Brian McGuire

The applicant, Melissa Merritt, challenged the constitutionality of the absence of an appeal route following the dismissal of a directed verdict application and a subsequent mistrial.

She argued that section 7 of the Charter requires an appeal to the Court of Appeal in these circumstances and attacked sections 674 and 675 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the argument, holding that Parliament is entitled to restrict appeals to those provided by statute and that interlocutory appeals are not constitutionally required.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant later pled guilty to manslaughter.

The three accused, Anand Nath, Suliman Raza, and Naqash Abbasi, were found guilty of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted murder with a firearm following a shooting at a restaurant.

The court considered whether the offense constituted a terrorism offense, finding that while the motive clause (political, religious, or ideological purpose) was met, the intention clause (to intimidate the public) was not.

The court emphasized the aggravating factors, including the planned and deliberate nature of the crimes, the group plan, the gratuitous violence against bystanders, and the profound impact on victims.

The judge imposed concurrent life sentences for all counts for each offender, along with ancillary orders.

Henry Morales was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder of his wife, Malena Morales, committed in 2006.

The court imposed a mandatory life sentence and determined the parole ineligibility period.

The Crown sought 16-18 years, while the defence argued for 12 years, reduced from 13 due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court considered aggravating factors, including domestic violence, abuse of trust, the presence of children during the murder, and post-offence conduct (staging the scene, flight to Mexico).

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, genuine remorse, pro-social behaviour while in Mexico, and participation in rehabilitation programs.

The court also extensively discussed whether harsh pre-sentence custody conditions could be a mitigating factor for parole ineligibility, concluding they could.

Ultimately, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 15 years, commencing February 20, 2020.

The three offenders were convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for the stabbing death of a 22-year-old victim.

The sentencing judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenders were the aggressors who tracked down the victim for revenge after an earlier altercation where the victim had cut the principal offender with a knife.

The court rejected the Crown's argument for an 'aggravated manslaughter' sentence range, finding the earlier provocation mitigated the offenders' moral blameworthiness.

After applying significant credit for pre-trial custody, harsh jail conditions including triple bunking, and strict bail conditions, the principal offender was sentenced to a further 14 months, the second offender to 6.5 months, and the third offender to time served.

During a first-degree murder trial, an alternate juror reported that another juror had expressed a belief in the accused's guilt before any evidence was called.

The offending juror was discharged.

The accused moved for a mistrial, arguing the remaining jurors may have been tainted.

The court dismissed the application, finding that several other jurors had immediately criticized the offending remark and defended the presumption of innocence, demonstrating that the jury was not tainted.

During a trial for first degree murder where the accused raised self-defence, the accused applied to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence under the Scopelliti framework.

Specifically, the accused sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's habitual possession of a knife and prior use of a racial slur.

The court ruled that the evidence of habitual knife possession was admissible as it indicated a violent tendency.

The court also held that a prior ruling from a mistrial excluding the racial slur evidence was not binding under section 653.1 of the Criminal Code in the interests of justice, and admitted the evidence to demonstrate the deceased's anger and aggressive conduct.

The applicant sought bail on a charge of first-degree murder, which involved a highly organized, gangland-style execution.

The Crown opposed release on all three grounds: flight risk, danger to the public, and erosion of public confidence.

The court found the applicant's pre-apprehension behavior alarming, the offence grave, the Crown's case compelling, ties to the community minimal, the release plan weak, and a history of non-compliance with court orders.

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions, the court concluded that detention was necessary on all three grounds, particularly given the brazen nature of the attack and the applicant's role in a sophisticated criminal plot.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The accused, I.M., brought an application for a court order to cross-examine a Crown witness on their previous conviction under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), despite the statutory access period having expired.

The Crown opposed, arguing for the YCJA's emphasis on rehabilitation and privacy for young persons.

The court considered the competing interests of youth rehabilitation and the accused's right to make full answer and defence, ultimately allowing the application.

The judge found that the proper administration of justice, especially given the serious charge and the witness's importance, justified allowing the cross-examination, distinguishing prior case law based on jurisdictional and public policy considerations.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a key witness to testify remotely from an undisclosed location during a preliminary inquiry into a first-degree murder charge.

The witness, who was the girlfriend of one of the accused and had direct knowledge of the defendants' conduct at the scene, had received an anonymous threatening message and reported being followed.

The defence opposed the application, arguing that the right to confront witnesses would be compromised and that alternative protective measures were available.

The court granted the application, finding that the witness's fears were genuine and reasonable, and that the legislative amendments to section 486.2 of the Criminal Code lowered the threshold for such orders from "necessary" to "facilitate."

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to leave forcible confinement murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code with the jury as a route to liability.

The accused admitted to shooting the victim but claimed it was an accident.

The court applied the air of reality test and found that, based on the primary facts and circumstantial evidence, a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the accused forcibly confined the victim by moving him from the front seat to the back seat of his car at gunpoint before shooting him.

The court ruled that this route of liability would be left with the jury.

The accused was convicted of several offences related to domestic violence after the complainant's recanted statements were admitted for their truth.

Prior to sentencing, the defence learned that the Crown had instructed police to remove a material witness warrant for the complainant from CPIC and failed to disclose that the complainant had been arrested and released.

The defence applied for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process and subpoenaed the trial Crown.

The court quashed the subpoena, finding the Crown's evidence was not strictly necessary.

The court found the Crown's conduct constituted an abuse of process by interfering with a judicial order and breaching disclosure obligations.

However, the court concluded a stay was not warranted and instead ordered a mistrial.

During a murder trial, the accused brought a mid-trial application to admit an additional portion of a deceased witness's video-recorded statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Crown opposed the admission.

The court found that while necessity was established, the statement lacked threshold reliability due to unmitigated hearsay dangers related to perception and narration.

The application was dismissed and the evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The applicants brought a pre-trial application to excise certain passages from transcripts of intercepted private communications, arguing the audio was inaudible and the transcripts would prejudice the jury.

The court dismissed the application, applying established law that the audio recordings are the evidence and the jury may use the transcripts as an aid.

The court found that the jury, properly instructed, could resolve disputes about the accuracy of the transcripts by listening to the recordings and considering cross-examination.

The applicant applied to reopen and reconsider a prior ruling that his post-arrest confession to two murders was voluntary.

The application was based on the subsequent exclusion of internet search queries under s. 24(2) of the Charter, which had been put to the applicant during his police interview.

The court dismissed the application, finding no material change in circumstances because the police acted in good faith using a presumptively valid warrant at the time of the interview.

The court concluded that the subsequent inadmissibility of the evidence did not render the police conduct oppressive or affect the voluntariness of the statement.

The co-accused applied to sever a second-degree murder count from two first-degree murder counts on the same indictment.

The co-accused argued that the stronger evidence on the first two counts, including a confession, would cause moral and reasoning prejudice on the third count, where the cause of death was disputed.

The court dismissed the application, finding a strong factual and legal nexus between the counts, as all three deceased were members of the same family involved in an ongoing child custody dispute.

The court also found that count-to-count similar fact evidence was likely admissible to prove identity, and that the interests of justice, including avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings, favoured a joint trial.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an omnibus motion under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude three categories of evidence obtained through various s. 8 Charter breaches: a PDF of a lock found on a cellphone, banking records, and internet search queries found on a laptop.

The court applied the Grant framework to each category.

The court admitted the PDF evidence, finding the police acted in good faith and the breach was at the lower end of the seriousness scale.

The court excluded the banking records, finding the production order was overbroad and based on a misleading Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court also excluded the internet search queries, finding a pattern of police misconduct, including misleading testimony, alteration of investigative records, and failure to disclose unauthorized access to the applicants' email accounts, which severely impacted the applicants' Charter-protected interests and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if admitted.

This ruling addresses whether the applicants, Melissa Merritt and Christopher Fattore, had a reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) in data stored on a 'loaner phone' provided by police after their original phone was seized.

The court applied the totality of circumstances test, considering the subject matter (data), the applicants' interest in it, their subjective expectation, and its objective reasonableness.

The court found that the applicants did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal data on the loaner phone, primarily because police had previously informed Ms. Merritt that a warrant would be required to access data on their seized family phone, fostering a reasonable belief that the same protection would apply to the replacement device.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, challenged the admissibility of his 15-hour post-arrest video-recorded statement to police.

He alleged violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel, his s. 7 right to silence, and argued the confession was involuntary due to police oppression and inducements regarding his common-law spouse and children.

The court found no s. 10(b) breach, as the accused accepted duty counsel advice without requesting a specific lawyer.

Applying the Oickle framework, the court held the confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

The police did not offer a quid pro quo or overbear the accused's will; rather, the accused made a calculated choice to confess in hopes of assisting his spouse, a motive that was largely self-generated.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a preliminary screening motion to determine whether they could adduce evidence of additional alleged Charter violations on their upcoming s. 24(2) application.

They sought to introduce evidence of violations of third parties' rights, other violations of their own rights, and unconstitutional police practices in unrelated investigations to establish a 'pattern of abuse' under Grant.

The court held the applicants lacked standing to assert third-party rights and rejected evidence of unrelated police practices.

For the applicants' own rights, the court permitted evidence of additional violations only where they met the Goldhart nexus test or had sufficient probative value to demonstrate a pattern of abuse without consuming disproportionate judicial resources.

The applicants, charged with multiple murders, brought an application to exclude electronic intercepts and tracking warrant evidence, alleging violations of section 8 of the Charter.

The application challenged the necessity of judicial authorization for police email exchanges in an undercover operation, the police's actions in repacking belongings containing listening devices, and the validity of a tracking warrant based on alleged material errors and omissions in the information to obtain.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the email communications, that police actions regarding the trailer were within the scope of implied invitation, and that the tracking warrant was valid.