Luke Schwalm

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death arising from a fatal ATV accident.

The appellant was towing the deceased's disabled ATV using a short fabric sling when his vehicle drifted left, causing the tow strap to become caught and the deceased's ATV to flip, resulting in her death.

The trial judge found the appellant was impaired by alcohol, engaged in an inherently dangerous towing operation without proper concentration, and that his conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in the trial judge's treatment of expert and lay evidence regarding the tow setup, and that causation was properly established for both offences.

The appellant appealed from a conviction for sexual assault on multiple grounds, including alleged errors in the trial judge's application of the burden and standard of proof, an adverse inference from silence, the admission of testimony regarding the complainant's demeanour, and improper reliance on the complainant's testimonial demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of law or consideration of evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Lorne Rappaport’s appeal from convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation.

The appellant, a hockey coach, was found to have engaged in a sexual relationship with the complainant, who was 15 at the time.

The appeal alleged misapprehension of evidence and improper application of legal principles regarding credibility.

The Court found no material misapprehension and held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and application of the law were reasonable and thorough.

The appellant, convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sexual assault against his nieces and great-nieces, appealed his convictions.

The primary grounds of appeal were that the trial judge erred by admitting similar fact evidence without properly considering collusion among complainants and by applying a different standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of collusion, credibility, or the application of similar fact principles.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for concluding that he intended to kill the deceased or cause serious bodily harm likely to cause death.

The appellant conceded guilt for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, when read as a whole, sufficiently explained the finding of intent based on the brutality of the beating, even without explicitly addressing an alternative theory raised for the first time on appeal.

The appellant, Clifton Vassel, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable regarding planning and deliberation, and that the jury instructions on this element were flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude planning and deliberation, and that the trial judge's instructions adequately outlined the relevant evidence, even if not exhaustive.

The appellant, Rajindra Becessar, appealed his conviction for firearm possession, challenging a pre-trial ruling that admitted his statement to police.

The application judge had found breaches of the appellant's s. 8 (search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights, excluding evidence from the search but admitting the statement.

On appeal, Becessar argued the statement should have been excluded due to the cumulative effect of the breaches, specifically that it was obtained in a manner infringing his s. 8 rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that this argument was not properly raised or supported with evidence before the application judge, thus she made no error in her analysis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder using a firearm, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the victim's provocative conduct in assessing the specific intent to kill.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons demonstrated a proper consideration of all circumstances, including the victim's actions, when determining whether the Crown had proven intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also dismissed the application for leave to appeal sentence due to lack of submissions.

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence.

On consent, the conviction for permitting the transmission of sexually explicit material to a person under 16 years was quashed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence was varied.

Specifically, the prohibition orders under s. 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code were modified, and the duration of the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order was reduced from life to 20 years, with the quashed conviction removed from its scope.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of child witnesses (his daughter S.R. and step-granddaughter S.R.D.) by improperly discounting inconsistencies and compartmentalizing evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of inconsistencies or his distinction between intentional and inadvertent tainting of evidence.

The court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding child witnesses and that his credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The appellant, L.G., appealed his conviction for gross indecency and sexual assault, which occurred in 1985-1986 when the complainant was 14.

The appellant claimed the sexual activity in 1987 was consensual.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence due to inconsistencies with his police statement and implausibility, and found the defence witnesses' testimony incredible due to suspected collusion or tainting.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's consistent evidence, which was corroborated by independent, non-contentious details.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not reverse the burden of proof in assessing defence evidence and did not err in considering circumstantial evidence as confirmatory, as it was more consistent with the complainant's account.

The appellant appealed convictions for home invasion related offences, challenging the admissibility and reliability of fingerprint evidence due to alleged confirmation bias, and the trial judge's dismissal of an application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged Charter breaches during an altercation in custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of fingerprint evidence and upholding the trial judge's decision to deny a stay, noting the high bar for such a remedy.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence arising from two attacks on the victim, including a conviction for attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the attempted murder conviction, finding the trial judge properly considered the evidence as a whole.

However, based on a Crown concession regarding the wording of the indictment, the court quashed the conviction for the included offence of assault causing bodily harm and substituted a conviction for assault.

The concurrent sentence for that count was reduced from three years to one year, leaving the net sentence of four years and two months unchanged.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal was abandoned and dismissed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years imposed for a spree of robberies committed over a two-week period.

Duty counsel argued that the sentencing judge erred by relying on an incorrect prior sentence from 2006, claiming the appellant had received six and a half years when he actually received five years and eleven months.

The court found the error immaterial as the sentencing judge had considered numerous factors and reduced a proposed 12-year sentence to 10 years based on rehabilitative efforts.

The sentence was upheld as fit and justified.

The appellant was convicted by jury of sexual assault, attempted choking with intent to overcome resistance to sexual assault, threatening bodily harm, and three counts of breach of recognizance following an attack on a complainant in an apartment building elevator.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and attempted choking, challenging the trial judge's instructions regarding evidence the jury could consider in determining whether the assault was of a sexual character.

Specifically, the appellant objected to the jury being instructed to consider evidence of his interactions with women at a nightclub earlier that evening and evidence of his communications with a body rub service approximately 30 minutes after the assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence was probative of the appellant's state of mind and intent, and that any prejudicial effect was adequately addressed through limiting instructions.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, specifically challenging the duration of a driving prohibition.

On consent and limited to the issue of the driving prohibition duration, the Court of Appeal reduced the prohibition from a lifetime ban to one expiring on May 20, 2022, pursuant to section 259(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant failed to appear at the appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision setting aside convictions for sexual assault and ordering a new trial.

The Court of Appeal majority had held that the trial judge erred by failing to engage in the second step of the admissibility inquiry and by giving inadequate jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct (the accused's failure to attend for his original trial date).

The Supreme Court held unanimously that failure to attend trial is not presumptively post-offence conduct and its admissibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

A majority allowed the appeal substantially for the reasons of Huscroft J.A. (dissenting in the Court of Appeal), restoring the convictions.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the information amendment during trial was proper.

The sentence appeal was partially allowed.

While the trial judge erred in treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, the appellate court upheld the one-year imprisonment sentence as fit given the appellant's abuse of trust and planned fraud against a vulnerable family member.

The court extended the time to pay the fine in lieu of forfeiture from six months to two years and set aside the victim fine surcharge.