Stacey Alexander Taraniuk

The applicant, charged with importing cocaine, sought a stay of proceedings alleging racial profiling by CBSA and RCMP officers under sections 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15 of the Charter.

The court found that Border Services Officer Coughlin did not racially profile the applicant, but Superintendent Ryan did, by relying on a stereotype based on the applicant's national origin (Jamaican-born Canadian travelling to a non-Jamaica Caribbean country) as an indicator of criminality.

This reliance on immutable characteristics was deemed discriminatory.

Consequently, the court found violations of the applicant's s. 7 and s. 15 Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The offender was convicted by a jury of one count of dangerous driving causing death and five counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after speeding through a downtown intersection and colliding with a vehicle making an illegal left turn, causing his vehicle to strike a crowd of pedestrians.

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence sought three years.

The court weighed the devastating impact on the victims, the offender's prior record, and the aggravating factors of multiple victims and driving for remuneration against mitigating factors including the offender's tragic background, the impact of anti-Black racism, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a total sentence of four years in custody, reduced by three years of pre-sentence custody credit, leaving one year to serve, along with a ten-year driving prohibition.

The defendant, Shaun Blackman, was charged with intimidation of a justice system participant (an undercover police officer, TK) and uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm to TK, contrary to ss. 423.1(1)(b) and 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The charges stemmed from Instagram posts made by Blackman revealing TK's identity and containing threats, prior to TK testifying at Blackman's preliminary inquiry.

The court found that Blackman was the account holder and that the posts were made by him.

The court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Blackman intended to provoke fear in TK to impede his duties and that the posts constituted threats of death or bodily harm.

Blackman was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant, Shaun Blackman, charged with threatening death and intimidating a justice participant, brought a pre-trial application under sections 7 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He alleged that police failed to seize and preserve crucial evidence related to threatening Instagram posts, thereby impairing his right to make full answer and defence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the police's actions did not constitute unacceptable negligence and that no Charter violation occurred, as the relevant evidence was preserved in substance and the defence retained the ability to challenge it at trial.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code, which imposes a mandatory minimum five-year sentence for procuring a prostitute under 18, unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's finding that the mandatory minimum was grossly disproportionate for a reasonable hypothetical offender with significantly reduced moral culpability, such as a victim-offender.

The court also addressed the procedural issue of the Crown's premature notice of appeal, finding no prejudice to the respondent.

The appellant appealed convictions for procuring a person under 18 for prostitution and making child pornography, challenging the constitutionality of a cellphone seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

The appeal hinged on the factual determination of whether the arrest occurred in a hotel hallway (lawful) or the hotel room (unlawful).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the arrest occurred in the hallway, affirming the trial judge's credibility assessment of police officers' evidence despite minor inconsistencies.

The Court found no material misapprehension of evidence or uneven scrutiny, dismissing the appeal.

The accused, Ramsey Safieh, was charged with dangerous operation of a conveyance, failing to comply with probation, and operating a conveyance while prohibited, following a hit-and-run incident.

The sole issue at trial was the identification of the driver.

The court found that the Crown had not proved the identification of the driver beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the officers' credible testimony, due to factors such as brief viewing time in darkness, lack of detailed description, and absence of pre-trial identification procedures.

The circumstantial evidence, including the accused's past address and flight, was found to add little to the Crown's case.

Consequently, all charges were dismissed.

During a first-degree murder trial, proceedings were halted for several months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Upon assessing the jury's availability to resume the trial in the fall, the court conducted individual inquiries with several jurors.

The court discharged two jurors due to undue hardship related to childcare, schooling, and employment concerns exacerbated by the pandemic.

As only nine jurors remained, and the parties did not consent to continue without a jury, a mistrial was declared.

The applicants, facing multiple drug and firearms charges, brought a pre-trial motion alleging various Charter violations during their arrest and the subsequent searches of a vehicle and a residential unit.

The court dismissed the claims regarding arbitrary arrest, search incident to arrest, strip search, and right to counsel, finding the police had reasonable grounds and acted lawfully.

However, the court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for the residential unit contained materially misleading and inaccurate information.

After excising the misleading details, the court concluded there were insufficient grounds to issue the warrant, resulting in a section 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the firearms and drugs found in the unit under section 24(2), citing the seriousness of the police negligence in drafting the ITO.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial motions to edit the videotaped police statements of two co-accused before they were played for the jury.

The moving parties sought to excise references to fears of reprisal, the interviewing officer's opinions on the credibility of another witness, and portions of other witnesses' statements played during the interviews.

The court dismissed most of the requested edits, finding that the passages were necessary to provide context for the accused's responses and that any potential prejudice could be cured by proper limiting instructions to the jury.

A few specific passages lacking probative value and carrying potential prejudice were ordered excised.

The four co-accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to be seated at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box during their trial.

The Crown opposed the application, citing courtroom security and the default practice of using the prisoner's box.

The court balanced the security concerns, which required six escort officers if the accused sat at counsel table, against trial fairness considerations, including the need for effective communication between the accused and their counsel during a lengthy trial.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused met their onus and that sitting at counsel table would facilitate communication and ensure the accused were viewed as individuals by the jury.

The appellant was convicted at trial on three counts of trafficking in fentanyl and three counts of knowingly using a forged document.

The charges related to his alleged participation in a scheme to obtain and use forged prescriptions for fentanyl patches.

The central issue at trial was identity—whether the appellant himself attended at the pharmacy to have the prescription filled or whether someone falsely presented himself as the appellant.

The trial judge accepted the evidence of a co-conspirator that the appellant participated in the scheme and rejected the appellant's claim that his health card had been lost or stolen.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's failure to assist him as a self-represented accused and claimed misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial was fair but allowed the appeal with respect to one trafficking count where there was insufficient evidence.

Sentencing following convictions on an agreed statement of facts for two counts of procuring persons under 18 to provide sexual services for consideration and two counts of making child pornography.

The offender recruited vulnerable underage complainants from a group home, used promises of drugs and money, photographed them for internet advertisements, and planned to place them into prostitution, but police intervened before any prostitution occurred or images were posted.

The court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society predominated in sentencing child sexual exploitation offences, while applying the totality principle to consecutive sentences required by statute.

A global six-year penitentiary sentence was imposed, less three days' pre-trial credit, together with all requested ancillary orders.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum five-year sentence for procuring a person under 18 to provide sexual services under s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court considered reasonable hypothetical scenarios, particularly one involving a youthful sex trade worker who was herself exploited and manipulated, recruiting a 17-year-old friend without financial gain.

The court found that in this hypothetical, an appropriate sentence would be two to 2.5 years, making the five-year mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate and thus a violation of s. 12.

The violation was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter due to a failure of minimal impairment.

The mandatory minimum sentence was declared of no force or effect.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of his detention, search, and arrest in connection with a series of street robberies in the York Village area.

The court found multiple Charter violations: an unlawful detention without reasonable grounds, an illegal search, and a failure to inform the accused of his right to counsel without delay.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these violations, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application seeking exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter of a firearm, ammunition, drugs, and identification seized during execution of a search warrant at his residence.

The court held that, although the redacted ITO alone did not sufficiently link the firearm to the residence, the Step 6 judicial summary of the unredacted material established that the confidential informer information was compelling, credible, and corroborated by police investigation.

Applying the deferential Garofoli review standard, the court concluded the authorizing justice could have issued the warrant.

The applicant failed to establish a breach of s. 8, and the exclusion application was denied.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with excess blood alcohol following a single-vehicle accident on a dark, curving highway.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including the accident itself, odour of alcohol, physical signs of impairment, and admissions by the accused.

The accused claimed the accident was caused by distraction from a text message.

The court found the accused guilty of both offences.

The accused sought Charter remedies for alleged mistreatment during detention, including failure to respond to complaints about handcuffs, loss of property, unnecessary delay in release, and photographing of tattoos.

The court found breaches of the right against arbitrary detention but denied both the stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence remedies.

The accused was arrested during a high-risk takedown based on information from a confidential informant and police observations of a suspected drug transaction.

A search incident to arrest revealed drugs and a loaded firearm.

The accused applied to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing his ss. 8 and 9 rights were violated because police lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest.

The court found the arrest for firearm possession was unlawful, breaching ss. 8 and 9, but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable.

The court also ruled the accused's utterances to police were voluntary and admissible.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and drug offences after police stopped his vehicle and discovered small quantities of marijuana and crack cocaine on his person and a loaded revolver hidden behind the vehicle’s dome light.

The Crown alleged the drugs were possessed for the purpose of trafficking and that the accused knowingly possessed the firearm.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence, including a suspected exchange with another vehicle and the presence of a firearm, did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were intended for trafficking.

The hidden firearm’s location and the accused’s control of the vehicle were insufficient to prove knowledge of the weapon.

The accused was acquitted of all firearm offences and drug trafficking counts but convicted of the included offences of simple possession of marijuana and cocaine.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings on charges of tax evasion, alleging abuse of process arising from late disclosure shortly before the scheduled trial.

The Crown had provided multiple volumes of trial materials days before trial, asserting that the documents largely contained previously disclosed records reorganized into trial volumes.

The court held that the materials constituted evidence intended to be tendered at trial and therefore fell within the Crown’s disclosure obligations under R. v. Stinchcombe, and that the disclosure was not provided sufficiently in advance of trial.

However, applying the abuse of process framework set out in R. v. Nixon, the court found that the prejudice alleged by the accused did not meet the high threshold required for a stay.

The adjournment of the trial, combined with the opportunity for the defence to review the new materials, was found to be an adequate remedy.