Dr. Charles Smith

This appeal concerns a wrongful conviction for manslaughter, stemming from the unreliable expert evidence of disgraced pathologist Dr. Charles Smith.

The appellant, convicted in 1997 for the death of a 17-month-old, sought an acquittal based on fresh expert evidence that contradicted the original "shaken baby syndrome" theory, proposing a "complex fall" as the cause of death.

The court admitted the fresh evidence, including a 911 call transcript and new expert opinions, finding that the modern forensic science undermined the trial evidence.

The court also discounted the appellant's police interview due to coercive interrogation techniques.

Given the lack of reasonable prospect for conviction, the appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his guilty plea to manslaughter entered in 2001 for the death of a 13-month-old child.

The appeal arose from the reinvestigation of cases involving Dr. Charles Smith, a pathologist whose evidence regarding cause of death in children was later found to be unreliable.

The appellant had pleaded guilty based significantly on Dr. Smith's opinion that the child died from asphyxia caused by the appellant.

Fresh evidence established that Dr. Smith's conclusions were flawed and unsupported by the autopsy findings.

Multiple independent pathologists concluded the cause of death was unascertained.

The Crown conceded that Dr. Smith's flawed opinion played a significant role in the appellant's decision to plead guilty and agreed that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the conviction and order a new trial.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1992 in connection with the death of her stepdaughter, largely based on the pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Decades later, fresh expert evidence unanimously discredited Dr. Smith's findings regarding the cause and mechanism of death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the original guilty plea was uninformed and the conviction unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction, arguing the proceedings should have been stayed as an abuse of process due to the misconduct of a forensic pathologist and the Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario.

The appellant had previously been convicted of murder based on the pathologist's flawed pediatric forensic pathology evidence, a conviction later overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal held that while the state actors' misconduct was egregious and fell within the residual category of abuse of process, a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

Balancing the interests, the court found that a trial on the merits was appropriate given the serious nature of the allegations of chronic physical child abuse and the fact that the systemic issues had since been addressed.

The applicant applied to re-open his abandoned appeal from a manslaughter conviction relating to the death of his infant grandson.

He argued that new understandings of Shaken Baby Syndrome following the Goudge Inquiry suggested his conviction might be a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the case did not turn solely on Shaken Baby Syndrome but on cumulative circumstantial evidence, including an unexplained skull fracture, and the applicant failed to provide an innocent explanation for the injuries.

The appellant appealed his 1995 conviction for aggravated assault in relation to the death of his infant son, which was based on a guilty plea.

The plea was heavily influenced by the unequivocal opinion of a pathologist that the infant died from non-accidental head injury.

Fresh expert evidence cast considerable doubt on that opinion, offering non-culpable explanations for the autopsy findings.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found the conviction unreasonable, set aside the guilty plea, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in 1995 for the death of her two-and-a-half-year-old son, based largely on the flawed pathological evidence of Dr. Charles Smith, who testified the child died of asphyxia.

Following a reinvestigation of Dr. Smith's cases, the Supreme Court of Canada remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to consider fresh evidence.

The fresh expert evidence demonstrated that the cause of death was unascertained and that Sudden Unexpected Death in Epilepsy (SUDEP) could not be excluded.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found the conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The complainant, an Aboriginal man, alleged he was subjected to racially biased policing when he was stopped, investigated, and arrested for possession of stolen property (his own bicycle) by a Toronto police officer.

The Tribunal found that the officer's heightened suspicions, closed-minded investigation, hasty arrest based on flawed information, and post-release demands were influenced by negative stereotypes about Aboriginal people lacking credibility and being prone to criminality.

The Tribunal concluded that the complainant's race was a factor in his treatment, establishing a case of racial discrimination in the provision of policing services.

The hearing was bifurcated, with liability and remedies to be determined subsequently.

The appellant pleaded guilty in 1992 to criminal negligence causing the death of his infant son, based on flawed expert evidence from Dr. Charles Smith regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, fresh expert evidence revealed that the infant's death was likely caused by natural disease processes or birth trauma, and that the triad of symptoms relied upon by Dr. Smith was not diagnostic of non-accidental head injury.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea to prevent a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to infanticide in 1998 based on the pathology opinion of a paediatric forensic pathologist.

Following a Coroner's Review and a public inquiry, new expert evidence revealed there was no reliable pathological evidence to support the conclusion that the cause of death was asphyxia.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1994 for the death of her newborn child, based heavily on the flawed forensic pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, which revealed serious errors in Dr. Smith's conclusions, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence demonstrating that the cause of death could not be ascertained and that there was no evidence of asphyxia.

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty but for the flawed expert opinion.

The appellant was convicted of infanticide in 1999 based on the expert pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith, who opined that her four-month-old son was smothered.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, fresh expert evidence conclusively refuted Dr. Smith's findings, demonstrating that the child likely died of accidental asphyxia in an unsafe sleeping environment.

The Crown conceded that the fresh evidence should be admitted and the conviction quashed.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal, noting the profound miscarriage of justice.

In an interim decision regarding a human rights complaint alleging workplace reprisal, the respondents requested the exclusion of the Commission's proposed expert witness on racism.

The Tribunal applied the Mohan criteria and excluded the expert evidence, finding that testimony regarding the reluctance of racialized persons to complain and the history of police-minority relations was irrelevant to the reprisal complaint.

Furthermore, evidence regarding police culture and the treatment of complainants was deemed to be within the Tribunal's own expertise and therefore unnecessary.

The appellants were convicted of various offences, including murder and criminal negligence causing death, relating to the death of their infant son.

The convictions were largely based on the expert testimony of a Crown witness.

Following the dismissal of their appeals by the Court of Appeal, fresh expert evidence became available that discredited the Crown's expert.

The Supreme Court of Canada admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial on all counts, finding that the unreliable expert evidence was central to the Crown's case and could have affected the jury's verdicts on both the homicide and non-homicide charges.

The appellant was wrongfully convicted of first-degree murder of his four-year-old niece in 1993 based on flawed pathology evidence.

Following a reference by the Minister of Justice, the Court of Appeal heard fresh expert evidence conclusively demonstrating that the deceased was neither sexually assaulted nor murdered, and that the trial experts were wrong.

The Court admitted the fresh evidence, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal, but declined to issue a formal declaration of factual innocence, holding that Canadian law does not recognize such a verdict.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondents, who were charged with first-degree murder in the death of their infant daughter.

The trial judge stayed the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, largely caused by the failings of the Crown's pathologist.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in including pre-charge delay in his calculation as a remedy for the cremation of the child's remains.

However, the Court upheld the stay, concluding that the post-charge delay of 55 months for one respondent and 42.5 months for the other was unreasonable and severely prejudiced their liberty and security interests.

The appellants were convicted of offences relating to the death of their eight-month-old son, who was found to have suffered extensive physical abuse during his life.

The father was convicted of second-degree murder and assaults, while the mother was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and failing to provide the necessaries of life.

On appeal, they argued the verdicts were unreasonable because the exact medical cause of death could not be determined, and challenged the admission of demeanour evidence, evidence of injuries to their second child, and various jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the Crown was not required to prove a specific medical cause of death, and that while there were minor errors in the admission of evidence and jury instructions, they did not occasion a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence of ongoing abuse.