Andreea Ioan Baiasu

Two appellants convicted of first degree murder following a home invasion robbery during which the victim was fatally shot appealed their convictions.

The first appellant, found to be the principal shooter, raised grounds including failure to consider defence of a third party, insufficient findings on forcible confinement, and reliance on inadmissible hearsay for identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence, that the evidence supported his participation in forcible confinement as a joint principal, and that the identification evidence was not hearsay.

The second appellant successfully argued that the trial judge applied an objective rather than subjective mens rea standard under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code for party liability for murder.

The Crown conceded the error.

The murder conviction was set aside and a conviction for manslaughter substituted, with a sentence equivalent to 12 years imposed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed outstanding issues in a motion brought by the respondent seeking orders under ss. 683(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code in support of an anticipated fresh evidence application.

The court considered two primary issues: (1) whether the Executive Legal Officer of the Superior Court should be required to provide a will-say statement and submit to cross-examination regarding communications with trial Crown counsel; and (2) whether counsel for the respondent could communicate with the now-retired trial judge to obtain clarification on matters raised in the trial judge's emails.

The court dismissed the motion for a will-say and cross-examination of the Executive Legal Officer, finding that while the communications were not themselves privileged, the risk of inadvertently disclosing matters subject to judicial immunity outweighed the limited probative value of the evidence sought.

The court also directed that neither counsel could communicate with the retired trial judge, holding that judges cannot waive judicial immunity and that the inquiries sought would necessarily disclose matters covered by judicial immunity.

Three appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the 2018 shooting death of Nnamdi Ogba.

The appellants appealed on seven grounds, including challenges to jury instructions on modes of participation, admissibility of expert gang evidence, after-the-fact conduct evidence, firearm videos, W.(D.) instructions, Browne v. Dunn breaches, and jury roll compilation errors.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on modes of participation under sections 21(1)(b) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were deficient and that there was no air of reality to section 21(2) liability.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court upheld the admissibility of expert gang evidence and other evidentiary rulings.

In a Crown appeal of an acquittal where the trial judge resigned due to permanent infirmity without providing written reasons, the respondent sought disclosure regarding communications between the Executive Legal Officer (ELO) of the Superior Court of Justice and the Crown.

The Office of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice (OCJSCJ) moved to provide unredacted communications in the ELO's possession to the appellate panel for judicial inspection only.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the OCJSCJ's motion, agreeing to review the sealed materials to ensure the panel has the necessary context regarding sensitive issues of judicial independence and privilege.

The court also deferred a decision on the respondent's request to contact the retired trial judge, inviting input from the Ontario Superior Court Judges’ Association.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered three applications related to a previous application by David Swaine, the respondent on a Crown appeal.

Swaine sought orders under sections 682 and 683 of the Criminal Code, including cross-examination of prosecuting Crowns and production of documents from the Executive Legal Officer of the Superior Court of Justice.

Two applications to intervene were brought by the Office of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Superior Court Judges’ Association, both raising concerns about the administration of justice and judicial independence.

The Crown also sought a sealing order for future materials.

The Court granted leave to intervene to both proposed interveners and dismissed the Crown’s application for a sealing order, finding it inapplicable to the materials at issue.

The applicant, a police officer acquitted of failing to provide the necessaries of life, brought an application to cross-examine the prosecuting Crowns and obtain documents from the Executive Legal Officer and the retired trial judge.

The Crown had appealed the acquittal based on the trial judge's failure to provide reasons.

The applicant sought this evidence to support a fresh evidence application, alleging that ex parte communications by the Crown with the Executive Legal Officer led to the trial judge being prohibited from sitting, which prevented the delivery of reasons.

The Court of Appeal granted the request to cross-examine the Crowns, finding it relevant to the fresh evidence application, but adjourned the requests for document production pending submissions on potential privilege claims.

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the complainant was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consenting, relying on circumstantial evidence including the complainant's state when awoken and the presence of the appellant's DNA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's use of common sense inferences appropriate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence fell within the established range for sexual assault involving forced penetration, regardless of whether the victim was awake or sleeping.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing the deceased, who had previously robbed him of a firearm.

On appeal, the appellant argued that administrative errors in compiling the 2022 jury roll violated his Charter rights to a representative jury and caused a miscarriage of justice.

He also challenged the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence with the jury, the admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, the voluntariness of his police statement, and the fitness of his 13-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no appearance of unfairness in the jury roll process, no air of reality to self-defence, and no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or sentencing.

The appellant, a taxi driver, appealed convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a 9-year-old child.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding the assailant's smoking and coffee-drinking habits, which the defence argued were central to identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and that the details were peripheral to the complainant's core, credible, and reliable testimony.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned due to lack of submissions.

The appellant, Michael Belleus, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the admission of a deceased witness's hearsay police statement, the trial judge's inquiry into juror apprehension of bias, and the jury instruction on aiding and abetting first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds, finding that the hearsay statement met the threshold reliability test under R. v. Bradshaw, the juror inquiry was sufficient, and the jury instructions on aiding and abetting were clear when read as a whole.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant, Steven Browne, sought leave to appeal a 14-year sentence imposed following guilty pleas to attempted murder with a firearm and discharging a firearm with intent to wound.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by exceeding the Crown's suggested range and by failing to give adequate credit for collateral consequences (Suter factors), disadvantaged background (Morris factors), and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (Duncan factors).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unfitness in the sentence, and that the sentencing judge properly considered the relevant factors without disproportionately reducing the sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm and unauthorized possession of a loaded prohibited firearm in a motor vehicle, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding him a party to the shooting based on circumstantial evidence, including his presence in the vehicle and flight from police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded from the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's DNA on the firearm and his coordinated actions with the co-accused, that he acted in concert to plan and carry out the shooting.

The sentence appeal was consequently dismissed.

The appellant, Reshane Hayles-Wilson, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper Crown submissions regarding tailoring evidence, an erroneous two-step deliberation instruction to the jury, and improper Crown submissions on motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred on all three grounds but concluded that these errors, individually or collectively, did not undermine the safety of the verdict given the overall fault-free trial and clear instructions on burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

The court also found no error in principle or manifest unfitness in the sentence.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The accused and a co-accused were convicted of first degree murder by a jury.

The accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge's failure to leave included offences with the jury with respect to the co-accused undermined his defence and tainted the verdict.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's error narrowed the jury instructions in the case of the accused and set aside the conviction, ordering a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's instructions properly left the reasonably available verdicts with the jury, and that the trial judge had explicitly instructed the jury to consider the accused's case separately from the co-accused's.

Applying the presumption that juries follow explicit instructions, the conviction for first degree murder was restored.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by using s. 633 of the Criminal Code to stand aside two male jurors for gender diversity, which was done in the presence of the jury.

The Court of Appeal found this was a legal error, as the judicial stand-aside power cannot be used to actively promote diversity on the petit jury, citing R. v. Chouhan.

The court further held that this error was not curable by the proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code because it prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial and undermined public confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the jury witnessed the defence's objection.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Furqan Akhtar, appealed his convictions for dangerous driving, criminal negligence, and street racing causing death and bodily harm, following a jury trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: misdirection on the mens rea for dangerous driving and criminal negligence, inadequate jury instruction on the effect of a co-accused's abscondment, and error in instructing the jury on the use of the appellant's prior Highway Traffic Act infractions for credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the dangerous driving and criminal negligence instructions, and that the instruction on the co-accused's abscondment was sufficient.

While the instruction on prior HTA infractions was deemed an error, it was cured by the proviso as it caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant's credibility.

The appellants, Jasmine and Richard Doxtator, appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

Their primary argument was that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury on the included offences of second-degree murder and manslaughter for Jasmine Doxtator, which they argued also impacted Richard Doxtator's trial.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, agreed that there was an "air of reality" to the lesser included offences for Jasmine Doxtator, and the trial judge's failure to leave these options to the jury constituted a legal error that tainted the verdict for both appellants.

The court rejected the Crown's argument to apply the curative proviso.

Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both Jasmine and Richard Doxtator.

The appellant, John McRae, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the life sentence with a 12-year parole ineligibility period for stabbing his son to death.

The appeal raised four grounds: the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on provocation, errors in the Scopelliti and Corbett rulings regarding character evidence, an erroneous hearsay caution, and an excessive parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no air of reality to the provocation defence, no significant prejudice from the character evidence rulings, the hearsay caution was not undermining, and the sentence was fit, including the application of the position of trust aggravating factor.

The appellant Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial for the respondent, who had been convicted of first degree murder after jury selection proceeded without peremptory challenges on the day Bill C-75 came into force.

The majority held that the statutory amendments abolishing peremptory challenges are constitutional because they do not infringe ss. 11(d) or 11(f) of the Charter, as the accused has no right to any particular jury selection procedure and adequate safeguards remain in place through challenges for cause, jury instructions, and the enhanced stand-aside power.

The majority further held that abolition of peremptory challenges is purely procedural and therefore applies retrospectively to all jury selections commencing on or after September 19, 2019.

Abella J. dissented in part, concluding that while the amendments are constitutional, they should apply only prospectively because they affect the accused's substantive right to meaningfully participate in jury selection.

Côté J. dissented in full, finding the abolition of peremptory challenges unconstitutional under s. 11(f) of the Charter as it substantially diminishes the core jury characteristics of impartiality, representativeness, and competence.

The appellant, convicted of multiple domestic violence offences and designated a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence, appealed his conviction and sentence.

Grounds included reasonable apprehension of bias, errors in credibility findings, abuse of process regarding a breach of recognizance, and unreasonable post-verdict delay violating Charter s. 11(b) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's findings on credibility, the dangerous offender designation, and finding no bias or Charter breach due to the exceptional nature of dangerous offender proceedings.