Brian McGuire

The applicant, Melissa Merritt, challenged the constitutionality of the absence of an appeal route following the dismissal of a directed verdict application and a subsequent mistrial.

She argued that section 7 of the Charter requires an appeal to the Court of Appeal in these circumstances and attacked sections 674 and 675 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the argument, holding that Parliament is entitled to restrict appeals to those provided by statute and that interlocutory appeals are not constitutionally required.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant later pled guilty to manslaughter.

The three accused, Anand Nath, Suliman Raza, and Naqash Abbasi, were found guilty of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted murder with a firearm following a shooting at a restaurant.

The court considered whether the offense constituted a terrorism offense, finding that while the motive clause (political, religious, or ideological purpose) was met, the intention clause (to intimidate the public) was not.

The court emphasized the aggravating factors, including the planned and deliberate nature of the crimes, the group plan, the gratuitous violence against bystanders, and the profound impact on victims.

The judge imposed concurrent life sentences for all counts for each offender, along with ancillary orders.

Henry Morales was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder of his wife, Malena Morales, committed in 2006.

The court imposed a mandatory life sentence and determined the parole ineligibility period.

The Crown sought 16-18 years, while the defence argued for 12 years, reduced from 13 due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court considered aggravating factors, including domestic violence, abuse of trust, the presence of children during the murder, and post-offence conduct (staging the scene, flight to Mexico).

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, genuine remorse, pro-social behaviour while in Mexico, and participation in rehabilitation programs.

The court also extensively discussed whether harsh pre-sentence custody conditions could be a mitigating factor for parole ineligibility, concluding they could.

Ultimately, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 15 years, commencing February 20, 2020.

The three offenders were convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for the stabbing death of a 22-year-old victim.

The sentencing judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenders were the aggressors who tracked down the victim for revenge after an earlier altercation where the victim had cut the principal offender with a knife.

The court rejected the Crown's argument for an 'aggravated manslaughter' sentence range, finding the earlier provocation mitigated the offenders' moral blameworthiness.

After applying significant credit for pre-trial custody, harsh jail conditions including triple bunking, and strict bail conditions, the principal offender was sentenced to a further 14 months, the second offender to 6.5 months, and the third offender to time served.

During a first-degree murder trial, an alternate juror reported that another juror had expressed a belief in the accused's guilt before any evidence was called.

The offending juror was discharged.

The accused moved for a mistrial, arguing the remaining jurors may have been tainted.

The court dismissed the application, finding that several other jurors had immediately criticized the offending remark and defended the presumption of innocence, demonstrating that the jury was not tainted.

During a trial for first degree murder where the accused raised self-defence, the accused applied to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence under the Scopelliti framework.

Specifically, the accused sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's habitual possession of a knife and prior use of a racial slur.

The court ruled that the evidence of habitual knife possession was admissible as it indicated a violent tendency.

The court also held that a prior ruling from a mistrial excluding the racial slur evidence was not binding under section 653.1 of the Criminal Code in the interests of justice, and admitted the evidence to demonstrate the deceased's anger and aggressive conduct.

During a criminal trial for a stabbing, the Crown applied under section 9.2 of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness on a prior inconsistent statement.

The witness testified at trial that one of the accused attempted to break up the fight, which contradicted his earlier police statement and preliminary inquiry testimony.

The court granted the application, finding the Crown could not have been expected to lead this evidence in-chief.

However, the court restricted the Crown from questioning the witness about post-offence phone calls with the accused, ruling that such questions would improperly suggest consciousness of guilt and be highly prejudicial.

The applicant, one of four individuals charged with first-degree murder, brought applications to sever his trial from his co-accused or, alternatively, to admit a co-accused's post-arrest statement as hearsay.

The applicant, alleged to be the second getaway driver, sought to rely on the co-accused's statement that he was highly intoxicated on the morning of the murder to support defences of lack of intent and abandonment.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding the proposed evidence was largely inadmissible self-serving hearsay and lacked proximity to the offence.

The court also dismissed the hearsay application, concluding the co-accused was a highly unreliable source, the statement contained double hearsay, lacked corroboration, and its admission would be highly prejudicial to the other co-accused.

The accused, charged with terrorism offences for allegedly attempting to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State, appeared for a mandatory detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court conducted a bail hearing 'from the ground up'.

The court found that the Crown's case was not overwhelmingly strong, as there was no direct evidence the accused intended to enhance the terrorist group's ability to carry out terrorist activities, nor any history of violence.

The court concluded that the accused's detention was not justified under the primary, secondary, or tertiary grounds, and ordered her release on a $100,000 surety bail with strict conditions, including a ban on social media and internet monitoring.

The defendant brought an application seeking the recusal of the trial judge assigned to his second trial, alleging that she demonstrated bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias during his first trial, which had ended in a mistrial.

The defendant argued that the trial judge's rulings, tone, and interventions during cross-examinations favoured the Crown and undermined defence counsel.

The court reviewed the transcripts and audio recordings and found that the trial judge's conduct was appropriate and necessary to manage a highly contentious trial.

The court concluded there was no cogent evidence of bias and dismissed the application.

During a first-degree murder trial, proceedings were halted for several months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Upon assessing the jury's availability to resume the trial in the fall, the court conducted individual inquiries with several jurors.

The court discharged two jurors due to undue hardship related to childcare, schooling, and employment concerns exacerbated by the pandemic.

As only nine jurors remained, and the parties did not consent to continue without a jury, a mistrial was declared.

The applicant sought bail on a charge of first-degree murder, which involved a highly organized, gangland-style execution.

The Crown opposed release on all three grounds: flight risk, danger to the public, and erosion of public confidence.

The court found the applicant's pre-apprehension behavior alarming, the offence grave, the Crown's case compelling, ties to the community minimal, the release plan weak, and a history of non-compliance with court orders.

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions, the court concluded that detention was necessary on all three grounds, particularly given the brazen nature of the attack and the applicant's role in a sophisticated criminal plot.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial motions to edit the videotaped police statements of two co-accused before they were played for the jury.

The moving parties sought to excise references to fears of reprisal, the interviewing officer's opinions on the credibility of another witness, and portions of other witnesses' statements played during the interviews.

The court dismissed most of the requested edits, finding that the passages were necessary to provide context for the accused's responses and that any potential prejudice could be cured by proper limiting instructions to the jury.

A few specific passages lacking probative value and carrying potential prejudice were ordered excised.

The accused, I.M., brought an application for a court order to cross-examine a Crown witness on their previous conviction under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), despite the statutory access period having expired.

The Crown opposed, arguing for the YCJA's emphasis on rehabilitation and privacy for young persons.

The court considered the competing interests of youth rehabilitation and the accused's right to make full answer and defence, ultimately allowing the application.

The judge found that the proper administration of justice, especially given the serious charge and the witness's importance, justified allowing the cross-examination, distinguishing prior case law based on jurisdictional and public policy considerations.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit text messages between the accused and a co-conspirator sent days before a fatal robbery.

The Crown argued the messages, which discussed purchasing a firearm, were probative of the accused's knowledge that the robbery's purpose was to obtain firearms.

The accused opposed, arguing the messages constituted highly prejudicial propensity evidence.

The court held the messages were admissible as specific propensity evidence, finding their probative value outweighed the moral and reasoning prejudice, provided certain inflammatory portions were redacted and a limiting instruction was given to the jury.

The applicant, a young person charged with first degree murder, brought an application to sit at counsel table during his trial instead of the prisoner's box.

The Crown opposed the application but raised no security concerns.

The court granted the application, noting the seriousness of the charge, the potential for prejudice against racialized persons, the lack of evidence disproving potential prejudice from sitting in the dock, and the facilitation of communication with counsel.

The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his wife and the attempted murder of his daughter following a stabbing in the family home.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on first-degree murder based on planning and deliberation, as well as constructive murder via unlawful confinement.

The Crown also sought committal for attempted murder.

The court found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation based on the accused's internet searches and statements prior to the offence.

The court also found sufficient evidence of unlawful confinement of both the deceased and the daughter.

Finally, the court found sufficient evidence of specific intent to kill the daughter.

The accused was committed to stand trial on first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a key witness to testify remotely from an undisclosed location during a preliminary inquiry into a first-degree murder charge.

The witness, who was the girlfriend of one of the accused and had direct knowledge of the defendants' conduct at the scene, had received an anonymous threatening message and reported being followed.

The defence opposed the application, arguing that the right to confront witnesses would be compromised and that alternative protective measures were available.

The court granted the application, finding that the witness's fears were genuine and reasonable, and that the legislative amendments to section 486.2 of the Criminal Code lowered the threshold for such orders from "necessary" to "facilitate."

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to leave forcible confinement murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code with the jury as a route to liability.

The accused admitted to shooting the victim but claimed it was an accident.

The court applied the air of reality test and found that, based on the primary facts and circumstantial evidence, a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the accused forcibly confined the victim by moving him from the front seat to the back seat of his car at gunpoint before shooting him.

The court ruled that this route of liability would be left with the jury.

The accused was convicted of several offences related to domestic violence after the complainant's recanted statements were admitted for their truth.

Prior to sentencing, the defence learned that the Crown had instructed police to remove a material witness warrant for the complainant from CPIC and failed to disclose that the complainant had been arrested and released.

The defence applied for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process and subpoenaed the trial Crown.

The court quashed the subpoena, finding the Crown's evidence was not strictly necessary.

The court found the Crown's conduct constituted an abuse of process by interfering with a judicial order and breaching disclosure obligations.

However, the court concluded a stay was not warranted and instead ordered a mistrial.