Cate S. Martell

The appellant appealed his convictions related to a firebombing, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on circumstantial evidence.

The prosecution's case relied heavily on electronic messages sent via TextNow, SMS, and Facebook, as well as a blurry surveillance video and a stolen van.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to recognize the inherent fallibility of the electronic messages, improperly relying on worthless video identification evidence, and inadequately addressing the timeline of the stolen van.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Three family members appealed their convictions and sentences arising from a scheme to steal lottery tickets from customers at their family convenience store, one of which won a $12.5 million prize.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding all verdicts were reasonable.

On sentence, the court reduced one appellant's custodial sentence from four to three years and reduced her restitution obligation, but otherwise upheld the sentences.

The court upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum imprisonment provisions under s. 462.37(4) of the Criminal Code, distinguishing Boudreault on the basis that the fine in lieu of forfeiture regime targets offenders who possessed proceeds of crime, unlike the indiscriminate victim surcharge.

The s. 11(b) application was dismissed under the transitional exceptional circumstance provision from Jordan.

On the Crown's appeal, the court entered convictions against the acquitted co-accused on theft and possession counts and ordered a new trial on fraud and possession of proceeds counts.

The appellant appealed her convictions for uttering forged prescriptions and possession of stolen property, as well as her 18-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals for uttering forged documents, finding no fatal errors in the Crown's examination of an accomplice or the trial judge's Vetrovec warning.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the possession of stolen property charge and ordered a new trial, as the jury was not properly instructed on the elements of theft, specifically 'fraudulently' and 'without colour of right'.

The sentence for the uttering charges was varied to a 12-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of steroids and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

At trial, the Crown introduced extensive evidence suggesting the appellant was associated with the Hells Angels and was a target of a large-scale organized crime investigation.

The Crown also introduced intercepted communications portraying the appellant as knowledgeable about the criminal justice system, and anecdotal opinion evidence from a police officer regarding steroid stockpiling.

The Court of Appeal held that the gang affiliation and intercept evidence constituted highly prejudicial bad character evidence that was irrelevant to the material issues.

Furthermore, the police officer's anecdotal testimony exceeded the proper bounds of opinion evidence, effectively reversing the burden of proof.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding the cumulative errors rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

This is a bail application pending leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applicant, Marshall Kazman, was convicted of serious fraud and money laundering offences, and his appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario was dismissed.

He sought release under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, arguing that his application for leave was not frivolous and that exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, his age (64), and pre-existing health conditions (asthma, respiratory, heart) made his continued detention unnecessary in the public interest.

The Crown opposed, emphasizing the high enforceability interest given the serious convictions and the weak merits of the leave application.

The court granted bail, finding that while the merits of the leave application were weak, the applicant's specific health vulnerabilities combined with the public health risks posed by COVID-19 in a correctional setting constituted exceptional circumstances justifying release, without undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Ontario Court of Appeal heard appeals from convictions and sentences related to a series of tractor-trailer thefts and robberies.

Appellants challenged the validity of cell tower production orders, the admission of evidence obtained from Charter-breaching production orders under s. 24(2), and the use of similar act evidence.

One appellant also challenged possession convictions.

The Court dismissed all conviction appeals, finding the initial production orders valid, the s. 24(2) analysis sound (due to reduced privacy expectation in public location data), and the similar act evidence properly admitted.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, finding the trial judge erred by analogizing the robberies to home invasions, which led to unduly high base sentences.

The Court reduced the total sentences for the three appealing accused.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm and threatening the complainant.

She appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in failing to allow the defence to advance a theory that could have raised a reasonable doubt as to her guilt.

The trial judge excluded evidence that two unidentified men had taken a backpack from the appellant's home, which could have supported the defence theory that the complainant, not the appellant, possessed the firearm.

The Court of Appeal found that there was sufficient evidence independent of the backpack's contents to give the defence an air of reality and that the jury should have been permitted to consider this alternative theory.

Both convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, Justine Ordonio, sought to adduce expert evidence from Todd Barron regarding the tendency of certain interview techniques to produce unreliable or false information, personal characteristics increasing suggestibility, and the implications of techniques used in this case for reliability.

The court dismissed the application, finding the evidence not necessary to assist the jury, as common sense and judicial instructions were sufficient.

Furthermore, the proposed expert lacked the required objectivity and did not fully review the evidence.

The accused, Justine Ordonio, sought to adduce ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased, Teresa Hsin, regarding a third-party suspect, Tim Chiu, to establish motive and disposition.

The court examined three categories of statements, considering their admissibility under the state of mind exception or the principled approach to hearsay.

While necessity was established due to the deceased's unavailability, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability.

This was attributed to the confrontational and strategic nature of one conversation, the deceased's compromised state in hospital during another, and the ambiguity and lack of specific fear of violence in statements relayed by the deceased's mother.

The motion to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to exclude his post-arrest statement to police, alleging breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter and arguing the statement was involuntary.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach occurred when an officer questioned the accused en route to the station before he spoke to counsel, but admitted the subsequent 13-hour interview statement under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the remaining Charter claims and found the statement voluntary, concluding the accused was not overborne by the length of the interview or the officer's use of the Reid technique, but rather chose to speak after being confronted with overwhelming incriminating evidence.

The applicant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment followed by 2 years of probation.

He sought bail pending appeal.

The trial judge's conviction turned on credibility findings, relying heavily on video evidence of the complainant's demeanour immediately after the alleged assault.

The applicant argued the trial judge improperly relied on demeanour evidence contrary to Supreme Court precedent and failed to adequately address serious credibility issues with the complainant's testimony.

The motion judge granted bail pending appeal, finding the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and that detention was not justified based on the applicant's bail compliance history and surety plan.

The appellant was convicted of three counts: intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to his dwelling house knowing it was inhabited or occupied (s. 433(a)), intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire that seriously threatened the safety and property of residents in proximity (s. 434.1), and wilfully endangering his dog (s. 445(1)(a)).

The trial judge found the appellant deliberately set a fire by igniting paper under a television.

On appeal, the court allowed the appeal on counts one and four, quashing those convictions, while upholding the conviction on count two.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated October 2, 2017.

The appellant, declared not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, challenged three aspects of the Board's decision: (1) the finding that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety; (2) the Board's failure to consider a conditional discharge; and (3) the wording of condition 4(f) of the disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's findings on the first two issues but amended condition 4(f) to clarify the Board's intention regarding restrictions on the appellant's attendance at locations where children under 14 are present.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and "over 80" causing death following a motor vehicle accident in which his cousin Aaron Knapman died.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant or Aaron was driving at the time of the accident.

The Crown's theory was that the two had switched places after leaving a party.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on evidence from an accident reconstructionist combined with the appellant's post-offence conduct, including multiple false statements to bystanders and police.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: that the trial judge erred in inferring guilt from disbelief of his testimony, that the trial judge erred in treating his falsehoods as fabricated statements, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the law and that the evidence, viewed as a whole, supported the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing to provide a breath sample into an Approved Screening Device, contrary to section 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged error in relying on roadside utterances for credibility assessment, a misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's hearing, and the unreasonableness of the verdict due to an alleged lack of unequivocal refusal.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning, no material misapprehension of evidence, and abundant evidence of unequivocal refusal.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana, and possession of stolen property.

He appealed on the basis that evidence obtained during execution of a search warrant at his residence should have been excluded, arguing the reviewing justice erred in considering the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the credibility and reliability of three confidential informants using the Debot criteria and that reasonable grounds existed to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the residence.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated June 30, 2017.

The appellant did not contest the Board's finding that he remained a significant threat to public safety or the disposition that he remain detained at the General Forensic Unit at CAMH.

However, he contended the Board acted unreasonably by not including a delegation of authority permitting community living in supervised accommodation when the Hospital deemed it appropriate, as had been included in the previous 2016 disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and entitled to deference, as the evidence clearly showed the appellant was not ready for community living at the time of the hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a jury trial.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The charge related to anal penetration that followed consensual oral and vaginal intercourse.

The complainant testified she repeatedly and unequivocally told the appellant to stop and resisted his attempts at anal penetration.

The appellant testified he asked for consent after partial insertion and the complainant agreed.

The court found no air of reality to the mistaken belief in consent defence, as the two accounts were fundamentally conflicting and could not be reconciled to support that defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine and her sentence of three years imprisonment.

The Crown's case established all essential elements of importing beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant's sole defence was duress, which the jury rejected.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that seeking assistance from Canadian Border Services Agency officers at the airport constituted a safe avenue of escape, contending that the importing offence was complete upon entry into Canada.

The Court of Appeal held that while importing may be legally complete upon entry, it is not factually complete until the contraband and its carrier clear customs.

Accordingly, assistance from domestic authorities remained available as a potential safe avenue of escape.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

On the sentencing appeal, the appellant sought a six-month reduction due to an unlawful strip search conducted by the RCMP.

While the trial judge erred in her analysis of the Charter breach's seriousness and in treating sentencing ranges as fixed, these errors did not impact the sentence imposed, which was fit.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge had found that the appellant struck the complainant with a doll, causing scratches.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied a lesser standard of proof and failed to provide sufficient reasons, specifically by failing to apply the second and third steps of the W.D. test.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the trial judge did not apply a lesser standard of proof, he failed to provide sufficient reasons explaining why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite unresolved discrepancies.

The court concluded the trial judge inadvertently treated the credibility assessment as a contest and failed to apply the third step of the W.D. test.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.