Dr. Michael Pollanen

The accused, Alexander Campbell and Tyler Josling, were charged with manslaughter after restraining Frank Harbalis during a violent incident at a restaurant.

The court considered whether the force used, including a chokehold, was excessive and outside the scope of lawful self-defence or defence of others.

The court found that while a brief chokehold was applied, the actions of the accused were not unreasonable in the circumstances, given the sudden and dangerous situation.

Both were acquitted.

The accused was charged with manslaughter after he ran at full speed up a sidewalk and forcefully pushed an 89-year-old pedestrian from behind, causing her to fall and suffer fatal neck injuries.

The accused claimed the contact was accidental and a reflex to the victim suddenly veering into his path.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding it inconsistent with video surveillance and his subsequent actions of fleeing the scene without hesitation.

The court concluded the push was a deliberate act of assault, satisfying the elements of unlawful act manslaughter.

The appellant, Emmanuel Owusu-Ansah, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the imposed sentence of life imprisonment with a 22-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised four issues: reasonable apprehension of judicial bias due to repeated interjections, erroneous admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, incorrect and inadequate jury instruction on provocation, and an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the admission of prior conduct evidence as probative of motive and context, affirming the jury instruction on provocation, and deeming the sentence fit given the horrific nature of the murder and the appellant's prior domestic abuse convictions.

This appeal concerns a wrongful conviction for manslaughter, stemming from the unreliable expert evidence of disgraced pathologist Dr. Charles Smith.

The appellant, convicted in 1997 for the death of a 17-month-old, sought an acquittal based on fresh expert evidence that contradicted the original "shaken baby syndrome" theory, proposing a "complex fall" as the cause of death.

The court admitted the fresh evidence, including a 911 call transcript and new expert opinions, finding that the modern forensic science undermined the trial evidence.

The court also discounted the appellant's police interview due to coercive interrogation techniques.

Given the lack of reasonable prospect for conviction, the appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

Bronson Lake pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of his girlfriend, Kim Gagne.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 16 years, while the defence argued for a lower end of the range, emphasizing the guilty plea.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the brutality of the domestic violence and lack of clear mental illness, and mitigating factors, such as the guilty plea and lack of prior criminal record.

The judge imposed a life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility, finding the brutality of the murder warranted a strong denunciatory sentence.

The accused was charged with multiple historical offences spanning 1995 to 2001, including manslaughter, bank robbery, car bombing, and two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on confessions the accused made to an undercover officer and a police agent during a 'Mr. Big' operation in 2018-2019.

The court carefully assessed the reliability of these confessions, finding them compelling, detailed, and corroborated by independent evidence.

The accused was found guilty of the robbery of Henrietta Knight (but acquitted of her manslaughter due to a gap in medical evidence regarding causation), the TD Bank robbery, the car bombing of David Allan's vehicle, and the first-degree murders of Richard Kimball and Stephen St. Denis.

The Crown applied to admit hearsay statements from the deceased victim and the post-mortem report of an unavailable pathologist in a manslaughter trial.

The court admitted the victim's statements, finding they met the criteria for spontaneous utterances and the principled exception to the hearsay rule, with sufficient markers of threshold reliability.

However, the court excluded the pathologist's report, concluding that the inability to cross-examine the expert on his baldly stated opinion regarding the cause of death would cause significant prejudice to the accused, outweighing its probative value.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included the trial judge's ruling on solicitor-client privilege over seized notes, the dismissal of an alternate suspect application, and the failure to leave manslaughter as an available verdict to the jury.

The sentence appeal sought a reduction in the 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction and the imposed sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings or the sentencing decision.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial judge's decisions regarding expert evidence on the cause of death.

The primary expert opinion suggested drowning based on diatom analysis, but an alternate theory of starvation was also presented.

The appellant argued that the alternate theory lacked sufficient evidentiary basis and caused confusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion on an alternate cause was properly admitted given the scientific controversy surrounding diatom analysis and other evidence supporting starvation.

The court affirmed that the jury, as the trier of fact, could consider all evidence and was not bound by expert opinions, especially when alternative explanations had an "air of reality."

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting and killing Arash Bakhtaryani at a banquet hall in Vaughan.

The appellant admitted to the shooting but claimed lawful self-defence.

The jury rejected the self-defence claim and convicted him of second-degree murder.

The trial judge imposed a life sentence with a 16-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the appellant raised five grounds of appeal regarding the admission of hearsay evidence, confirmatory evidence instructions, cross-examination tactics, self-defence instructions, and jury instructions regarding videotape playback.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant parents appealed a trial decision making their two children Crown wards without access.

The parents had previously been convicted of manslaughter in the death of their middle child due to malnutrition.

On appeal, the parents argued the trial judge made numerous errors, including finding the youngest child in need of protection, excluding the reasons for sentence from their criminal trial, and terminating access.

They also sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued they received ineffective assistance from their trial counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law.

The court also held that the fresh evidence would not have changed the outcome and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was both moot and unfounded.

The appellant appealed his guilty plea to manslaughter entered in 2001 for the death of a 13-month-old child.

The appeal arose from the reinvestigation of cases involving Dr. Charles Smith, a pathologist whose evidence regarding cause of death in children was later found to be unreliable.

The appellant had pleaded guilty based significantly on Dr. Smith's opinion that the child died from asphyxia caused by the appellant.

Fresh evidence established that Dr. Smith's conclusions were flawed and unsupported by the autopsy findings.

Multiple independent pathologists concluded the cause of death was unascertained.

The Crown conceded that Dr. Smith's flawed opinion played a significant role in the appellant's decision to plead guilty and agreed that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the conviction and order a new trial.

The co-accused applied to sever a second-degree murder count from two first-degree murder counts on the same indictment.

The co-accused argued that the stronger evidence on the first two counts, including a confession, would cause moral and reasoning prejudice on the third count, where the cause of death was disputed.

The court dismissed the application, finding a strong factual and legal nexus between the counts, as all three deceased were members of the same family involved in an ongoing child custody dispute.

The court also found that count-to-count similar fact evidence was likely admissible to prove identity, and that the interests of justice, including avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings, favoured a joint trial.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing a 2½-year-old child in his care and assault causing bodily harm.

He was acquitted of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the jury instructions were inadequate, that the murder conviction was unreasonable, and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the jury was properly instructed, that the evidence supported the murder conviction, and that the verdicts were reconcilable based on their different elements and temporal distinctions.

On sentencing, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of his Aboriginal status, which was admitted but found insufficient to warrant a reduction in the 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

A two-year-old child died from blunt force trauma to the abdomen.

The defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter for failing to provide necessaries of life.

This decision addresses a Gardiner hearing to determine aggravating factors for sentencing.

The Crown sought to prove that the defendant assaulted the child's mother, inflicted the fatal blow to the child's abdomen, and assaulted the child on other occasions.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant physically and emotionally abused the child's mother and repeatedly assaulted the child on various parts of the body, constituting despicable assaultive behavior.

However, the court could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant inflicted the fatal blow to the child's abdomen, considering other possible explanations and witness credibility issues.

Joel France was charged with second-degree murder.

This decision concerns a voir dire ruling on the admissibility and scope of expert evidence from Dr. Michael Pollanen, a forensic pathologist, regarding the cause of death of Nicholas Cruz.

The court limited Dr. Pollanen's testimony, prohibiting opinions on whether the fatal injury was deliberately inflicted or accidental, the statistical probabilities of causes, or inferences based on other injuries.

The court also restricted the language used by the expert, disallowing terms like "significant blow" and "consistent with" to avoid misleading the jury.

The judge found Dr. Pollanen's preparation and impartiality lacking in certain aspects, highlighting the dangers of expert overreaching and bias.

A Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking statutory and protection findings under the Child and Family Services Act, and an order for Crown wardship of a child apprehended at birth.

The respondent parents had previously been convicted of manslaughter in the death of another child due to malnutrition and failure to provide necessaries of life.

Two other children had been made Crown wards without access.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding whether the child was in need of protection and the appropriate disposition, despite the serious history of parental neglect and the parents' lack of demonstrated change.

The appellants were convicted in relation to the death of a young man who was assaulted twice in one night—first by Manasseri inside a bar, and then by Kenny outside.

Manasseri was convicted of second-degree murder, and Kenny of assault causing bodily harm.

On appeal, both argued their charges were improperly joined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the joinder ground.

However, the Court admitted fresh expert medical evidence regarding the cause of death, quashed Manasseri's conviction, and ordered a new trial.

For Kenny, the Court applied the newly released Jordan framework, found the 68-month delay unreasonable, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter following the death of a 14-month-old child in her care.

The child suffered a severe skull fracture and subdural hematoma.

The court found that the accused momentarily lost her patience and intentionally assaulted the child, causing the fatal injuries.

Alternatively, the court found that the accused failed to provide the necessaries of life by delaying calling 911 for over an hour after observing the child was unresponsive and limp, which significantly contributed to the child's death.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for first degree murder on the basis that the Crown had not led evidence capable of supporting the predicate offence of sexual assault required under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The evidence established that the accused’s semen was found in the deceased’s mouth and that the deceased died from neck compression during a violent encounter in her apartment.

The court held that while there was evidence of both a sexual act and a homicide, there was no evidence linking the sexual act to non-consensual activity or establishing that the death occurred while committing or attempting to commit sexual assault.

The preliminary inquiry judge’s inference that the sexual activity was non-consensual improperly conflated the violent killing with the earlier sexual act and relied on speculation rather than evidence.

The committal for first degree murder was therefore quashed, but the accused was ordered to stand trial for second degree murder.