skin colour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were legally sound and fair.

The Crown applied for certiorari to set aside a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge two respondents, Justin McGregor and Herve Kalonji, on various drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, affirming the narrow scope of jurisdictional review for preliminary inquiry decisions.

The court reiterated that such decisions are reviewable only for jurisdictional errors (e.g., failing to consider all evidence, impermissible weighing), not for errors of law or sufficiency of evidence.

The judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge properly exercised her jurisdiction in concluding there was insufficient evidence for committal, despite some potential errors in her reasoning regarding the evidence.

A 16-year-old appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his 14-year-old cousin.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his statements to police were admitted in breach of section 146(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) and section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge conducted a voir dire and admitted all statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two fatal legal errors: (1) he improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding detention from the Crown to the appellant, and (2) he erred in concluding that section 146(2) protections did not apply because the appellant's detention related to a different offence (obstruction of police) than the ultimate charge (first-degree murder).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was psychologically detained and entitled to the protections of section 146(2), which were not provided.

The statements were therefore improperly admitted, and the conviction was set aside with a new trial ordered.