Peter Zaduk

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his role as a party in a fatal shooting that occurred during an attempt to recover stolen property.

The 19-year-old accused was not the shooter but participated in the physical altercation knowing an associate was armed.

The court sentenced the accused to four years' imprisonment (leaving two years to serve after pre-sentence credit) and a three-year probation term, emphasizing his youth, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, and rehabilitative potential.

The court sentenced an accused who pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 committed through a workplace breach of trust involving 21 fraudulent cheques totaling $50,308.98.

Applying proportionality, parity, denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court treated repeated transactions, prior similar record, and business harm as aggravating, while crediting an early guilty plea, remorse, family support, employment, and sustained addiction recovery efforts.

The court found some unfairness in the charging timeline but held that post-plea fraudulent conduct still required a meaningful sanction.

A six-month conditional sentence was imposed to balance denunciation and deterrence with demonstrated rehabilitation.

Sufyan Jogiyat pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 7 years, while the defence proposed 4 years.

The court sentenced Mr. Jogiyat to 4 years and 4 months for aggravated assault and 18 months consecutive for drug trafficking, resulting in a global sentence of 5 years and 10 months.

The judge also ruled on the admissibility of aggravating evidence regarding prior trafficking, excluding it as it was not sufficiently material and risked unduly prolonging the hearing.

The decision considered the principles of sentencing, aggravating factors (home invasion, commercial drug operation), and mitigating factors (guilty pleas, remorse, youth, first offender status, pre-sentence custody conditions).

The appellants, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for first-degree murder convictions, ordering a new trial due to the trial judge's error in restricting routes to liability and failing to leave included offenses (second-degree murder and manslaughter) to the jury.

The court found that the murder and attempted murder charges were not inextricably linked.

The appeals on the attempted murder convictions were dismissed, and leave to appeal the life sentences for attempted murder was granted but the appeals were dismissed, finding no error in principle in the sentencing.

The moving parties were found by the Capital Markets Tribunal to have committed insider trading and tipping, resulting in market participation bans and significant financial penalties.

They appealed the Tribunal's decision and brought a motion for a stay of the sanctions pending their appeals.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the moving parties failed to establish irreparable harm.

The court also held that the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in enforcing securities regulations and maintaining market integrity.

The Capital Markets Tribunal issued its reasons and decision on sanctions and costs following a merits decision that found the respondents engaged in insider trading, tipping, and misleading Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission.

The Tribunal imposed significant market participation bans ranging from 3 to 15 years, administrative penalties totaling $2.95 million, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains totaling over $1.4 million, and costs of approximately $735,000.

The Tribunal emphasized the seriousness of insider trading and tipping, noting that such conduct undermines investor confidence and the integrity of the capital markets.

The accused, an inmate serving a life sentence for murder, was charged with counselling another inmate to commit the murders of four individuals connected to his civil litigation.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of a fellow inmate, 'Joe', an unsavoury witness with a mixed reputation for honesty.

The court found Joe's evidence unreliable and the alleged murder plot too implausible and contingent to meet the threshold for the offence of counselling.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown brought an application for an enhanced publication ban under s. 486.31 of the Criminal Code and the court's inherent jurisdiction to protect the identity of an inmate witness, 'Joe'.

The accused, serving a life sentence for a previous contract killing, allegedly attempted to solicit Joe's assistance to hire a hitman to murder four individuals.

The defence sought to interview other inmates to investigate Joe's motivations, arguing it needed to disclose Joe's identity as a witness in this proceeding.

The court granted the application in part, holding that while the defence could investigate Joe's motivations using his real name, it was prohibited from disclosing to potential witnesses that Joe was a witness in this proceeding or identifying the accused as their client, due to the serious risk to Joe's safety.

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from searches of his condominium pursuant to a general warrant and a search warrant.

The defendant challenged the validity of the warrants on facial and sub-facial grounds, arguing the affiant made misleading statements and omissions.

The court found that while there were some minor errors in the Information to Obtain (ITO), the affiant acted in good faith and the errors did not invalidate the warrants.

Applying the Debot test, the court found the confidential informant information was compelling, credible, and corroborated.

The court concluded the warrants were valid and there was no s. 8 Charter breach.

Even if there had been a breach, the court held the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Justine Ordonio, sought to adduce ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased, Teresa Hsin, regarding a third-party suspect, Tim Chiu, to establish motive and disposition.

The court examined three categories of statements, considering their admissibility under the state of mind exception or the principled approach to hearsay.

While necessity was established due to the deceased's unavailability, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability.

This was attributed to the confrontational and strategic nature of one conversation, the deceased's compromised state in hospital during another, and the ambiguity and lack of specific fear of violence in statements relayed by the deceased's mother.

The motion to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to exclude his post-arrest statement to police, alleging breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter and arguing the statement was involuntary.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach occurred when an officer questioned the accused en route to the station before he spoke to counsel, but admitted the subsequent 13-hour interview statement under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the remaining Charter claims and found the statement voluntary, concluding the accused was not overborne by the length of the interview or the officer's use of the Reid technique, but rather chose to speak after being confronted with overwhelming incriminating evidence.

The Crown applied for a bail review after the accused was released on charges relating to two drive-by shootings, firearm possession, and drug trafficking.

The Superior Court of Justice found a material change in circumstances due to a new ballistics report linking the accused's seized handgun to the shootings.

The court also found that the justice of the peace erred in law by applying the ladder principle in a reverse onus situation, failing to conduct a proper risk analysis, and misapplying the tertiary ground test.

The court vacated the release orders and ordered the accused detained on both the secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the strong Crown case and the grave risk to public safety.

Criminal trial concerning an alleged fentanyl diversion scheme involving a pharmacy, false prescriptions, and a physician supplying prescriptions for illicit distribution.

The court found the evidence, particularly text messages and prescription backdating, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that one accused knowingly participated in trafficking fentanyl and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court rejected that accused's innocent explanations for the communications and dispensing practices.

As to the co-accused, the court held the evidence directly admissible against him was too ambiguous to safely satisfy the Carter co-conspirator framework and declined to rely on hearsay communications of the co-actors to convict.

One accused was convicted on both counts and the other acquitted on both counts.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, challenged the admissibility of his 15-hour post-arrest video-recorded statement to police.

He alleged violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel, his s. 7 right to silence, and argued the confession was involuntary due to police oppression and inducements regarding his common-law spouse and children.

The court found no s. 10(b) breach, as the accused accepted duty counsel advice without requesting a specific lawyer.

Applying the Oickle framework, the court held the confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

The police did not offer a quid pro quo or overbear the accused's will; rather, the accused made a calculated choice to confess in hopes of assisting his spouse, a motive that was largely self-generated.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a preliminary screening motion to determine whether they could adduce evidence of additional alleged Charter violations on their upcoming s. 24(2) application.

They sought to introduce evidence of violations of third parties' rights, other violations of their own rights, and unconstitutional police practices in unrelated investigations to establish a 'pattern of abuse' under Grant.

The court held the applicants lacked standing to assert third-party rights and rejected evidence of unrelated police practices.

For the applicants' own rights, the court permitted evidence of additional violations only where they met the Goldhart nexus test or had sufficient probative value to demonstrate a pattern of abuse without consuming disproportionate judicial resources.

The applicants, charged with multiple murders, brought an application to exclude electronic intercepts and tracking warrant evidence, alleging violations of section 8 of the Charter.

The application challenged the necessity of judicial authorization for police email exchanges in an undercover operation, the police's actions in repacking belongings containing listening devices, and the validity of a tracking warrant based on alleged material errors and omissions in the information to obtain.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the email communications, that police actions regarding the trailer were within the scope of implied invitation, and that the tracking warrant was valid.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Charter application alleging s. 8 violations regarding the search of a trailer on their property and the subsequent warrantless seizure and technological examination of laptops and USB drives found inside.

The court held that the initial search of the trailer was lawfully executed because police took control of the premises within the time specified in the warrant.

The warrantless seizure of the electronic devices was justified under s. 489 of the Criminal Code as the officers had reasonable grounds to believe they would afford evidence.

However, the court found s. 8 violations occurred when an officer conducted a warrantless preview of a USB drive, when the subsequent search warrant failed to authorize a technological examination, and when detention orders were improperly extended.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained by police from Walmart and CIBC.

The police obtained CCTV footage and a transaction receipt from Walmart without a warrant, and basic account information from CIBC prior to obtaining a production order.

The court found the applicants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the CCTV footage, the transaction receipt, or the limited banking information provided to police.

However, the court found the subsequent production order issued to CIBC was overbroad and invalid.

The court declined to sever the valid portions of the production order, concluding that the records produced by CIBC were obtained in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

The applicants brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless seizure of their garbage, which included items containing DNA evidence.

The applicants argued they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage and, alternatively, in the DNA information embedded on the items.

Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court found that the applicants had abandoned the garbage by placing it out for municipal collection.

The court further held that the abandonment of the garbage effectively constituted the abandonment of any privacy interest in the DNA information it contained.

The application to exclude the evidence under section 8 of the Charter was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a cell phone seized from one of the accused without a warrant during a police interview.

The accused alleged violations of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused was not detained during the interview, so s. 10(b) was not violated.

The warrantless seizure of the cell phone was lawful under s. 487.11 of the Criminal Code due to exigent circumstances.

The court also held that the accused lacked standing to challenge searches of the deceased's cell phone and email, and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in basic subscriber information.

However, the court found that the search warrant subsequently obtained to examine the contents of the seized cell phone was facially invalid because it did not authorize a technological search, resulting in a s. 8 violation.

The court concluded that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was sufficient to have supported a proper warrant.

The determination of whether to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) was deferred.