Vincenzo Rondinelli

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting the joint submission on sentence.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to attempted murder of his spouse on the third day of trial.

The Crown and defence had agreed that a sentence of seven years was appropriate.

The trial judge rejected the joint submission as contrary to the public interest and imposed a sentence of 10 years' incarceration instead.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the joint submission was so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching of his step-daughter over a period of approximately nine years, from when she was five to fourteen years old.

The sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching convictions were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and the appellant was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing they were tainted by palpable and overriding errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder as the middleman between the deceased's nephew who orchestrated the murder and the hired killer who carried it out.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the jury composition on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge improperly used static triers to decide challenges for cause without a formal application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code, and (2) that the trial judge erred in discharging an elderly juror with physical disabilities without reasonable cause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, holding that the appellant obtained what he wanted in substance regarding jury selection procedures and that the trial judge had reasonable cause to discharge the juror based on his inability to follow proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm under section 255(2) of the Criminal Code.

The primary ground of appeal concerned the trial judge's admission of a prior inconsistent statement made by a defence witness for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in conducting an analysis regarding whether the statement could be used for its truth (a matter neither party had addressed), this did not constitute reversible error.

The trial judge had only used the statement for the proper purpose of assessing the witness's credibility and had not relied upon it for its truth in reaching the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code following trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof and improperly applied an objective standard of fault when concluding the refusal was intentional.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s reference to a “reasonable person” related to the officer’s decision to stop further testing, not the mens rea of the offence.

Although the trial judge did not expressly refer to the reasonable doubt standard, the reviewing court concluded that the proper standard was implicitly applied and that the conviction was based on credibility findings rejecting the appellant’s explanation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for failing to comply with a demand to provide a suitable breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

She argued that the trial judge’s extensive questioning of witnesses compromised the appearance of trial fairness and that the judge erred in assessing the elements of the offence, particularly regarding voluntariness and reasonable excuse.

The court acknowledged that the trial judge improperly assumed part of the Crown’s role during examinations-in-chief but found that the interventions did not undermine the overall fairness of the trial.

The court further held that the trial judge reasonably concluded that the accused intentionally failed to provide a suitable sample and rejected the explanation that cold weather and nervousness made compliance impossible.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following convictions for drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and related offences, the Crown applied under s. 462.37 of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of assets and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court applied the reverse onus provisions for criminal organization offences and accepted forensic accounting evidence showing substantial unexplained wealth.

Certain assets were found to be proceeds of crime or partly derived from such proceeds, including cash seized from a residence, equity from a property sale, a vehicle, and unexplained deposits.

The court exempted a condominium claimed by a third party where evidence established it had been purchased using inherited funds.

Significant fines in lieu of forfeiture were imposed where assets were no longer available.

Following a forfeiture hearing, defence counsel requested the release of additional funds from seized assets to pay legal fees.

The court had previously authorized the release of $80,000 from the seized funds.

In a supplementary order correcting an inadvertent omission in the earlier decision, the court refused the request for additional funds.

The court cited the accused’s lack of cooperation and the costs associated with the prosecution as reasons not to release further assets.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving two incidents with a minor complainant, as well as the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on similar fact reasoning across counts, failed to consider possible innocent collusion between witnesses, and imposed an excessive sentence.

The Superior Court rejected the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not improperly use similar fact evidence and that no evidentiary foundation existed for innocent collusion.

However, the court found an error in principle in sentencing where the trial judge treated the appellant’s exercise of the right to trial and lack of admission of guilt as aggravating factors.

Re‑sentencing afresh, the court reduced the custodial term to a 90‑day intermittent sentence while maintaining the probation and ancillary orders.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending an extradition hearing to the United States on charges of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine.

The court applied the bail framework incorporated through the Extradition Act and Criminal Code provisions, noting the reverse onus applicable to drug trafficking allegations and non‑resident status.

The court found the applicant failed to establish that detention was not justified on the primary ground due to a significant flight risk, including use of aliases, prior deportations, illegal re‑entries into Canada and the United States, and untrustworthy evidence regarding residence.

Although the court found no substantial risk to public safety given the absence of a criminal record, it concluded detention was also necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the seriousness of the allegations and strength of the evidence.

Bail pending extradition was therefore denied.