K.Y. Tina Yuen

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault against two complainants and uttering a threat, arguing trial unfairness arising from repeated judicial interventions and improper reliance on cross-count similar fact evidence.

The court held that the interventions, viewed individually and cumulatively, were aimed largely at fairness and efficiency and would not cause a reasonable observer to perceive bias or alignment with the prosecution.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court found the trial judge was entitled to conclude that the similarities between the two assaults strongly rebutted coincidence and supported the complainants' evidence on the central issue of consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Adriel Cyrus, sought to bifurcate his conviction and sentence appeals after being convicted of two counts of sexual assault and one count of uttering a threat, and being declared a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, per George J.A., dismissed the motion, finding no compelling reason to separate the appeals.

The court emphasized the efficiency and consistency of hearing both appeals together, referencing prior authority and the inefficiency of duplicating review of the trial record.

The appellant, Alexander Rose, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's post-event demeanour and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge was entitled to rely on video surveillance footage of the complainant's distraught emotional state as powerful corroboration of non-consent.

The court affirmed the principles of appellate deference to credibility findings and the functional review of trial judge reasons, dismissing arguments that the verdict was unreasonable or that the evidence was improperly assessed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and "over 80" causing death following a motor vehicle accident in which his cousin Aaron Knapman died.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant or Aaron was driving at the time of the accident.

The Crown's theory was that the two had switched places after leaving a party.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on evidence from an accident reconstructionist combined with the appellant's post-offence conduct, including multiple false statements to bystanders and police.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: that the trial judge erred in inferring guilt from disbelief of his testimony, that the trial judge erred in treating his falsehoods as fabricated statements, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the law and that the evidence, viewed as a whole, supported the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose arising from a road rage incident.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in rejecting the defence theory that the altercation was a consensual fight.

The court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and conclusion that the appellant was the aggressor were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence.

Although the appellate judge identified speculative reasoning regarding whether the complainant’s wound was caused by a sharp-edged instrument, the error was immaterial because the trial judge properly concluded the altercation was non‑consensual.

Applying Kienapple principles, the conviction for assault with a weapon was stayed but the appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant challenged his child luring conviction on the basis that text messaging by cellular telephone did not amount to communicating by means of a computer system within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The court held that text messaging using cellular phones involves interconnected devices and computer programs performing logic and control functions, and therefore falls within s. 342.1(2).

On sentence, the court upheld a six-and-one-half-year global penitentiary term for grooming and sexually assaulting a 12-year-old after inducing her with false promises of millions of dollars.

The court confirmed that grooming may be treated as an aggravating factor and emphasized that denunciation, deterrence, separation of offenders, and child protection are paramount in sentencing adult sexual predators.