Carter Martell

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and (b) were violated, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was adequately informed of the reasons for his arrest and the jeopardy he faced before speaking to duty counsel.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim due to a lack of evidentiary foundation and found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, which were supported by corroborating evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault against two complainants and uttering a threat, arguing trial unfairness arising from repeated judicial interventions and improper reliance on cross-count similar fact evidence.

The court held that the interventions, viewed individually and cumulatively, were aimed largely at fairness and efficiency and would not cause a reasonable observer to perceive bias or alignment with the prosecution.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court found the trial judge was entitled to conclude that the similarities between the two assaults strongly rebutted coincidence and supported the complainants' evidence on the central issue of consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Not Criminally Responsible by Reason of Mental Disorder (NCR) verdict entered in 2013 following a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated assault.

This was the applicant's second application for an extension of time, the first having been denied in 2016.

The applicant raised new grounds of appeal based on an allegedly uninformed plea and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court found a material change in circumstances warranting reconsideration and granted the extension of time, finding that the interests of justice favoured allowing the appeal to proceed despite the significant delay and prejudice to the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's jury charge relating to after-the-fact conduct evidence failed to properly equip the jury to decide the case according to law and the evidence.

The Crown presented extensive evidence of the appellant's conduct in the hours following the killing, including exchanges with neighbours, apparent attempts at concealment, admissions to friends, and various activities at commercial establishments.

The trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction restricting the jury's use of this evidence solely to the issue of intoxication and rational mindset, instead inviting the jury to consider it broadly in determining the appellant's mens rea for murder.

The trial judge also failed to address the risks of consciousness of guilt reasoning and invited the jury to infer callous disregard as evidence of intent to kill.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding three reversible errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Stephen Young’s appeal from his convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement, as well as his sentence appeal.

The court found that the trial judge’s credibility findings were entitled to deference and that the trial judge had properly addressed the evidentiary and credibility issues raised by the appellant.

The sentence of 5.5 years less presentence custody was found not to be unfit.

The appeal is subject to a publication ban under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the powers of police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle and its occupants under s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, 2017.

The respondent, a passenger, was acquitted at trial after the judge found his Charter rights under ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were infringed and excluded evidence of firearms found in the vehicle.

On appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred in concluding that the respondent’s rights under ss. 9 and 10(a) were violated, but agreed that s. 10(b) was breached.

The Court held that s. 12(3) of the CCA does not justify a general suspension of the right to counsel under s. 10(b), distinguishing the context from roadside sobriety stops.

The evidence was ultimately admitted, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Adriel Cyrus, sought to bifurcate his conviction and sentence appeals after being convicted of two counts of sexual assault and one count of uttering a threat, and being declared a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, per George J.A., dismissed the motion, finding no compelling reason to separate the appeals.

The court emphasized the efficiency and consistency of hearing both appeals together, referencing prior authority and the inefficiency of duplicating review of the trial record.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Osama Filli’s appeal from his conviction for manslaughter in the stabbing death of Nahom Berhane.

Filli, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder after trial, challenged the trial judge’s findings on self-defence, the use of mental health evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellate court found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the threat, the opportunity to retreat, or the use of mental health evidence, and held that the verdict was supported by the evidence and reasoning.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's text message as a spontaneous utterance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors and errors of law by improperly concluding that the parties agreed on the immediate timing of the text message, failing to consider the risk of "bootstrapping" (using the statement's content to prove its spontaneity), and not resolving conflicting evidence regarding the timing of the message.

The Court held that the text message was inadmissible hearsay and a prior consistent statement, and its improper admission materially affected the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility on both counts.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault and a Crown appeal from sentence.

The appellant challenged the conviction based on alleged errors in the trial judge’s reasoning, including the *Browne v. Dunn* rule and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings.

The Crown appealed the two-year less a day conditional sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court declined to interfere with the sentence, finding it was an exceptional case justified by the offender's remorse, commitment to rehabilitation, insight, and the severe family consequences of incarceration.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of various drug-related offences following a large-scale police investigation involving wiretaps, tracking warrants, and search warrants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing their pre-trial Garofoli applications challenging the constitutionality of the searches and interceptions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the application judge's assessment of the wiretap authorizations, the reliance on confidential informants, the refusal to excise certain information from the warrants, and the determinations regarding reasonable expectations of privacy in condominium units and common areas.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge sentence imposed on the respondent for assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and carrying a concealed weapon.

The respondent had attacked a pregnant dental clinic staff member with a knife.

The sentencing judge had imposed a conditional discharge, largely due to the respondent's 126 days of pre-trial custody and mental health issues.

The Superior Court found the sentencing judge erred by not giving sufficient weight to the victim's impact, failing to acknowledge aggravating factors (planning, weapon use), and misapplying the pre-trial custody credit in the context of a conditional discharge.

The court determined the conditional discharge was demonstrably unfit, set it aside, and imposed a sentence of 189 days custody (deemed served due to pre-trial custody with enhanced credit) and varied the probation order to include reporting and counselling conditions.

The appellant, Sukhchain Brar, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife, Gurpreet Brar.

He admitted the killing but sought a manslaughter conviction based on lack of mens rea or provocation.

The appeal raised constitutional challenges to s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code, which defines the partial defence of provocation, arguing it infringes s. 7 of the Charter by being arbitrary and overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding the purpose of the amendment was to limit provocation to serious unlawful conduct, not just to address "honour killings." The court also dismissed other non-constitutional grounds of appeal related to jury instructions on provocation, cultural/religious motive, ante-mortem statements, and after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant, convicted of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal addressed arguments that the appellant had abandoned his intent to import, that the importing offence was not complete because the cocaine was seized at customs, and that the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of duress.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, affirming that importing is complete upon physical entry with intent, even if customs seizes the drugs, distinguishing from controlled delivery scenarios.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 10-year sentence to be fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant, Jabir Khan, appealed his convictions for possessing a restricted firearm and occupying a vehicle with a firearm.

He argued that the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a s. 24(2) analysis regarding the firearm's exclusion and materially misapprehended evidence, leading to an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the s. 24(2) argument was inappropriately raised for the first time on appeal.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence, upholding the trial judge's thorough and compelling reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony due to its illogical nature and inconsistencies with audio surveillance and circumstantial evidence.

This appeal concerned convictions for second-degree murder and discharge of a firearm with intent.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's jury charge was unfair and unbalanced due to alleged errors in presenting evidence and failing to adequately relate evidence to the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions.

The court concluded that the charge, read as a whole, was fair and adequately conveyed the defence's position and the relevant legal principles, upholding the convictions.

Bradley MacGarvie and Thomas Nagy appealed their convictions for first- and second-degree murder, respectively.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct evidence, failing to adequately explain its relevance and possible inferences.

For Nagy, the trial judge also incorrectly defined the mental element for party liability for murder under a common unlawful purpose and failed to provide a decision tree, leading to jury confusion.

While the provocation defence was correctly rejected for MacGarvie, and the admission of Nagy's criminal record and lay opinion evidence was upheld, the errors in jury instructions were deemed sufficiently serious to warrant a new trial for both appellants.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession, making available, and making child pornography, raising four grounds: unfair trial due to admission of child pornography, undermined defence, breach of s. 10(b) Charter rights regarding right to counsel, and breach of s. 8 Charter rights regarding a strip search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, finding that the trial judge properly balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence, did not err in charging the jury, and correctly applied Charter principles regarding the right to counsel and the reasonableness of the strip search.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences, his dangerous offender designation, and his indeterminate sentence.

The appeal challenged the fairness of the trial due to the complainant's detention as a material witness and the assessment of her credibility.

It also contested the dangerous offender designation, arguing errors in defining "pattern" of behaviour and reliance on disputed facts, and the indeterminate sentence, asserting the trial judge erred by presuming indeterminate detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice or error in credibility assessment.

It upheld the dangerous offender designation.

While acknowledging the trial judge's error in principle regarding the indeterminate sentence by presuming it and conflating the designation and sentencing stages, the Court of Appeal re-sentenced the appellant and ultimately imposed the same indeterminate sentence, concluding that no lesser measure would adequately protect the public given the appellant's extensive criminal history, low prospects for treatability, and manageability issues, despite mitigating factors related to systemic anti-Black racism.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm, appealed his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings on causation were supported by evidence and the verdict was reasonable.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the three-year custodial sentence and three-year driving prohibition, finding the trial judge properly considered mitigating factors and collateral immigration consequences.