David Gary Bayliss

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Akashkumar Narendrakumar Khant, who pleaded guilty to attempted commission of an indecent act contrary to section 173(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, following a police sting operation targeting individuals seeking sexual services from minors.

The Crown sought 90 days custody, while the Defence proposed a conditional discharge with probation and house arrest.

The Court considered extensive psychological assessments, mitigating factors including Khant’s remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and severe immigration and professional consequences of a conviction.

The Court distinguished this case from more serious precedents, noting evidentiary weaknesses and the incomplete nature of the offence.

Ultimately, the Court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, including 3 months house arrest, emphasizing proportionality, rehabilitation, and the avoidance of disproportionate collateral consequences.

Chang Yul (Colin) Lee pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, forcible confinement, extortion, transmitting intimate images, and fraud under, stemming from a 30-hour ordeal where the victim was held hostage, severely beaten, humiliated, sexually violated, and extorted by Lee and a co-accused.

The Crown sought a 5-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought 2 years less a day.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the gratuitous, prolonged, and sexualized nature of the violence, and the severe physical and psychological impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included Lee's guilty plea (though attenuated), lack of prior criminal record, significant rehabilitative efforts for substance abuse, strong family support, low risk of re-offending, and the fact he was not the mastermind.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, tempered by the principle of restraint for a first offender.

Lee was sentenced to a total of 4 years in the penitentiary for the most serious counts (aggravated assault, forcible confinement, extortion), with concurrent sentences for transmitting intimate images and fraud, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and no-contact order.

Patrick Doyle was convicted by a jury of manslaughter and first-degree murder.

The court's task was to sentence him for these offences.

For first-degree murder, a mandatory life sentence with no parole eligibility for 25 years was imposed.

For manslaughter, the Crown sought 10 years, and the Defence sought 5 years.

The court imposed an 8-year concurrent sentence, considering the gravity of the offence, the degree of the offender's responsibility, and aggravating factors such as a lengthy criminal record and firearms prohibition.

The court also considered mitigating collateral consequences of harsh pre-sentence detention conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic, applying a "Duncan credit" as a factor in determining the fit sentence, and a "Summers credit" for time served.

The applicant, Roger Craig Short, charged with first-degree murder, sought to admit evidence from a failed "Project Somerton" undercover police operation (a "Mr. Big" scenario) where he did not confess.

The defence argued the statements were admissible under the Edgar exception, as unique evidence from a failed "Mr. Big" project, or as evidence of consciousness of innocence.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Edgar exception inapplicable due to lack of spontaneity and no undertaking to testify.

The "Mr. Big" argument was rejected as the project was not "unbeatable" and lacked the inducements/threats seen in Hart.

While the court initially considered admitting the evidence to counter Crown's post-offence conduct evidence, the Crown subsequently abandoned significant portions of its post-offence conduct evidence, rendering the Project Somerton evidence lacking sufficient probative value for admission.

This pre-trial application in a first-degree murder trial addressed the admissibility of hearsay evidence, specifically ante-mortem statements made by the deceased, Barbara Short.

The Crown sought to admit these statements to establish the deceased's state of mind, the nature of her marriage, the accused's animus and motive, and her future intentions.

The defence contested much of this evidence, citing concerns about reliability due to "circumstances of suspicion" and potential "impression management" by the deceased, and argued that the evidence was cumulative and prejudicial.

The defence also sought to admit several hearsay statements of its own.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, balancing threshold reliability against probative value and prejudicial effect.

The accused, Roger Craig Short, facing a third trial for first-degree murder, brought several pretrial applications, including one to preclude the Crown from using his testimony from the second trial.

The Crown also brought applications, such as for leave to call more than five expert witnesses and to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct and post-offence conduct.

The court granted leave for additional expert witnesses, ruled on the admissibility and editing of statements to persons in authority and a reporter, and determined the scope of prior discreditable conduct and post-offence conduct evidence.

Crucially, the court exercised its common law exclusionary power to prevent the Crown from cross-examining the accused on his second trial testimony, finding that the previous trial judge's error in forcing counsel to continue, coupled with counsel's inadequacies, created a miscarriage of justice and undermined trial fairness.

The accused was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon without authorization, two counts of possession of a prohibited weapon, careless storage of a firearm, careless storage of ammunition, possession of a firearm obtained by an indictable offence, and possession of a firearm with its serial number defaced.

A .32 calibre silver revolver with three live rounds and a spent shell casing were discovered during a search warrant execution at the accused's apartment.

The accused challenged committal for trial, arguing insufficient evidence of knowledge, a material element of possession.

The court found the evidence circumstantial and sparse, with equally plausible inferences available regarding knowledge by either the accused or a third party with regular access to the apartment.

The court discharged the accused, finding the Crown failed to meet the threshold for committal.

The defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault against a 15-year-old complainant between August and September 2010.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The complainant alleged multiple incidents of unwanted touching of her breasts and genital area by the defendant, who was her mother's boyfriend and lived in the family home.

The defendant denied all allegations.

The complainant initially recanted her allegations in a sworn affidavit in April 2012, but subsequently advised her lawyer in May 2013 that the affidavit was false and the allegations were true.

The trial focused on credibility, with the judge finding the complainant credible despite her psychological vulnerabilities and the apparent inconsistencies in her account, while finding the defendant and the complainant's mother utterly incredible.

The defendant was convicted on all three counts.

The accused was charged with several firearms offences after police arrested him during a surveillance operation and recovered a loaded handgun beside a vehicle in which he was a passenger.

Prior to trial, the accused sought exclusion of the firearm under ss. 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 but admitted the firearm evidence under s. 24(2).

At trial, the central issue was whether the accused possessed the firearm.

Accepting the police officers’ testimony that the handgun fell from the accused’s waistband when he was removed from the vehicle and rejecting the accused’s alternative explanation, the court found possession proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused applied to adjourn a scheduled murder trial pending an intended appeal to the Court of Appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial.

The applicant argued that the appeal raised significant issues regarding constructive murder and the requirement of subjective foresight of death.

The court held that an accused’s right to appeal does not automatically entitle them to an adjournment of a scheduled murder trial, particularly where there was insufficient evidence that the applicant had taken all reasonable steps to expedite the appeal and funding arrangements.

The court also considered the interests of co-accused who had been in custody for over two years and the public interest in timely trials.

Balancing these factors, the court declined to exercise its discretion to adjourn the proceedings.

The offender was sentenced following jury convictions for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, ammunition, and a high-capacity magazine without authorization, along with related firearms offences and breach of a Youth Court prohibition order.

The firearm, a loaded prohibited handgun with a removed serial number and a magazine capable of holding more than ten rounds, was discovered in a suitcase containing the offender’s identification during execution of a search warrant.

The court considered the offender’s lengthy and escalating criminal record involving violence and firearms, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives under s. 718 of the Criminal Code.

After reviewing comparable authorities and rejecting a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum under s. 95, the court imposed a six-and-a-half-year sentence for possession of the loaded firearm with concurrent sentences on related counts and a consecutive one-year sentence for breach of a prohibition order.

Credit was granted for pre‑sentence custody, including enhanced credit for time spent triple bunked and during lockdown conditions.

The accused brought a Corbett application seeking to exclude portions of his criminal record if he elected to testify at trial on firearm possession charges.

The court applied the factors from R. v. Corbett to determine whether the probative value of the prior convictions on credibility outweighed the risk of prejudice.

While the accused argued that violent and weapons-related convictions were highly prejudicial and of little value to credibility, the court found that many convictions were relevant to present a balanced picture of his respect for societal rules, particularly given defence attacks on police credibility.

However, convictions for weapons possession and use of an imitation firearm were excised due to their similarity to the charges before the jury, and the attempted murder conviction was edited to an assault conviction to minimize prejudice.

The remaining convictions could be used for credibility purposes if the accused testified.

The accused applied for a bail review after a justice of the peace ordered detention on the secondary ground following charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault arising from an alleged knife attack.

The reviewing court found that the proposed surety on review was reliable and capable of supervising the accused, addressing the secondary ground concerns.

The court then considered whether detention was necessary on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

While acknowledging the seriousness of the alleged offence and the apparent strength of the Crown’s case, the court held that the statutory factors did not reach the highest level and that the tertiary ground must be used sparingly.

Considering the accused’s age, lack of criminal record, positive antecedents, and the strength of the proposed surety, detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused were charged with possession of ketamine for the purpose of trafficking after police stopped their vehicle, detained them, conducted a perimeter search of a residence, and entered the house where a drug laboratory was discovered.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of all evidence under s. 24(2), alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the investigative detention was arbitrary because officers lacked reasonable suspicion, and that the accused were not promptly informed of the reasons for detention or their right to counsel.

The court also held that the warrantless perimeter search and entry into the residence were unlawful and that the seizure of identification constituted an unreasonable seizure.

Given the seriousness and multiplicity of Charter breaches, including misleading testimony and investigative conduct based on a mere hunch, the court excluded the accused’s roadside statements, identification evidence, and the drug laboratory evidence.

During a criminal jury trial, the accused brought a motion for a non-suit arguing there was no evidence upon which a jury could find that an object used during a confrontation was a real firearm rather than an imitation.

The defence contended that witness belief and the accused’s conduct were equally consistent with an imitation firearm and therefore could not support proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court held that the proper test on a directed verdict motion is whether there is some evidence upon which a reasonable jury could convict, not whether alternative explanations exist.

Evidence including witness descriptions of the gun, the accused’s threat to shoot, and the circumstances of the confrontation could support an inference that the firearm was real.

The motion for non-suit was therefore dismissed and the issue left for determination by the jury.

During a criminal trial for robbery, extortion, and firearms offences, the Crown sought to introduce a firearm seized during a search warrant executed nine months after the alleged robbery.

The Crown argued the firearm constituted circumstantial evidence permitting the jury to infer it was the same weapon used in the offence.

The defence opposed admission, arguing the firearm’s generic description and the passage of time rendered the evidence minimally probative and highly prejudicial.

The court held that although the firearm had some probative value, it was significantly weakened by the time gap and the generic description provided by witnesses.

The prejudicial risk—particularly the likelihood of propensity reasoning by the jury—outweighed its probative value, and the evidence was excluded.