David Gary Bayliss

The defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault against a 15-year-old complainant between August and September 2010.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The complainant alleged multiple incidents of unwanted touching of her breasts and genital area by the defendant, who was her mother's boyfriend and lived in the family home.

The defendant denied all allegations.

The complainant initially recanted her allegations in a sworn affidavit in April 2012, but subsequently advised her lawyer in May 2013 that the affidavit was false and the allegations were true.

The trial focused on credibility, with the judge finding the complainant credible despite her psychological vulnerabilities and the apparent inconsistencies in her account, while finding the defendant and the complainant's mother utterly incredible.

The defendant was convicted on all three counts.

The accused applied to exclude a loaded firearm seized by police, arguing his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated.

The court previously found that the accused was arbitrarily detained at gunpoint for a split second and that a subsequent search of his residence was unreasonable.

Applying the section 24(2) framework, the court found the police conduct was not deliberate or in bad faith, and the evidence was highly reliable and essential to serious charges.

The court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with several firearms offences after police arrested him during a surveillance operation and recovered a loaded handgun beside a vehicle in which he was a passenger.

Prior to trial, the accused sought exclusion of the firearm under ss. 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 but admitted the firearm evidence under s. 24(2).

At trial, the central issue was whether the accused possessed the firearm.

Accepting the police officers’ testimony that the handgun fell from the accused’s waistband when he was removed from the vehicle and rejecting the accused’s alternative explanation, the court found possession proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused applied to adjourn a scheduled murder trial pending an intended appeal to the Court of Appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial.

The applicant argued that the appeal raised significant issues regarding constructive murder and the requirement of subjective foresight of death.

The court held that an accused’s right to appeal does not automatically entitle them to an adjournment of a scheduled murder trial, particularly where there was insufficient evidence that the applicant had taken all reasonable steps to expedite the appeal and funding arrangements.

The court also considered the interests of co-accused who had been in custody for over two years and the public interest in timely trials.

Balancing these factors, the court declined to exercise its discretion to adjourn the proceedings.

The offender was sentenced following jury convictions for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, ammunition, and a high-capacity magazine without authorization, along with related firearms offences and breach of a Youth Court prohibition order.

The firearm, a loaded prohibited handgun with a removed serial number and a magazine capable of holding more than ten rounds, was discovered in a suitcase containing the offender’s identification during execution of a search warrant.

The court considered the offender’s lengthy and escalating criminal record involving violence and firearms, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives under s. 718 of the Criminal Code.

After reviewing comparable authorities and rejecting a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum under s. 95, the court imposed a six-and-a-half-year sentence for possession of the loaded firearm with concurrent sentences on related counts and a consecutive one-year sentence for breach of a prohibition order.

Credit was granted for pre‑sentence custody, including enhanced credit for time spent triple bunked and during lockdown conditions.

The accused brought a Corbett application seeking to exclude portions of his criminal record if he elected to testify at trial on firearm possession charges.

The court applied the factors from R. v. Corbett to determine whether the probative value of the prior convictions on credibility outweighed the risk of prejudice.

While the accused argued that violent and weapons-related convictions were highly prejudicial and of little value to credibility, the court found that many convictions were relevant to present a balanced picture of his respect for societal rules, particularly given defence attacks on police credibility.

However, convictions for weapons possession and use of an imitation firearm were excised due to their similarity to the charges before the jury, and the attempted murder conviction was edited to an assault conviction to minimize prejudice.

The remaining convictions could be used for credibility purposes if the accused testified.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

During the investigation, an undercover police officer posed as an Obeah spiritual advisor and obtained incriminating statements from two of the appellants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the undercover operation violated their Charter rights to freedom of religion and equality, constituted a 'dirty trick', and that the statements were protected by common law religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellants' participation was motivated by a desire to obstruct the justice system rather than sincere religious belief, and that the police conduct did not shock the conscience of the community.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding an in camera hearing and the refusal to sever the trial of the third co-accused.

The accused applied for a bail review after a justice of the peace ordered detention on the secondary ground following charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault arising from an alleged knife attack.

The reviewing court found that the proposed surety on review was reliable and capable of supervising the accused, addressing the secondary ground concerns.

The court then considered whether detention was necessary on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

While acknowledging the seriousness of the alleged offence and the apparent strength of the Crown’s case, the court held that the statutory factors did not reach the highest level and that the tertiary ground must be used sparingly.

Considering the accused’s age, lack of criminal record, positive antecedents, and the strength of the proposed surety, detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused were charged with possession of ketamine for the purpose of trafficking after police stopped their vehicle, detained them, conducted a perimeter search of a residence, and entered the house where a drug laboratory was discovered.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of all evidence under s. 24(2), alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the investigative detention was arbitrary because officers lacked reasonable suspicion, and that the accused were not promptly informed of the reasons for detention or their right to counsel.

The court also held that the warrantless perimeter search and entry into the residence were unlawful and that the seizure of identification constituted an unreasonable seizure.

Given the seriousness and multiplicity of Charter breaches, including misleading testimony and investigative conduct based on a mere hunch, the court excluded the accused’s roadside statements, identification evidence, and the drug laboratory evidence.

During a criminal jury trial, the accused brought a motion for a non-suit arguing there was no evidence upon which a jury could find that an object used during a confrontation was a real firearm rather than an imitation.

The defence contended that witness belief and the accused’s conduct were equally consistent with an imitation firearm and therefore could not support proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court held that the proper test on a directed verdict motion is whether there is some evidence upon which a reasonable jury could convict, not whether alternative explanations exist.

Evidence including witness descriptions of the gun, the accused’s threat to shoot, and the circumstances of the confrontation could support an inference that the firearm was real.

The motion for non-suit was therefore dismissed and the issue left for determination by the jury.

During a criminal trial for robbery, extortion, and firearms offences, the Crown sought to introduce a firearm seized during a search warrant executed nine months after the alleged robbery.

The Crown argued the firearm constituted circumstantial evidence permitting the jury to infer it was the same weapon used in the offence.

The defence opposed admission, arguing the firearm’s generic description and the passage of time rendered the evidence minimally probative and highly prejudicial.

The court held that although the firearm had some probative value, it was significantly weakened by the time gap and the generic description provided by witnesses.

The prejudicial risk—particularly the likelihood of propensity reasoning by the jury—outweighed its probative value, and the evidence was excluded.

The appellant was wrongfully convicted of first-degree murder of his four-year-old niece in 1993 based on flawed pathology evidence.

Following a reference by the Minister of Justice, the Court of Appeal heard fresh expert evidence conclusively demonstrating that the deceased was neither sexually assaulted nor murdered, and that the trial experts were wrong.

The Court admitted the fresh evidence, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal, but declined to issue a formal declaration of factual innocence, holding that Canadian law does not recognize such a verdict.