Andreea Ioan Baiasu

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of nine months in custody, three years probation, and $50,000 restitution imposed for an eleven-year fraud on a small union.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider mitigating factors including early guilty plea, cooperation, and intent to make restitution.

The sentencing judge rejected a request for a conditional sentence as part of a blended sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's rejection of the conditional sentence given the circumstances of the offence and the need for general deterrence, and determined that the custodial sentence was at the low end of the range reflecting mitigating factors.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that dismissed his appeal from convictions for assault and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by confusing the distinction between a proved absence of motive to lie and the absence of evidence of a motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the legal principle was well-settled and the merits of the appeal were not strong.

The trial judge's statement that she did not find a motivation to fabricate was a rejection of the defence submission rather than a positive finding that no motive existed.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The conviction was for robbery with a firearm, where the Crown's case relied on a BB gun.

The appellant argued that a BB gun did not fall within the definition of firearm under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that on the evidence accepted by the trial judge, the BB gun fell within the definition of firearm in section 2 of the Criminal Code and that this definition applies throughout the Act, including to the robbery provision.

The Court also found the sentence imposed was not unfit and declined to interfere.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The accused was convicted of child luring by means of computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after engaging in sexual conversations with a police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl on Craigslist.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of three provisions: the presumption of belief in section 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement in section 172.1(4), and the mandatory minimum one-year sentence in section 172.1(2)(a).

The trial judge found section 172.1(3) violated the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter and was not justified under section 1.

The trial judge upheld section 172.1(4) as constitutional under section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the mandatory minimum sentence grossly disproportionate under section 12 of the Charter and imposed 75 days intermittent incarceration instead.

Both the conviction appeal and Crown's sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the 33-month sentence as fit, finding no error in principle regarding the trial judge's characterization of the sentencing range.

However, the court varied the sentence by modifying the firearms prohibition from a lifetime ban under s. 109(2) to a ten-year ban, considering the appellant's youth and absence of prior firearm misuse.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting the victim through the heart in a bus shelter in broad daylight.

The appellant claimed self-defence under former s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, asserting that the victim had unlawfully assaulted him.

The jury rejected this claim and found him guilty.

The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds regarding the jury instructions on self-defence and challenged the parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and the appeal from sentence, finding no error in principle or misdirection by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon (a lamp) entered by Justice Jane E. Kelly on May 15, 2012.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, and insufficiency of reasons/unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, no reversal of the burden of proof, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the evidentiary concerns and met the functional requirements for appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of robbery, having their faces masked, assault with an imitation handgun, and using an imitation handgun.

One appellant was also convicted of resisting a peace officer.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on party liability for the firearm offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury was not properly instructed that a non-gun-wielding intruder must know the other intruder had a firearm to be found guilty as a joint principal.

The appeal was allowed for the joint convictions and disguise charges, but the conviction for resisting arrest was upheld as the appellant's actions constituted active resistance.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and forcible seizure following an alleyway beating outside a nightclub.

At trial, the judge admitted a security guard's written statement identifying the appellant as a participant under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the statement lacked threshold reliability and that phone call evidence was mishandled.

He also appealed his three-and-a-half year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the hearsay evidence met the traditional exception's conditions, the jury was properly instructed, and the sentence was proportionate to the gravity of the vigilante attack.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He had forced his way into the complainant's apartment, confined her, and eventually ordered her to watch him masturbate.

The appellant argued that because he did not touch the complainant or verbally threaten her, his actions did not amount to a threat of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in the context of the violent and sexualized atmosphere created by the appellant, his actions constituted a threat to apply force of a sexual nature.

The appellant appealed his conviction for weapons trafficking under s. 99 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the Crown failed to prove he knew the sale of the gun was unauthorized, and that the finding he aided and abetted the transfer was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence had conceded the knowledge element at trial by focusing exclusively on whether the appellant played a role in the transfer.

The Court also held that the trial judge's conclusion regarding aiding and abetting was amply supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board had no obligation to make further inquiries beyond the joint position of the parties based on the record.

The Court noted the appellant's progress, the existence of a treatment plan, and concluded that the Board's disposition was the least onerous and least restrictive available.

The young person appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement as an aider and abettor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions relating to the main sexual assault in the bedroom, finding the trial judge's factual findings supported the inference that the appellant intended to assist his friends.

However, the Court quashed the convictions relating to an earlier 'tickling incident' because the trial judge failed to provide any analysis of how the appellant aided and abetted that specific assault.

The appeal was allowed in part, with a new trial ordered on the quashed counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the trial judge erred in characterizing his relationship with the complainant as exploitative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was fully justified given the appellant was 11 years older, acted as the complainant's drug supplier and street protector, and took advantage of the resulting power imbalance.

The appellant appealed a sentence of indeterminate detention following a dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge erred in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was firmly grounded in the evidence, noting the appellant committed the predicate offence while on conditional release.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault and other charges.

The Ontario Review Board granted him an absolute discharge, finding he no longer posed a significant risk to public safety.

The hospital appealed, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent had rapidly decompensated, resumed substance abuse, and become aggressive shortly after his discharge.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have affected the board's decision as it undermined the factual foundation of the absolute discharge.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the board for a rehearing.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not support findings of planning and deliberation or criminal harassment.

He also argued that a decision tree provided to the jury was misleading and that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction regarding his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict on all bases left to the jury, the decision tree was properly contextualized by the trial judge's instructions, and the substance of the W.(D.) principles was adequately conveyed.

The appellant appealed a second-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal shooting during a gang-related confrontation at a public festival.

The appeal challenged the jury charge on former s. 34(2) self-defence, the refusal to leave provocation under s. 232 to the jury, and the trial judge’s review of the evidence.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, fairly presented self-defence and correctly focused the jury on the critical moment of the shooting.

It further held that there was no air of reality to provocation because the defence position was deliberate self-preservation, not loss of self-control, and found no material misstatement or omission in the evidentiary review.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

Following the court's earlier ruling that the mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional and that the trial sentence was manifestly unfit, the remaining issue was whether the respondent should be re-incarcerated after having completed the sentence originally imposed.

The court held that a fit sentence at trial would have been two years less a day, with 12 months' credit reducing the remaining custodial term to 12 months.

However, given the lengthy appellate delay, the respondent's successful completion of the conditional sentence, and his demonstrated rehabilitation, the court permanently stayed execution of the 12-month sentence.

The accused appealed his convictions for violent offences against a former friend, while the Crown appealed the refusal to designate him a dangerous offender.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge made no reviewable errors in applying the credibility framework, assessing the forensic evidence, or giving reasons.

On the sentence appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in law by importing intractability into s. 753(1), by treating spontaneity and absence of 'serial' offending as defeating pattern, and by misapprehending the availability of long-term offender style community control for a non-sexual violent offender.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and the disposition was varied to five years' imprisonment followed by a ten-year supervision order.