Emily Anne Bala

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault against two complainants and uttering a threat, arguing trial unfairness arising from repeated judicial interventions and improper reliance on cross-count similar fact evidence.

The court held that the interventions, viewed individually and cumulatively, were aimed largely at fairness and efficiency and would not cause a reasonable observer to perceive bias or alignment with the prosecution.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court found the trial judge was entitled to conclude that the similarities between the two assaults strongly rebutted coincidence and supported the complainants' evidence on the central issue of consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of one count of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against his adopted daughter and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment, sought release pending appeal pursuant to s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous, as there was a serious issue regarding whether the trial judge materially misapprehended the relevance of the complainant's admitted fabrication of a prior criminal allegation against her mother.

Despite the seriousness of the offences and the length of the sentence, the reviewability interest outweighed the enforceability interest given the arguable ground of appeal challenged the credibility evaluation central to the conviction.

Public safety concerns were mitigated by the applicant's three-year compliance with his bail plan.

The motion was granted and the applicant was ordered released on conditions.

The applicant, convicted by a jury of historical sexual offences against his daughter and sentenced to eight years, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would attend court but argued detention was necessary in the public interest given the seriousness of the offences, the lengthy sentence, and outstanding breach charges.

The motion judge found a serious issue to be tried regarding the trial judge's exercise of exclusionary discretion over relevant defence evidence, that the breach allegations had a problematic foundation reducing their weight, and that the applicant's age, health problems, and long history of compliance with release conditions favoured release.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered Lisa Griffiths’s appeal from her conviction and sentence for multiple counts of breaking and entering and attempted break and enter.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by treating Griffiths’s decision to go to trial as a lack of remorse and by increasing her sentence on that basis.

The court substituted a sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment and two years’ probation, but declined to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Andrew Zock, who was convicted of sexual assault after a judge-alone trial.

The court found that Zock received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer elected the mode of trial (judge-alone) without Zock’s informed instructions or advice about his right to a jury trial.

The court set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial before a judge and jury, finding that the loss of the right to elect the mode of trial constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the verdict was unreasonable, holding that the trial judge’s finding of incapacity to consent was supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the Crown’s appeal from an acquittal on a charge of sexual assault.

The Crown argued that the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes about how a sexual assault victim should behave, particularly in finding it significant that the complainant returned to sleep in the same bed as the accused after the alleged assault.

The Court found that the trial judge did err in law by relying on such stereotypes, but held that the error did not have a material bearing on the acquittal, as the trial judge’s reasonable doubt was also based on other concerns about the complainant’s reliability and inconsistencies in her evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Adriel Cyrus, sought to bifurcate his conviction and sentence appeals after being convicted of two counts of sexual assault and one count of uttering a threat, and being declared a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, per George J.A., dismissed the motion, finding no compelling reason to separate the appeals.

The court emphasized the efficiency and consistency of hearing both appeals together, referencing prior authority and the inefficiency of duplicating review of the trial record.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing the deceased, who had previously robbed him of a firearm.

On appeal, the appellant argued that administrative errors in compiling the 2022 jury roll violated his Charter rights to a representative jury and caused a miscarriage of justice.

He also challenged the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence with the jury, the admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, the voluntariness of his police statement, and the fitness of his 13-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no appearance of unfairness in the jury roll process, no air of reality to self-defence, and no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or sentencing.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault, assault, and assault by choking, along with breaches of court orders, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court emphasized the high enforceability interest due to the seriousness of the crimes and the applicant's history of violating court orders designed to protect the complainant, which outweighed the reviewability interest, as the grounds of appeal were not strong.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The central issue at trial was the complainant's age when the sexual contact began, which determined the validity of consent.

The trial judge found the contact started when the complainant was 15 and the appellant was in a position of trust.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability findings, arguing reliance on illogical assumptions regarding the complainant's behaviour and the implausibility of the appellant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges on credibility and reliability, and finding no palpable and overriding error or ungrounded assumptions.

The appellant, convicted of multiple firearms offences, appealed his convictions on two grounds: misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding forensic testing, and unreasonable verdicts due to the circumstantial evidence not eliminating the possibility of another person hiding the guns.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence was not material to the conviction.

It also found the verdicts were reasonable, as the inference of the appellant's knowledge and control over the hidden firearms was available given his operation of the studio and the nature of the hidden items.

The appeal was allowed in part, quashing the conviction on one count of careless storage of a firearm (Count 16) and entering an acquittal, but otherwise dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual interference involving two child victims.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, specifically regarding the admission of cross-count similar act evidence and the consideration of unconscious collusion between the complainants.

The appellant also argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the second prong of the R. v. W.(D.) test for reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or application of legal principles, noting that the similar act evidence was used only in the alternative and the trial judge's reasons were clear and owed deference.

The appellant, J.D., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his three-year imprisonment sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included allegations of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, improper use of voir dire testimony, an unreasonable verdict, and the trial judge's failure to grant s. 278 applications for disclosure of the complainant's medical records.

The sentence appeal ground related to the trial judge's alleged misapprehension of the potential immigration consequences of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, no improper use of voir dire evidence, and that the verdict was reasonable given the appellant's admissions.

The court upheld the dismissal of the s. 278 applications, characterizing them as a fishing expedition.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge's error regarding immigration consequences did not impact the fitness of the sentence, which was within the appropriate range for forced penetration.

The appellant, S.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault related to a second sexual encounter with the complainant.

The complainant, heavily intoxicated, had no memory of this encounter.

The Crown's case relied significantly on Facebook messages exchanged between the appellant and the complainant's boyfriend (impersonating the complainant), where the appellant described overcoming resistance and not taking "no" for an answer.

The appellant argued these messages were exaggerated due to impairment and an attempt to sound "macho." The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanation, finding the messages to be a truthful account demonstrating the complainant's non-consent and the appellant's knowledge or recklessness regarding it.

On appeal, S.W. challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment and reliance on the messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in the trial judge's reasoning or her application of legal principles regarding consent and credibility.

The applicants, charged with gang sexual assault and other offences, brought a constitutional challenge to the common law principle that a person cannot consent to the intentional infliction of bodily harm during sexual acts, including BDSM.

They argued this principle, particularly as affirmed in R. v. Zhao, violated their Charter rights to freedom of expression (s. 2(b)), liberty and security of the person (s. 7), and equality (s. 15).

The court dismissed the application, finding that violence is not a protected form of expression, that the right to liberty does not extend to inflicting bodily harm, and that BDSM is not an analogous ground for discrimination under s. 15.

The court upheld the common law principle as constitutional and justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The central issue on appeal concerned the proper use of an accused's mixed statement (containing both inculpatory and exculpatory elements) when introduced by the Crown, and when the accused subsequently testifies consistently with the exculpatory part.

The trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the exculpatory aspect of the out-of-court statements could not be used for their truth.

The Court of Appeal clarified that such mixed statements, when led by the Crown, are admissible for the truth of their contents, regardless of whether the accused later testifies consistently.

However, the jury must be cautioned against impermissible lines of reasoning, such as inferring truth from mere repetition or using the prior statement as independent corroboration.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's erroneous instruction and the resulting confusion and prejudice to the accused.

The appellant, R.K., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and an eight-year sentence.

The appeal raised nine grounds, including alleged errors in refusing production of the complainant's diary, improper use of the diary to enhance credibility, misapprehension of evidence, improper cross-examination on bad acts, overvaluing demeanour, improper corroboration by peripheral details, improper reliance on lack of motive to fabricate, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding both the conviction and the sentence, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and sentencing decision to be sound.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict was unreasonable due to inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and contradictions with other evidence, including her mother's testimony and forensic findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that it was for the jury to assess credibility and weigh evidence, especially considering the complainant's age.

The court found that the trial judge's post-verdict factual findings for sentencing (limiting the proven facts to a single incident of touching) did not render the jury's initial verdict unreasonable, as there was no demonstrable deliberate lie by the complainant.

The appellant, Jeffrey Visscher, appealed his convictions for assault and breaking and entering.

He abandoned the ground of appeal regarding unreasonable verdicts and proceeded solely on the ground that the trial judge made a legal error in assessing the credibility of the complainant and another witness.

The Court of Appeal found no such legal error and dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions.